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Chapter 1
General Introduction
1.1     Introduction
This thesis deals with incentive and information problems of strategically interacting
firms. Since the seminal contributions of Spence (1973) and Akerlof (1970) the lit-
erature on problems of incentives and information has grown steadily. The growth
of information economics is reflected in the growth of the number of fields in which
its insights are applied. Among these fields are industrial organization, the theory
of regulation and procurement, the theory of banking, corporate finance, and pub-
lic economics. This thesis contributes to the field with the analysis of a problem of
optimal incentive regulation, and a problem of information and incentives in inno-
vation. These problems and their solutions are introduced in the remainder of this
introductory chapter.
In particular, the next section discusses the problem and contribution of the sec-
ond chapter. This chapter studies optimal incentive regulation and organization of an
industry for complementary inputs. Section 3 of this Introduction discusses the con-
tribution of the thesis's third chapter. These contributions are to the topic of strate-
gic information revelation and revenue sharing in races for an innovation. Section 4
discusses chapter 4, which studies strategic preannouncements and concealments in
innovative industries. Finally section 5 summarizes the structure of the thesis.
1.2 Regulating Complementary Inputs
The theory of optimal incentive regulation is relevant for both economic policy and
(applied) theory. It gives economic insights on basic regulatory problems, and it
contributes to the theory of information economics. In the next subsection we sketch
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the problem of regulating complementary inputs, while in the second subsection we
explain the main results from solving the problem.
1.2.1 Optimal Incentive Regulation
Since the 1980s many countries reformed the regulation of some of their industries.
This wave of reform stimulated not only a political, but also an economic debate
on regulation. In countries like the UK and US many industries were reorganized,
and sophisticated regulatory schemes were designed to give incentives to the firms
in the industry. For example, in the UK electricity and rail industries the network
has been separated from the generation of products that run through the network.
In the US telecommunications industry Ma Bell has been split up into long-distance
carrier AT&T and several local Baby Bells. Regulatory schemes range from cost-plus
contracts to price caps. Recently regulators start refining the sophistication of their
instruments. For example, the UK water regulator, Ian Byatt, publishes a league
table of service performance for the water supply companies each year. He observes
that:
"comparative competition may not make them quite like com-
panies subject to market competition. But it can goad them to
improved performance and the regulator has a responsibility to
ensure that it is channelled into fruitful areas." [Byatt (1997)]
UK electricity regulator Stephen Littlechild introduced a so-called yardstick on elec-
tricity purchase costs. This would  give the Regional Electricity Companies  (RECs):
"a sharper incentive to control their electricity purchase costs,
by limiting the amount of genemtion costs that they could pass
through to customers. [Littlechild] considered the possibility of
permitting the RECs to pass through to franchise customers only
some  type  of  'yardstick'  amount,   such  as  the average cost of
electricity purchased for franchise customers in England and
Wales." [Office of Electricity Regulation (1996)}
Although the yardstick has not been implemented in practice, it plays a role in "pro-
viding information and facilitating regulation." In the next subsection we will discuss
when these comparative regulatory schemes can be helpful for a regulator.
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A standard problem in incentive regulation is the mechanism design problem of
Baron and Myerson (1982). It derives the optimal regulatory scheme, consisting of
a per-unit price and a lump sum transfer, that a regulator should offer to a regu-
lated monopolist. Key elements of the problem are that there is a conflict of interest
between the regulator and the regulated firm, and that the monopolist has private,
non-verifiable information about his costs of production. Although the regulator can
commit to a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the firm, he should respect the existing infor-
mation asymmetry. Therefore he cannot do better than offering a regulatory scheme
that is compatible with the monopolist's incentives. The best feasible scheme is one
in which an efficient firm receives an informational rent, while it produces the efficient
amount of the good. An inefficient firm receives a transfer that is just big enough
to make it accept the offer, while it produces at a price higher than would be opti-
mal without information asymmetries. Inefficient firms produce less than would be
optimal without information asymmetry, to save informational rents for the efficient
firm. Such a distortion of the symmetric information scheme due to the presence of
asymmetric information is commonly observed in information economics.
The theory on optimal incentive regulation has blossomed since the seminal paper
by Baron and Myerson. Recent text books on regulation, such as Armstrong et al.
(1994), and Laffont and Tirole (1993), opened up many avenues for relevant research.
The second chapter is in line with this theoretical literature.
1.2.2   Contribution of Chapter 2
In chapter 2 we analyze a problem of optimal incentives in which more then one input
is needed to produce the final good.  For the production of products, such as electricity,
gas, and telephony, more inputs are needed to produce them. For electricity and gas
we need both generation and distribution, while for long-distance telephony services
we need both local and long-distance telephone services. The organization of the
industry is a crucial choice for a regulator who wants to optimize social welfare. In
chapter 2 of the thesis we study the choice between monopolistic and independent
input supply for a product that requires two inputs.
The introduction of more inputs in the industry introduces two opposing effects
to the analysis. Let us first introduce a second input supplier with production costs
identical to those of the incumbent supplier. The incumbent produces the first input,
while the second supplier produces the second input. Both inputs together create
an output. Production cost is private information to each input supplier, and costs
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are perfectly positively correlated. Is the regulator's optimal scheme for two identical
input suppliers similar to the scheme for one input supplier? No, in fact the regulator
can exploit correlation and competition between independent suppliers and extract all
rents. The seminal paper of Shleifer (1985) illustrates this. Although costs are private
information, the regulator can extract both suppliers' rents and implement the social
welfare maximizing scheme. He does this by offering the welfare maximizing scheme
whenever both input suppliers report equal costs, while he punishes both firms when
cost reports conflict. Each input supplier knows that both suppliers have the same
costs of production. Hence, if one supplier expects that the second supplier tells the
truth, it is best for himself to do the same.  This kind of competition is called yardstick
competition.  In case of perfect correlation between costs, the regulator only needs a
small punishment to implement the welfare maximizing outcome. For imperfect cost
correlation only imperfect inferences between suppliers are possible. But sufficiently
severe punishments for unlikely cost combinations can still implement the expected
welfare maximizing outcome. The regulator compares the suppliers' cost reports, and
fully extracts expected rents from suppliers by rewarding and punishing optimally on
basis of suppliers' relative cost position.
The regulator's possibilities to fully extract suppliers' rents depend on two crucial
factors. First, the regulator must be able to punish suppliers severely for some cost
combinations. Severe ez post punishments need however not be realistic. Often firms
are to some extent protected from severe punishments by limited liability law. In that
case full rent extraction need no longer be feasible to the regulator.
Second, the argument of full rent extraction depends on the assumption that one
supplier can infer something about the other supplier's cost after observing his own
cost. That is, this argument depends on the assumption that costs are correlated.
When costs are independently distributed, the yardstick competition effect disappears,
and can no longer help the regulator to extract any rents from the industry.  In
that case, competition between two suppliers only hinders the regulator's welfare
maximization. Because the inputs are complementary, prices are optimally set as a
function of both suppliers' cost report. This creates an informational externality for
independent input suppliers. In case input suppliers send cost reports independently,
the regulator has to give an informational rent to both efficient input suppliers to
prevent them from overstating their costs. Each independent input supplier can only
imperfectly anticipate the cost of the other supplier. An independent input supplier
does not internalize the externality that his report causes on the other supplier. When
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a monopolistic supplier knows both input's costs and coordinates his cost reports, the
supplier internalizes this informational externality, and the regulator economizes on
informational rents. The regulator only needs to pay rents to prevent overstatement
of one of the input's costs. Therefore, for independent retailing costs the regulator
extracts most rents from the input suppliers by letting them coordinate their cost
reports. This informational externality is discussed in more detail by Gilbert and
Riordan (1995).
In chapter 2 we apply the same line of argument to study the optimal incentive
regulation of complementary inputs.  A special feature of the model is that ex post
punishments are infeasible, because the input producers are limitedly liable for losses
they make. We give a characterization of the optimal regulatory scheme for any non-
negative correlation between costs. And derive which organization of input production
is optimizing expected social welfare. Given the line of argument of the previous two
paragraphs, the following optimal organization should no longer be surprising. For
sufficiently small correlation between costs, coordination between the input suppliers is
best, while for big cost correlation competition between the input suppliers is best for
expected social welfare. For substitutable products Dana (1993) analyzes an analogous
trade-off, and obtains qualitatively identical results. However, the optimal regulatory
schemes that implement the optimal organization of the industry differ substantially.
We show this in chapter 2.
1.3  RLD Race with Learning Laboratories
In the previous section we assumed that the regulator can precommit to a scheme for
an input supplier. This is a basic assumption we make in chapter 2. For a regula-
tor such a strong assumption concerning commitment could be realistic. For other
economic problems this assumption is too strong. In problems in which competing
firms reveal information to each other, credible commitment to a scheme need not
be realistic. We therefore drop the assumption on commitment in our analysis of
strategic information revelation in research and development (R.&D) races. In the
next subsection we describe the basics of the problem of chapter 3, while the second
subsection summarizes its main results.
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1.3.1 Revenue Sharing and Strategic Revelation
In some major US sports leagues, such as the Major League Baseball (MLB) and
the National Football League (NFL), teams share revenues. For example, in the
MLB the top 13 revenue-generating teams contribute US$ 10Om to the 15 teams with
lowest revenues. For the National Hockey League revenue sharing is a hot issue in
negotiations. Sports leagues share revenues between teams to create a level playing
field among their teams. A match between two teams is exciting, and attracts many
viewers, if the teams are of comparable strengths. Teams can achieve comparable
strengths by investing comparable sums of money in talent.  This is only possible
when revenue differences among teams were not too big. Revenue sharing is a way
to level the teams' revenue levels, and thereby attract more spectators and tv-money.
Besides that, revenue sharing has another effect. An individual team knows that if
it wins relatively much money, it has to share part of its revenues with a team of
relative small fortune.  If the team will perform badly, it knows that a strong team
will cover part of the costs. This anticipation gives teams incentives to invest less
in talent. That is, revenue sharing introduces free-rider effects among the league's
members, which lowers wasteful overinvestments in sports talent.
Revenue sharing could play a similar role for competing firms in innovative indus-
tries too. One adverse effect of revenue sharing among competing firms is, however,
that it could facilitate collusion among the firms. Therefore revenue sharing need
not be a realistic arrangement among competing firms. The study of the incentive
effects of revenue sharing should however be seen as a first step towards the study of
effects of patent scope on firms' incentives to invest in R.&D. A change in the revenue
share redistributes revenues between firms, while the expected total revenue remains
constant.  One call therefore focus attention on the redistributional effects of a change
in revenue share. A change of the patent scope has two effects on the industry. First,
it redistributes revenues between firms. But, second, it also affects the expected total
revenues of firms. This second effect should be incorporated in the analysis in order
to study the effect of patent scope on the firms' R&D investments. The analysis of
patent scope in R&D races awaits future research.
We study the effects of revenue sharing on incentives of firms that invest in research
as well as development. Firms learn from research in the sense that they receive an
imperfect, but informative signal about their costs of development after they invest
in research. This affects firms' incentives to invest and share learned information
greatly. The analysis of chapter 3 aims at understanding firms' incentives to invest in
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R&D. and incentives to reveal signals. We focus on the effect of revenue sharing on
investments and revelation.
Concerning information revelation there are two basic effects. For perfectly posi-
tively correlated development costs, one firm's signal gives his rival information about
his own development cost. When a firm reports that it found good news, then its rival
learns that its project is a good project too, and the rival becomes more optimistic
about development costs. Therefore a low-cost message encourages a rival firm to
invest in development. We call this effect the informational effect. An effect that
opposes the informational effect is the strategic effect. When a firm sends a low-cost
message, then its rival learns that this firm has low development cost and will invest
aggressively in development. This discourages the rival's investments. The informa-
tional effect gives firms an incentive to reveal only bad news, while the strategic effect
gives incentives in the opposite direction. For positively perfectly correlated develop-
ment costs the informational effect dominates the strategic effect in most cases. When
firms share part of their revenues with their rival, firms' incentives change.  For big
enough revenue share firms want to encourage their rival to invest in development.
Firms like to free-ride on the revenue that is generated by their rival's augmented in-
vestments. Therefore, given the predominance of the informational effect, firms want
to reveal only good news.
1.3.2   Contribution of Chapter 3
In chapter 3 we study an R&D race of two firms that work on the same project. Firms'
costs of investment are therefore perfectly positively correlated. When the project is
easy for one firm, it is easy for its rival too. This creates a big scope for a firm to
learn from its rival about its own cost.
A big difference between chapter 3 and the previous subsection is that neither of
the firms know initially whether they have good or bad information. How well a firm
is informed about its cost is determined endogenously by its information acquisition
investment.  Such a problem of firms that learn while doing R&D was first studied
by Choi (1991). Firms interact in an interesting manner because they can potentially
learn from each other. Therefore firms underinvest in acquiring information when the
acquired information is public. Each firm rather learns from its rival, than from its
own investments. Firms incentives to invest in information acquisition are increased
when they receive private signals. Firms can only rely on their own information.
This gives bigger incentives to invest in development and to acquire information. In
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chapter 3 the interrelation between firms' investment decisions and beliefs is exposed
in more detail.
What happens when a firm believes that its rival reports development costs truth-
fully? Then there is always a firm that wants to misrepresent its costs. When firms
share little of their revenue, a firm wants to discourage its rival's development invest-
ments. It therefore has an incentive to always report bad news. For high revenue
shares firms always want to report good news. When a firm believes the good news, it
is encouraged to invest in development, and its rival will take a free ride on the firms
increased investments. Analogous to Crawford and Sobel  (1982)  we can prove  that
since there is a conflict of interest between firms, information has a binary support,
and communication is costless, no relevant information will be send by a firm. Since
the sending firm has an incentive to misrepresent its costs, and it has no means to
make its report credible, the receiver cannot take any information from the sender
seriously. Each firm can therefore do no better than to ignore its rival's cost report,
and choose the development investment that maximize its ex ante expected profit.
This negative result depends on the non-verifiability of firms' information.  When a
firm's information is verifiable, it only has a choice between disclosing its information
or concealing it from its rival. In that case it is rational for its rival to be skeptical.
This means that for low (resp. high) revenue shares it expects to face the most (resp.
least) efficient firm with an incentive to conceal. This is consistent with a firm's
incentives to conceal information, and this makes it optimal for the firm to reveal its
costs completely. This unraveling result was discussed in the seminal contributions
on strategic disclosure of verifiable information by Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981),
and  Milgrom and Roberts  (1986). For intermediate revenue shares  both  low-  and
high-cost firms have an incentive to conceal costs in our setup. Therefore there are
no beliefs such that full disclosure is reached in equilibrium.
Both the incentives of firms to invest in R,&D and incentives to reveal information
are discussed in greater detail in chapter 3.
1.4 Disclosure Regulation and Correlation
In chapter 4 we study a problem that is similar to that of chapter 3. Again there
are two competing firms that invest in information acquisition, decide how much
to communicate to their rival, and invest in development. The interaction between
the informational and strategic effect plays a major role in chapter 4 too. In the
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preceding two sections we assumed that information is known to the informed party
with certainty. This resulted in powerful results concerning firms' incentives to reveal
and disclose their private information. In this section we show how these extreme
results break down when it is no longer certain whether or not a firm has private
information about its retailing costs.
1.4.1 Partial Information Disclosure
In many innovative, high-tech industries, firms actively manage expectations of cus-
tomers, investors, and competitors.  It is easy to find examples of information man-
agement in the popular press. For example, The Economist observes the following on
the management of biotech firms.
"Running a biotech company is like managing other high-growth
industries such as information technology, only worse. For
much of their jirst decade biotech firms live on promises rather
than products, white their bright ideas make their wai/ through
pre-clinical  and clinical trials. Sustaining  investors'  and  em-
Plovees' enthusiasm is a daunting task." [The Economist "Eu-
ropean Biotech: Management Shortfall", 18/07/19981
Firms can affect expectations of other agents in the industry by concealing or announc-
ing information. The preannouncement of a new product could make customers,
investors and competitors more optimistic about the potential introduction of the
product in the market. In the industry for video game consoles, for example, Oliver
Burkeman reports about Sony and Nintendo's product preannouncements after Sega's
recent introduction of a new console:
"Few details of either machine, a successor to Sony's PlaySta-
tion, (...)  and a new Nintendo console (...), have been made
public yet.  And in an industry noted for its obsessive deploy-
ment of blulT, counter-blu# and spoiling tactics, the battle lines
are unlikely to be clear for some time yet."  [The Guardian
"Mortal Combat", G2-Europe, 03/09/1999]
In other instances it would be better for firms if they concealed intermediate successes
on innovations. Product concealment would be a strategy for firms that work on
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intermediate innovations that are also useful for their rivals. The strategies of firms
in a high-tech industry do not only concern the amount of money to invest and the
direction in which research should proceed, but also what information to announce,
and what to conceal. A general lesson from this brief introduction to the issue, drawn
by The Economist, is that:
" The lesson for the bosses of Britain's current bmed of high-tech
companies is that in addition to their scientijic and financial
skills, there is another vital skill they need - that of managing
expectations." [The Economist "Biotech Blooms", 25/05/19961
In chapter 4 we study in more detail how active expectation management affects firms'
investments in research and development.
Seminal contributions on strategic disclosure of verifiable information are Gross-
man (1981), Milgrom (1981), and Milgrom and Roberts (1986). A basic property of
their problems is that it is known that the sender of information is informed, and
information is costlessly verifiable. The basic result here is that the uniformed party
(the receiver) forms sceptical equilibrium beliefs, that forces the sender to fully dis-
close his information in equilibrium. If the receiver expects the worst consistent with
the sender's disclosure, this is consistent with the sender's incentives to disclose and
conceal information, and given these beliefs it is best to disclose. This powerful result
is called the "unraveling result". In Okuno-Fujiwara et at.  (1990) suflicient conditions
for the unraveling result between competing parties are found.
The unraveling result is weakened by the introduction of uncertainty about whether
or not the sender is informed. Although information is still verifiable, it is no longer
verifiable whether or not the sender is informed. This uncertainty disables the un-
raveling result in most cases. Austen-Smith (1994) shows that when the receiver is
uncertain about the informedness of the sender, the sender can conceal some of his in-
formation in equilibrium. Typically, uncertainty about the informedness of the sender
enables an informed sender with bad information to pool with his uninformed coun-
terpart. In equilibrium only partial disclosure occurs. Good news is disclosed while
bad news is concealed from the financial market. This argument is generalized and
refined by Shin (1994). Recently Krishnan et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence
that firms partially disclose earnings information to the financial market. We will use
a similar framework of uncertain informedness to study strategic disclosure by racing
R&D laboratories.
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The approach of chapter 4 is to assume that firms do not always learn.  It is
therefore not known whether or not firms are informed. When a firm discloses its
information, this is verifiable, but when a firms claims to be uninformed, this is not
verifiable. Uncertainty about a firm's informedness causes a break-down of the unrav-
eling result, because an informed firm that does not want to disclose its information
can pool with the uninformed firms.
In the fourth chapter of this thesis we apply and extend this basic economic insight
in a dynamic model of R&D competition.  We give an overview in the next subsection.
1.4.2   Contribution of Chapter 4
In chapter 4 of this thesis research laboratories partially disclose information too.
However the conditions under which partial disclosure occurs, and the kind of infor-
mation that is eventually disclosed are sensitive to the particular context in which
firms operate. There are two main causes for this.
First, there is strategic interaction between the sender and receiver after informa-
tion exchange. Firms disclose and conceal information in anticipation of the effects
that the disclosure and concealment will have on later competition. Competing firms
have in general an incentive to make their rival as pessimistic about his possibili-
ties of successfully completing his innovation. When firms can learn most from each
other, i.e. future costs are perfectly correlated, they have an incentive to make their
rival as pessimistic as possible about their discoveries. Firms disclose bad news and
conceal good news in general. But since firms interact strategically, there are also
extreme cases in which firms have an incentive to unilaterally disclose good, or con-
ceal bad information to manipulate their rival's beliefs. When firms' future costs are
not related to each other, i.e. future costs are independent, then firms make their
rival pessimistic about his future potential by disclosing good news about themselves.
This means that correlation between development costs crucially affects the contents
of firms' disclosures. Cost correlation is the first main topic of the fourth chapter.
Second, not only do disclosure and concealment of information affect future com-
petition, but it also affects firms' incentives to acquire information. The uncertainty
of being informed is determined by firms' information acquisition investments. The
incentives to acquire information are affected by the correlation between development
costs, and disclosure regulation. We compare two regimes of information disclosure.
In the first firms are required to disclose information. Under that regime firms with
perfectly correlated development costs free-ride on each other's information as in chap-
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ter 3. Consequently, firms acquire less information than is efficient. Under voluntary
disclosure firms partially disclose. Firms with perfectly correlated costs have to rely
more on themselves for information, which increases their incentives to acquire in-
formation. For firms with identical independently distributed development costs we
observe different effects. First, under mandated disclosure firms cannot learn from
their rival about own costs of development. Consequently there are no free-rider in-
centives for information acquisition. Generically firms have an incentive to overinvest
in information acquisition, while under voluntary disclosure firms' equilibrium infor-
mation acquisition investments are even bigger. The effects of disclosure regulation
on firms' incentives to invest in R&D are studied in chapter 4 in greater detail.
These are the main contributions, and will be the main parts of the discussion in
chapter 4.
1.5    Organization of the thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows.  Part I, that consists of chapter
2, presents a problem of regulating complementary input supply. It analyzes how
limited liability and cost correlation affect the optimal organization of an industry in
which complementary inputs are produced.  Part II consists of two chapters on incen-
tive problems in dynamic research and development competition. Incentive problems
occur in the acquisition and revelation of information, and in the development of
the innovation. In the first chapter, i.e. chapter 3, our focus is on the effects of
revenue sharing and strategic information revelation on investments in research and
development.  Part II closes with chapter 4 that focuses on the effects of disclosure
regulation and cost correlation on firms' R.&D investments and information disclosure.
The chapters of this thesis can be read independently from each other.
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Introduction to Part I
In this part of the thesis we analyze a problem of optimal regulatory design.  Key
feature of the problem is that there is asymmetric information between the regulator
and the industry on the costs of production. Because firms have superior information
and different interests than the regulator, the regulator has to give firms financial in-
centives to make them produce optimally. The industry produces two complementary
goods. The regulatory problem is to organize the industry such that firms' incentives
for truthful information revelation and participation are obtained at minimal social
cost. The regulator chooses between a monopolist who produces two products, and
two independent producers who produce one product each. Besides the organization
of the industry, the regulator chooses subsidies and the probability with which the
final product is produced.
For the choice between monopolistic and independent production the regulator
trades off two effects.  On the one hand the regulator can save information rents
by comparing the cost reports of two independent firms, and making the regulatory
instruments dependent on this comparison. When the costs are correlated, the cost of
one firm gives an indication of the costs of the other firm. In that case the regulator
can economize on a part of the subsidy. The stronger the correlation, the sharper the
indication that costs give about each other, and the more subsidy can be saved. We
call this effect the yardstick competition effect. Because a monopolist can coordinate
his cost reports, incentives based on a cost comparison are useless.  On the other
hand the regulator can save subsidies because a monopolistic producer can coordinate
his cost reports. When independent producers overstate their costs, they cause an
externality on each other.  If it would be known that one firm overstates its cost,
the other firm would have a lower incentive to overstate its cost too. Independent
firms cannot coordinate their reports in such a way, and they need higher subsidies
to overcome this externality. A monopolistic producer internalizes this externality,
which saves subsidies for the regulator. We call this the internalization effect. Both
the cost correlation and the firms' liability affect the trade-off between these two
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effects. A regulated industry with limitedly liable firms is optimally organized as
follows. For low correlation the regulator chooses monopolistic production, because
the internalization effect dominates, while for high correlation independent producers
are better for welfare. In chapter 2 we discuss these two effects in more detail, and




In most regulated industries the production of final output requires the production
of more than one input. For example, for public utilities production and distribution
are two distinct activities. In the telecom industry long-distance and local telephony
services can be distinguished. Moreover, these inputs are perfectly complementary
goods that are used in fixed proportions to produce the final output. Traditionally,
final output is supplied by a regulated monopolist that produces both inputs. In
the 1980s and 199Os, several countries decided to break up some of these monopolies.
For example, in the US telecommunication market the long-distance telephony supply
was separated from local telephony supply, and the supply of local telephone services
was delegated to local monopolies. The new AT&T provides long-distance services
and several Baby Bells serve the local markets.1  In many European countries the
incumbent PTTs still provide both local and long-distance telephone services.
In this setting a regulator faces the following organizational choice. Either all
inputs are produced by one multi-product monopolist, or each input is produced by
an independent input producer. A change of the industry's organization changes
incentives of the industry's firms. The regulator can use this fact by choosing the
firm's organizational structure such that the producers' incentives are best suited for
maximizing social welfare. This regulatory choice is studied in this chapter.
We abstract from technological reasons for choosing a certain organization of in-
put supply.  If the regulator would be fully informed about the inputs' production
costs, and if he would have enough regulatory instruments, the firm's organizational
i The 1996 Telecommunications Act has allowed the Baby Bell in the long-distance telecom market,
but this has not effectively changed the market structure so far.
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structure would not matter. However, in a more realistic setting, the regulator is not
completely informed about the input producers' costs. In order to receive truthful
cost messages from the input supplier(s), the regulator has to pay the supplier(s) so-
cially costly informational rents. To economize on these transfers, the regulator must
commit to refrain from production in more states of nature than would otherwise be
socially desirable. In the second-best solution, the regulator trades off the social cost
of transfers against allocative efficiency.  In such a situation the organization of input
supply matters.
There are two conflicting effects at work. First, there is the "informational exter-
nality" effect, which is studied by Baron and Besanko (1992) and Gilbert and Riordan
(1995). When one producer overstates his cost, this decreases the other producer's
incentive to overstate his cost. Since independent input suppliers do not learn each
other's cost message at the moment of message sending, the input producers are not
able to correct their messages for this externality. Under monopolistic input supply
the monopolist internalizes this externality. This gives the monopolist less incentives
to overstate the individual input production costs. Therefore, the regulator saves
informational rents by choosing monopolistic input supply. Second, there is the yard-
stick competition effect, as studied by Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Shleifer (1985).
When production of the two inputs requires comparable technologies, the costs for
providing these inputs is likely to be correlated. In that case, under independent in-
put production each producer's cost message to the regulator gives some information
about the other producer's cost. The regulator can exploit this fact by punishing the
producers for sending messages that give unlikely cost combinations and by rewarding
more likely ones. Thereby the regulator can extract some of the producers' surplus.
Because a monopolistic input supplier can coordinate his cost messages, such a scheme
does not work under monopolistic input supply.
Dana (1993) studies a similar organizational problem in a model where the goods
supplied are substitutes. The paper by Dana shows that for low enough correlation
coefficients, monopolistic input supply is the regulator's optimal choice. For all other
values of the correlation coefficient the yardstick competition effect still dominates.
As we observed, there are important regulated industries in which the goods supplied
are complements. In this chapter we study the optimal regulatory scheme for these
industries both under monopolistic and independent input supply. We show that a
similar result holds true for an industry with perfectly complementary goods. The
regulatory schemes that underpin the optimal organization of input supply, however,
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are quite different  from  that  in  Dana  ( 1993). When inputs are needed in fixed  pro-
portions to produce the output, it would be socially wasteful to choose a regulatory
scheme that does not respect these proportions. This means that quantity discrimi-
nation between independent input suppliers is not desirable. Therefore the regulator
must rely more on the transfers to discriminate between independent suppliers.
The optimal regulatory scheme under independent input supply differs from that
under monopolistic supply. Especially for highly correlated costs the optimal scheme
under independent input supply is not monotonous in total costs, and, therefore, not
feasible under monopolistic input supply. This then gives rise to the yardstick com-
petition effect. The occurrence of the yardstick competition effect depends on the
regulator's possibility of punishing producers for sending unlikely (and unfavorable)
cost messages. The regulator punishes a producer by letting him earn low profits
or even suffer losses in some instances. The extent to which the regulator can force
producers to suffer losses depends on the extent to which producers are protected
by liability rules. We say that a producer's liability is limited when that producer
cannot be forced to bear realized losses as a consequence of participating in the reg-
ulatory contract. This definition corresponds to limited zero-liability contracts as in
Sappington (1983) and imposes an ex post participation constraint on the regulatory
contract.
When producers have unlimited liability, they can be forced to bear ex post losses.
Both CrOmer and McLean (1985) and Demski and Sappington (1984) show that, un-
der assumptions similar to ours - risk-neutral regulator and producers, positively
correlated costs, and a binary support for the producers' state variables - the reg-
ulator call achieve the first-best solution under independent input supply.2 He does
this by punishing both producers severely in unlikely cost states. Under monopo-
listic input supply, he can only reach a second-best solution (Baron and Myerson,
1982). That is, under unlimited liability, the yardstick competition effect dominates
the "informational externality" effect for all positive correlation coefficients.
In order to fully extract producers' rents, the regulator must force the producers to
bear ez post losses for unlikely cost combinations. For small, but positive correlation
between the costs, the scheme that implements the first-best solution relies on severe
2These models study full rent extraction when products are substitutes. Similar optimal schemes
are applicable when products are complementary. An exception to this regularity is the model
described by Auriol and Laffont   ( 1992).     In that model the first-best solution   is not reached   for
intermediate degrees of correlation because it contains an independently distributed cost component,
besides a correlated one.
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ez post losses. When producers are protected by limited liability, they cannot be
forced to bear such losses. In that case the smaller the correlation between costs, the
bigger the extent to which the regulatory scheme differs from the full rent extracting
scheme. Therefore, the smaller the cost correlation, the smaller the extracted rents,
and the weaker the yardstick competition effect.
If costs are independently distributed, there is no yardstick competition effect,
while the "informational externality" effect still holds. Then under both limited and
unlimited liability, monopolistic input supply is the best organizational choice for a
regulator. This is illustrated in Baron and Besanko (1992) and Gilbert and Riordan
(1995), respectively.
If costs are perfectly correlated, the distinction between limited and unlimited lia-
bility disappears. In this situation the yardstick competition effect clearly dominates
the "informational externality" effect. Moore (1992) shows that the first-best can be
uniquely implemented under independent input supply. 3
Recent studies analyze the optimal organization of regulated industries in different
settings. Severinov (1997) studies how the optimal industrial organization of firms
with independently distributed private information on production costs depend on
the substitutability of products. Iossa (1999) studies optimal organization in a model
in which firms have private information about a demand intercept. Jeon (1998), and
Laffont and Martimort (1997) endogenize the cost of independent input supply by
considering collusion between agents. And Dalen (1998) compares firms' incentives
to invest in process innovation in a setting with correlated private cost information.
The chapter is organized as follows. The model of optimal organizational choice is
described in section 2. In section 3 we derive the equilibrium choices of the regulator
and the input producers given the choice on the organization of input production. A
comparison between monopolistic and independent input supply is made in section 4.
Section 5 concludes the chapter.
2.2 The Model
The players of the regulation game are the regulator, and the production units of
input 1 and 2. The production of one unit of an indivisible output with social value
3In order to obtain uniqueness, multi-stage mechanisms in combination with the subgame perfect
equilibrium refinement are necessary. Multi-stage mechanisms are not studied in this paper. Nalebuff
and Stiglitz (1983) and Shleifer (1985) show that the truth-telling first-best is one of the equilibria
of the optimal mechanism.
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V requires the supply of one unit of input 1 and one unit of input 2.  The cost of
producing input i, 8, (i = 1,2), can be either high, 8, or low, 2, with 0 < 2 < 8.
The players play a 5-stage game with incomplete information. Chronologically, the
following choices are made.
In the first stage of the game the regulator chooses either monopolistic or indepen-
dent input supply. This decision induces two subgames: the subgame after choosing
monopolistic input supply, and the subgame for independent input supply. These
subgames are defined in the remainder of this section.
In the monopotistic input supply (MIS) subgame, the regulator sets a transfer
scheme T :  {22,2 + 8,28}  -+ 32 that specifies the transfer from the regulator to the
monopolist in case the monopolist's report on total cost of production is 22,2+8
and 28, respectively. The transfer is not conditional on whether or not production
AM .takes place. Fbrthermore, the regulator lets production occur with probability v
{22,0 + 0,20} - [0,1].4
Nature chooses the costs for producing input 1 and 2 in the third stage of the game
by drawing these costs from a symmetric probability density. The prior probabilities
are  shown in Table  2.1.     In this table we depict prior probabilities  Pr[81,02],   for
81,82 E {2,0 ·
01
il.*M
, 11:  '1  11'
[Table 2.1: prior probabilities]
LH 2
Note that the correlation coefficient  is  p = (pf+5)(p-M+q, I This means that  when
q = v/FiIH- the production costs of the inputs are independently drawn from the
distribution. When q=0 there is perfect positive correlation between the production
4 It  sufiices to focus attention  to a regulatory scheme that depends on total reported costs  G  =
81 + 82 only, since the inputs are perfect complements. Because the inputs are produced in fixed
proportion, the incentives of the regulator as well as the monopolist are symmetric in the components'
costs. If the regulator would offer an asymmetic scheme, either the monopolist, or himself would be
better off choosing only one of the schemes for (2,0) as well  as  (e, 2). The regulator can therefore do
no better than offering a scheme that is symmetric in cost reports.
In  a  model with divisible output, choosing  QM (.) would be regulation of quantities.    In a fully
regulated industry regulated quantity is in a one-to-one relation to price through consumers' demand.
Then  regulation of QI (.) is equivalent to price regulation.   Due to the linearity of the present model,
it is optimal for the regulator to either require or forbid production with probability one.
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costs of the inputs. We assume that P 2 0,o r 0<q s v*LPH-. The monopolist
learns the production costs of both inputs, 01 and 82·The regulator is not informed
about the production costs of input 1 and 2.
Due to the revelation principle (e.g. see Myerson 1982, Proposition 2), the regu-
lator can focus on direct revelation mechanisms without loss of generality. Given the
regulatory scheme, the monopolist sends a message about his total cost to the regula-
tor in the fourth stage of the game. The monopolist sends message e €  {22, Gte, 20},
and the regulator's instruments are a function of these messages,  {T(e),QM(e)}.
Given these instruments and his cost message, the monopolist decides whether or
not to participate in the regulatory scheme in the fifth stage of the game. In case he
decides not to participate, he gets zero profits. Whenever the monopolist chooses to
participate, the scheme is implemented in the last stage of the game.
Given the regulator's first-stage choices, and the second-stage private information,
the monopolist maximizes his expected profit. The regulator maximizes expected
social welfare, which is defined as the sum of total expected profits and the net
consumers' surplus, allowing for distributional distortions caused by taxes.  If the
monopolist participates in the scheme, then social welfare is defined as:
WA,(e, e) = vQA, (e)- (i + MT(e) + .(e, e)
where V is the social value of the produced output, A represents the social cost of
public funds,5 and the monopolist's expected profit is:
II( , e) = T( ) - eQA, ( ),
with e, e e {22,Gte,20}.
In the independent input supply (IIS) subgame, the regulator sets a transfer scheme
(tl, 12)  :  {2,8}  X  {2, 8}  --*  32  x  R with transfers  from the regulator  to the producer
of input 1 and 2, respectively. Furthermore he chooses a probability of production
QI  :  {0, 8} x {2,8}  -+  [0,11. The input production costs are drawn from the same prior
probability distribution as under MIS. Each producer is privately informed about his
own cost, while communication between the two input producers about their costs is
not possible. The regulator is not informed about the production costs of input 1 and
2. Given the regulatory scheme, the input producers simultaneously send a message
about their costs to the regulator in the fourth stage of the game. Input producer i
5 In some other models of regulatory economics, e.g. Baron and  ,Iverson (1982), social welfare
is defined as the weighted sum of consumers' surplus and industry's profits, W = VQ + aH, with
0 5 a<1. Such specification gives similar qualitative results.
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sends message 8, for i = 1,2, and the regulator's instruments are a function of these
messages, {ti(8), t2(8), QI(8)}, where 8 = (01,82) E {2,0} x {2,8}
In the fifth stage of the game the input producers learn each others' costs and
decide whether or not to participate in the regulatory scheme. This stage reflects
the producers' limited liability. Unlimitedly liable producers would have to make
their participation decision in the third stage of the game on basis of interim profit
evaluation.  If one input producer decides not to participate, both producers receive
zero profit; if both input producers choose to participate, the regulatory scheme is
implemented.
Given the regulator's first-stage choices and the second-stage private information,
each input producer maximizes his expected profit.  If both input producers participate
in the scheme, social welfare is defined as:
WI(8, 0) = VQI(0) - (1 + A)[tl(8) + t2(8)1 + I71'1(8, 0) + 71'2(0,8)1,
and  firm i's expected profit  is:
4(8,0) = t,(0) - 0,QI(8), with 0 = (01,82) and i = 1,2.
A sketch the timing of the game is depicted in Table 2.2. Denote the monopolist
by M, and independent input supplier 1 (resp. 2) by Il (resp. I2).
t = 1.1   Regulator: MIS Regulator: IIS
t == 1.2 Regulator: Regulator:
<T(.),QMC )3 {tl( ),t2(.),QI(.)}
t=2 M learns costs: Il learns cost 01 6 {2,8}
(ei,0 )  e {2,0}2 I2 learns cost 02 E {2,8}
t=3 M sends message: Ilsends message:  81 E  0, 0}
  E  {22,2 + 0,20} I2 sends message:  82 E {0,8}
t=4 Il,I2 learn each others costs
Il,I2 accept/reject scheme
t = 5 Implement scheme Implement scheme
[Table 2.2: sequence of moves}
We solve the game backwards. In the next section we solve the game up to the
regulator's industrial organization choice. Section 4 closes the 1IlOdel's analysis by
characterizing the optimal organizational choice for the regulator.
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2.3   Solving the Subgames
In this section we study the equilibrium strategies of the regulator and input pro-
ducer(s) given the organization of input supply  In the first subsection we characterize
the equilibrium strategies under monopolistic input supply. The second subsection
characterizes the equilibrium strategies under independent input supply. All proofs
are relegated to the Appendix.
2.3.1 Monopolistic Input Supply (MIS)
The regulatory problem under MIS is similar to that in Baron and Myerson (1982).




n(e, e) 2 H(6, e) (2.1)
II(e, e) 2 0, for all e, 6 E {22,2 + 0,20}. (2.2)
Inequality (2.1) is the incentive compatibility constraint, which states that it is op-
timal for the monopolist to reveal its true costs. Inequality (2.2) is the monopolist's
participation constraint. A regulatory scheme that satisfies both (2.1) and (2.2), is
called feasible. In this standard setting the regulatory instrument scheme is feasible
if and only if the probability with which production occurs is non-increasing in the
monopolist's cost message, i.e., 0 5 QM(28) S QA,(2 + 8) S QM(22) S 1.
Given a non-increasing probability of the production scheme, we can easily derive
the optimal transfers.
Lemma 2.1 For MIS the optimal transfers are such that they reimburse the monop-
olist's  expected  cost  and give  him  an  informational  rent  that  is  non-increasing  in  his
Costs:
T(c) = eQM(e) + (0 -2) Z QM(e), fore e {22,2 + 8,28}
e>e
Analogous to Baron and Myerson (1982), this second-best transfer scheme is non-
increasing in the monopolist's cost message.
2.3.  Solving the Subgames                                                      27
After substituting for the optimal transfers in the expected welfare function, the
maximization problem becomes:
max. {QA,(28)pHwit'(20)  + QA,(2 + 0)2qwA,(2 + 0) + QM (28)pLWAI (20)}
{QM(.)}
S.t. 0 s QM (2#) S QA,(2 + 0 5 QM(22) 5 1,
with
wAI(e)=v-(1+ AK)-A (8-2), for e € {22,2 + 4,2#},Pr[01 + 82 < el -Pr[81 + 82 = e]
the "virtual welfare" at cost e, i.e., the social value of the output minus the social
costs of production minus informational rents. Because informational rents are non-
negative, the second-best probabilities of production are such that in some cases
production does not occur despite the fact that it would be desirable in the first-best.
The probability scheme trades off allocative efficiency and informational rent saving.
It is easily verified that the tivirtual welfare" is non-increasing in production costs
for probabilities q that exceed the critical value:
"' -  210'i   '1 )
At the optimum, production takes place whenever the "virtual welfare" is non-negative,
which gives a non-increasing probability scheme.  This is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2 For MIS and q 2 qM, production takes place with certainty whenever
the "virtual welfare" is positive, and there  is  no production otherwise:
QA<Ce) -< Lifu,M(e) 20 'foT e €{22,2+0,28}l 0, otherwise
For lower values of q (high correlation) the "virtual welfare"  is no longer monotonous
in costs, since wAI (2 + 8) < wA,(28). Analogous to Myerson (1981) the solution is
found by equalizing the probabilities of production for costs (2 + 0) and 20, and
maximizing expected welfare given that constraint. This is stated in the following
lemma.
Lemma 2.3 For MIS and q < qM, (i) if both production units have low costs, pro-
duction takes place with certainty whenever the "virtual welfare"   is   positiue:
QAI(22) =  
1, ifwA,(22) 2 0
0, otherwise,
28 Regulating Complementary Inputs
(ii) for other cost combinations, production takes place with certainty whenever the
conditional expected   "virtual  welfare"  of production,  given  at  least  one  high  cost  pro-
duction unit, is positive:
QA'(2 + 0) = QA, (20) =     '  ff    (  + 0) + pHWA'(28) 2 0
In the next subsection we analyze the optimal regulatory scheme under indepen-
dent input supply.
2.3.2 Independent Input Supply (IIS)
The regulatory problem under IIS is related to that in Dana (1993). While Dana
studies an industry with substitutable inputs, we study complementary input supply.
Since the inputs are needed in fixed proportions to produce the output, it would be
socially wasteful to choose discriminatory probabilities of production. This reduces
the number of instruments that the regulator can use effectively. The regulator solves




Ee,{lri(0,8)} 2 Ee, {7ri[(Oi, Bj), 81},  for all ij = 1,2, j ti, (2.3)
and 81, 8, E {2,8}
lr,(0,0) 20, foralli=1,2, and 81,02 E {2,8} (2.4)
Inequalities (2.3) are the input producers' incentive compatibility constraints. The
regulatory instruments induce truthful cost revelation in Bayesian equilibrium. Re-
striction (2.4) is the ez post participation constraint.  Due to the limited liability
assumption, an input producer must receive non-negative profits in all states of na-
ture to induce his participation.
The regulator must give a low-cost input producer an informational rent that
eliminates the producer's incentive to overstate his cost. Also for this problem there
is a critical value, 4, above which the "virtual welfare" is non-increasing in total
production costs. This critical value is equal to:
'I =  ,/0{VI''H (1 + A + 711+8- VP" l--r) f
6 1\ -/1 + JA) 1
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Notice  that  qI   S   f(1 - PH).6 For q k qL (relatively low correlation between producers'
costs) the transfer scheme is similar to the monopolistic input supply scheme, which
is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1  For IIS and q 2 qI the optimal transfers are such that they reim-
burse the producers' expected costs and they give an informational rent to each tow-cost
producer:
t1  1, 2  = 81QI(81,02) + 0 - 2)  E  QI(81,82), for 81,82 E {2,0}.
81>01
Producer 2 receives similar transfers.
These transfers do not implement truth-telling in a unique Bayesian equilibrium.
For each producer with low cost, 2, the transfer scheme makes him indifferent between
truth-telling and cost overstating, irrespective of the other producer's message sending
strategy.  We can avoid "bad" equilibria and approximately maintain the optimal
expected welfare level by slightly changing the regulatory scheme. This is stated in
the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2 Dejine AG =8-2.  For IIS and q 2 q I the regulator can stay
arbitmrily close to the optimal welfare level and induce truthful revelation of the pro-
ducers' costs  as a (interim) dominant strategies Bayesian equilibrium, by making the
following changes to the optimal regulatory scheme.
Increase t (2,8),  #(8,4)  t2(2, 8)  and t2(8,2) with E > 0, and take 6 > 0.
(i) If QI(.) = 0, choose Q'(2,2)  = 2( 6 + 6)  and Q'(2, -0) = QI(-8,2)  =  * + b.
(ii) If only Q'(2,2)  = 1, choose QI(2,0)  = QI(8,2)  =    + 6.
(iii) If only QI (8, #) =0, choose QI(2, 8) = QI(8,2) =1- (  + 6).
(iv) If QI(.) = 1, choose QI(2,8) = QI(8,2) = 1-(42+8) and Q/(0, e) = 1-2( +6)
For lower q (high correlation) the regulator rewards producers by paying them
informational rents only if they both report low costs, but not otherwise. This gives
the producers optimal incentives to reveal their costs. This is stated by the following
proposition.
6Since q/ increases in A, it suffices to check whether  lim qI = 477( 4278 - 3*p-)  S
A-OC
i(1 - PH).  That is, *[34PH(PH + 8) - (4 + 5PH)1 5 0 Since this function increases in PH, and
for PH  =  1 the function equals  0,  qi  5   (1  - PH) is established.   Note  that  q  <  qi  S  1(1 - PH),is
equivalent  to  q  <pt
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Proposition 2.3  For IIS and q < q'  the optimal transfers reimburse each producer's
expected cost and give an informational rent only if both producers report tow produc-
tion costs:
t1(2,2)    =   GQI(2,2) +(0- 2)[QI(8,2) + 1. QI(0,8)1
P"
t1 81, 02) = 01QI(81,82 , r (81,02)96(2,2).
Producer 2 receives similar transfers.
These transfers do not implement truth-telling in an (interim) dominant strategy
Bayesian equilibrium. Moreover, dominance cannot be obtained by means of arbitrary
small changes in the regulatory scheme. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2.4 For IIS and q < qI an arbitrary small change in the optimal regu-
tatory scheme does not give truth-telling as a Bayesian equilibrium in (interim) dom-
inant strategies whenever QI(0,8) > 0.
Since a Bayesian equilibrium cannot be obtained in dominant strategies, the cost
messages that producers send to the regulator will depend on their expectations about
the other producer's cost message strategy. This problem could be overcome by using
non-direct revealing mechanisms, as in Moore (1992).
Propositions 2.2 and 2.4 imply that the possibility of implementation of the optimal
expected welfare level by dominant strategies, depends on q. Whenever producers'
costs are only slightly correlated, implementation in dominant strategies is possible.
For highly correlated costs, this is no longer the case.
After substituting the optimal transfers in the regulator's optimization problem
and observing that this problem is symmetric in probabilities QI(2, 0)  and QI(8, 2),
we obtain the following optimization problem:
max. {Q (28)PHw,(e, e) + QI(2+ e)q[w'(2,0) + w'(0,0)1 + Q'(22)wl(2,2)}
{Q,(.)}
s.t.  0 5 Q'(81 + 02) 51, for 81,82 E {2,8},
where
-       -            72=.Pr[Bi< Oi, 8· = 8· ]  -W'(8)=V-(1+ A)(81 + 82)- A- I -  3      J  (0 - 2)
PrIe = 0]
is the "virtual welfare" at costs (81,82) under independent input supply   Due  to
symmetry w'(2,8) = w'(#,2), which makes  wl ( . ) a function of total costs only. Given
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the optimal transfer scheme of independent input supply, incentive constraints do not
put any restriction upon the probabilities of production. Under monopolistic input
supply the probability scheme was required to be non-increasing in total costs.
It is easy to check that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 2.5  For IIS the optimal probabilities of production are such that pro-
duction takes place with certainty whenever the virtual value of welfare is positive:
Q'(01 + 02) = f , for 01,02 E {2,8}1,  if w'(81 + 82)  2 0l 0, otherwise
For small values of q (q < qI, high correlation) monotonicity of w'(.) breaks down.
In that case, the optimal QI(.) is no longer monotonous in total production costs. By
making QI(2 + 8) smaller than  QI (20) the regulator saves informational rents. Under
IIS the regulator chooses a probability of production scheme that is not feasible under
MIS. Therefore the choice for IIS enables the regulator to save more rents than under
MIS.
The optimal transfer and probability of production schemes differ from those ob-
tained in the substitutable products case studied by Dana (1993). As we noted before,
it is not optimal to choose discriminatory probabilities of production when inputs are
perfect complements. Because of this, the regulator has to rely more on the transfers
to discriminate between input producers. He does this especially when cost correla-
tion becomes high, i.e.  q < qI, by shifting all informational rents to the (2,2) state of
nature, which does not happen in Dana (1993).
When the producers have unlimited liability and costs are positively correlated, the
first-best expected welfare can be implemented, see e.g. CrOmer and McLean (1985).
This requires a regulatory scheme with large ex post punishments and rewards for
low degrees of correlation. For firms that are protected by limited liability laws these
punishment are not feasible for the regulator. The best he can do then is to choose
the scheme of propositions 2.1, 2.3 and 2.5.
2.4 The Optimal Organizational Choice
The propositions in the previous section illustrate the difference between the optimal
monopolistic and independent regulatory schemes. In this section we study which
scheme yields the higher expected social welfare. The proposition's proof is relegated
to the Appendix.
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For high values of q (low correlation coefficients) the optimal probabilities of pro-
duction under both MIS and IIS are non-increasing in the producers' total cost. This
means that there are transfer schemes that implement the optimal independent sup-
ply probabilities of production, QI(.) under MIS. It is easy to show that the expected
transfer payment that implements  Q' (.) under  MIS,  Ee{T(e)}, is smaller  than  the
expected total transfers under IIS, Ee{ti (0) tt2(0)}. In state (2,2) the regulator needs
to give both independent input suppliers an incentive not to overstate their costs. A
monopolistic input supplier with costs  (2,2) must effectively  only be induced  not  to
say that he has intermediate cost 2 + 8. Because the monopolist coordinates his cost
messages, he internalizes the externality that a cost overstatement causes on the other
input producer. This effect is called the "informational externality" effect.
For low values of q (high correlation coefficients) the incentive constraints for the
probabilities of production under MIS become binding. Because the optimal produc-
tion probabilities under IIS do not obey these monotonicity constraints, they are not
feasible for the monopolistic input supply problem. The non-monotonous probability
scheme saves informational rents. By conditioning each independent suppliers' infor-
mational rents on both suppliers' cost message, the regulator can extract some of their
rents. This is called the yardstick competition effect. Due to this effect, independent
input supply yields higher expected welfare than monopolistic supply for low q.
The following proposition shows how the optimal organizational structure depends
on q. Define the critical values:
1-/- .  1 + 2X _. PH(1 -PH)qi   =   i,/pn[jip"(  +  2) +4- \,/Pii(   A   )1, q  = PH(1+2A) + 1, and
PH                 2q              29                      .L
F =
1(1 + A)28 + A (0
-2)1- 1(1 + A)(2 + 0) + An-(A -2)1
PH -2q PH - 2q                       2q
Proposition 2.6 The regulator chooses:
(i)  MIS, for q 2 max{Yi,q2},
(ii) MIS only if V<v, for qi <q< 42,
(iii)  IIS  only  if V  <  v,  for -4  <  q  <  41,
(iv) IIS, for q S min{yl, 2}.
Figure 2.1 illustrates regions (i) until (iv) for A - 1. Along the horizontal axis we
depict PH, while probability  q is along the vertical  axis. The dotted line represents
critical value qi,  and the thin line stands for critical value *2.
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Figure 2.1: Regions (i)-(iv)
The proposition confirms that the regulator prefers IIS for high correlation, while
he prefers MIS for low correlation.  This is intuitive given the presence of the yardstick
competition and informational externality effect.
An alternative interpretation of the proposition is the following. For big enough
q the regulator's choice of the industry's organization depends on the firms' liabil-
ity structure. If firms have unlimited liability, the regulator can punish independent
input suppliers severely for unlikely and unfavorable cost combinations, and thereby
extract all informational rents. Limited liability puts a binding upper bound to the
independent input suppliers' punishments which makes the regulator prefer monop-
olistic input supply. This means that both the cost correlation and the producers'
liability structure influence the optimal organizational structure of complementary
input supply.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we showed that the optimal organizational structure of regulating
complementary input supply trades off two effects. The yardstick competition effect
occurs when costs are correlated. A multi-product monopolist can coordinate the
reports that he sends to the regulator. Independent firms, however, send reports
independently. The regulator can extract some of the independent firms rents by
comparing the firms' reports and rewarding or punishing firms on the basis of this
comparison. The second effect is the informational externality effect, and is most
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powerful when costs are independently distributed. Because independent firms send
reports independently, they do not internalize the externality that their reports has on
the other firm's payoff. The regulator must therefore give both firms an incentive to
not overstate their costs. A monopolistic input supplier internalizes this externality,
and this saves rents for the regulator. The yardstick competition is strongest when
costs are highly correlated. When costs are independent, the yardstick competition
effect disappears. This implies that complementary activities with highly correlated
costs are best regulated by creating two separate firms each performing one activity
only. In contrast, complementary activities with low cost correlation are best regulated
by having one firm that performs both activities.
Not only cost correlation, but also the liability structure of input producers mat-
ters, when costs have a small, non-negative correlation coefiicient. For small, non-
negative correlation coefficients, a social welfare maximizing regulator prefers monop-
olistic input supply when the producers are protected by limited liability, while he
prefers duopolistic input supply under unlimited liability. Under unlimited liability
and positive cost correlation, the regulator extracts all the independent suppliers'
rents by punishing an input supplier severely in unfavorable and unlikely states of na-
ture and rewarding them in other states. Limited liability makes these punishments
infeasible, since producers must receive non-negative profits in all states of nature.
Therefore, in industries consisting of suppliers with limited liability the yardstick
competition effect is weaker than in industries with unlimitedly liable firms. Higher
correlation coefEcients make independent input supply more desirable for the welfare
optimizing regulator under both limited and unlimited liability.
The regulatory schemes that implement the optimal expected welfare level in our
model are quite different compared  to  that  in  Dana (1993), where goods are divisible
substitutes.
In our model the choice between monopolistic and independent input supply is
made before costs are reported, and are therefore, in a sense, exogenous. Endoge-
nizing the organizational choice of the regulator by procuring the control over input
production between two bidders could give interesting new insights in the current
problem.
It could also be worthwhile to investigate the implications of this chapter's insights
for the problem of access pricing.  In the problem of access pricing a monopolistic firm
supplies both a bottleneck facility and a final good that makes use of this facility.
There are also other final goods suppliers that need the bottleneck facility. In com-
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parison with this chapter, the monopolistic firm's incentives to report costs truthfully
are distorted, because his cost messages affect competition in the final goods market.
If the regulator separates the facility provider from the final good producer, this dis-
tortion vanishes. This would save informational rents. However, separation triggers
the informational externality effect, which costs the regulator rents. Whether or not
separation of the monopolist is socially desirable, needs to be explored.
2.6 Appendix
The first subsection of this Appendix contains the proof to lemmas 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3,
which concern optimal monopolistic input supply schemes. The second subsection
gives the proof to propositions 2.1, 2.3 and 2.5, and to 2.2 and 2.4, which concerns
the optimal regulatory schemes under independent input supply. The last subsection
of this Appendix proves proposition 2.6, which concerns the optimal organization of
input supply.
2.6.1 MIS: Proof of Lemmas 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3
Note that the welfare optimization problem under MIS is a linear programming prob-
lem. Suppose that the 20-monopolist's participation constraint is binding with slack
variable gh = A, where A is the social cost of public funds. This gives transfer T(20)
in lemma 2.1.  Take the incentive compatibility constraint of a (2 + 8)-monopolist
overstating his cost binding, and set its slack variable gHIm = A(1 - PH). This results
in  transfer  T(2 + 8).   Take the incentive compatibility constraint  for a 22-monopolist
claiming to be (2 + 8) binding with slack variable &™IL = APL. This determines trans-
fer T(22) of lemma 2.1. Finally we suppose that neither the incentive constraints
for understating costs are never binding, nor the participation constraints for low and
middle total costs are binding. We can write down the following reduced dual problem
for the remaining slack variables 88, 88, sQH of the probability feasibility constraints,
QM(.)  5  1, and the incentive compatibility constraint of a 22-cost monopolist claiming
to have total costs 28, sHW:
min  { 88  +  83  + 88}8>0
36 2 PLIV - (1 + A)20
s.t.  <  s8 - (-8 - 2)sHIL 2 2q[V - (1 + A)(2 + 8) - Alf,(8 - 0)14 + 0- 2)SHIL 2 pHIV - (1 + A)2# - Atp<4#- 2)]
36 Regulating Complementary Inputs
for 38, ss, sg, SHIL 2 0.
For q 2 qM we set sHIL = 0, which gives dual solution:
88 = max {0, PLWA/(22)}
83 = max {0,2qwAI(9   #   
SQH = max {0, pHWA,(28)}.
Then the primal solution of lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 is feasible, since it satisfies the comple-
mentary slackness conditions.   And it implements the optimal dual value 36 + §8 +  QH.
From the duality theorem we can conclude that this scheme is optimal.
For q < qM we take 3HIL , 0. This implies from the complementary slackness
conditions that QA,(28) = QM(2 + 8).  Then the following slack variables solve the
reduced dual problem:
&8 - max {O, pLwM(22)}
as t  3   -   max{o, 2qwM(8 + 0)+PHWA,(20)}.
Then the scheme of lemmas 2.1 and 2.3 is feasible, since it satisfies the complementary
slackness conditions.  And it implements &8 + g8 + ilf· It follows from the duality
theorem that this scheme is optimal.
This completes the proof of lemmas 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3.
2.6.2 IIS: Proofs
Optimal Schemes: Proof of Propositions 2.1, 2.3 and 2.5
Under IIS, the welfare optimization problem is a linear programming problem. Ob-
serve that the schemes under propositions 2.5 and proposition 2.1 or 2.3 give feasible
variables to this problem. Make firms' incentive compatibility constraint for over-
stating costs binding, and set the slack variable 9 IL = A. Also make the high-cost
firms' participation constraint binding by choosing slack variables A L = A(pL + q)
and aiH = A(q + PH), and similar slack variables for firm 2.  Set all remaining slack
variables for incentive compatibility and participation constraints equal to 0. Choose
the slack variables for the feasibility of probability of production as follows:
954 = max {o, PLIV-(1 + A)20}
nL
S L = SYJ = max <0, q[V-(1 + A)(2 + 8)- A--(8- 2)] q
s H = max<0, PH[V-(1 + A)20 - A.33(8- 2)1  Pn
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Consequently, for q 2 qI the regulatory scheme from propositions 2.1 and 2.5 satisfies
the complementary slackness condition and equalizes the primal and dual values.
Therefore this scheme is optimal.  For q  <  qI the regulatory scheme from propositions
2.3 and 2.5 satisfies the complementary slackness condition and it equalizes dual and
primal values. It follows from the duality theorem that the regulatory schemes are
optimal. This completes the proof to propositions 2.1, 2.3 and 2.5.
Dominant Strategy Equilibrium: Proofs of Propositions 2.2 and 2.4
Suppose that producer 2 chooses mixed strategy P2(82) - Pr(0 = 2182) in the message
sending stage. Given this strategy, producer 1 assigns the following probability to a
low cost message:
Pr(/2 - 21/1,1'2 ·   - Pr(/2 - 2181);)2(2) + Pr(/2 - 81/1 2(8)
The expected profit for producer 1 from stating low costs is:
E#2 <71'1  Pl  1  = 1,P2(82 | 1   =
Pr(82=0181,P,) [ti(2,2)-02'(2,2)] +
+ (1 - Pr(02 - 2181,1 2)   [tl(2, e) - 2QI(2, A)]  ,
and he obtains the following from stating high costs:
E92 {7rl  Pl /l  -  ,1)2(82)181)} =
pr<02= 2181,16) [tl(e, 2)-2QI(0,2)1 +
+ (1 - Pr(12 - giGi,P2))  It 1(e, e) - eQI(e, 8)]  .
Substituting the modified regulatory transfer scheme from proposition 2.2 into the
expected profit functions proves this proposition immediately.
The proof to proposition 2.4 is given in the remainder of this subsection.  A
Bayesian equilibrium in interim dominant strategies cannot be obtained for arbitrary
small changes to proposition 2.3's transfer scheme and the optimal probabilities of
production.  If one producer always states high costs, i.e. p,(0,) = 0 for all 8, € {2, 8},
the other producer  has a strict preference to overstate  his cost, whenever QI (8.0)  > 0.
This proves proposition 2.4.
2.6.3    MIS vs IIS: Proof of Proposition 2.6
In this subsection we compare the expected optimal welfare level under MIS with that
under IIS. Define AB -8-2 and AW = Ee{WI(8)} - Ee{WAI(e)}
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We first show how the critical values are ordered. It is obvious that qA' 5 42
Furthermore,  qM  5 41, because this gives:
V/0  (PH + A(1 + PH)) 4. 2 + PH(4X +1) - 42(4A2 +A t (3X + 1)PH) 
4A(PH + A(1 + PH))
20,
which is equivalent to:
(PH + A(1 + PH))2(4. 2 7-PH(4.  + 1)) 2 PH(4. 2 +A t (3X + 1)PH22,
and this is equivalent to 4, 3(1 - PH)2(A + PH) 2 0, which obviously holds always.
The inequality q, 5 qI always holds, because it gives:
(PH + A(1 + 2PH))V A2(PH +8) +PH(BA +1)2 v/BH-(A2(7 + 2PH) +A+ (5X + 1)PH),
which is equivalent to 8A3(1 - PH)2(A + PH)2 2 0, which obviously holds always.
For later use we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4 qi 2  2 ** PH S 20
Proof. Take PH = 4fS, with 0 5 6 5 4+1. Then:
(1 + 4X + 6(1 + 2. )) ./EiiA+62 - 5(1 + 6A + 6)
 1 _  2 ==
V 4A+1
4(1 + 4X + 6(1 + 2A))
Therefore, qi 2  12 is equivalent to:
6(1 + 4A + 8(1 + 2A))2(4X + 6) 2 62(1 + 6.  + 8)2(4X + 1),
which gives:
46. (1 - 6)(1 + (4- 6)A)(1 +6+ 4A) 2 0.
This holds whenever 8 5 1. Finally, note that for b=l w e obtain qi =  72 - 2Ii*+11 -
 pH, which proves the lemma.0
Note that for QM(22) = QM (2+8) = O, QM(28) = 1, and Qi(22) = 1, QI(2+8) =
0, Q'(28) = l we have:
L
AW = PH  V - (1 + A)28 - A  AB  - 2q  V - (1 + A)(2 + 8) - A2- de   .  (2.5)
2q
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For q S qM and q 2 qI the expected welfare comparison is straightforward, result-
ing in a preference for independent and monopolistic input supply, respectively. For
qM <q<O w e distinguish four cases, that are analyzed in the following four cases.
(i)  For  max{41, q2}  S q f q I  w e  have the following parameter ordering:
L                    24
(1 + A)(8 + 8) + ALAO   <   (1 + A)28 + A--zae < (2.6)2q                             PH
L    1 H
<   (1 + A)(2 + 0) + A -88 21(it X)20 + A   -f  de.
q                           Ptl
The welfare comparison is straightforward, except for the case in which:
2q                            L
(1 + A)28 + A--1 de <V< (1+ A)(2 + 8) + A2-de. (2.7)r q
Then AW is as in (2.5). This means that for PH > 2q, AW <0 *> V<u* *
L
V   <   (1 + A)(2 + 0) + AP-aG +
q
1-PUL
1 PH      <[(1 + A)28 + A del- 1(1 + A)(2 + 8) + ALAol)
PH-2q C PH                      q    )
which holds given (2.6) and (2.7). For pH = 2q, AW < 0 is a direct consequence of
(2.6). Finally, for PH < 27, aw <0 4*v> v* *
2q
V   >   (1 + A)28 + A-88 +*
2q                  29                        L
1  [(1 + A)28 + Apidel- [(1 + A)(2 + 8) + ALAO] PH - 2q                                                      2q
which holds given (2.6) and (2.7).
(ii) Due to the lemma 2.4, qi <q<q 2 gives PH > 2q, and:
L                     2q
(1 + A)(2 + 8)+AE-de   <   (1 + A)28 + A-wae< (2.8)
2q                   pn
1-PH               L<   (1 + A)20 + A Ae < (1 + A)(2 + 8) + AE-ae.PH                       q
The welfare comparison is straightforward, except for:
2q                                 1 - PH
(1 + A)28 + Api:88 <V< (1+ A)28 +A   PH   de
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Then AW is as in (2.5), and AW > 0 whenever V > v. It suffices to note that, due
to (2.8),
2q                                     1 -PH
(1 + A)28 + A--LJO <0< (1+ A)28 +A AO
P.'                       PH
since rewriting gives:
2q
F   =   (1 + A)28 + A-zae +pn
2q   /                  L                   2q
<1(1 + A)(2 + 8) + AE--881 - [(1 + A)28 + A--TAO} ,PH -tq                                2q                                P.
and
2q
T   =   (1 + A)28 + A-ZLJO +
Pn
2q/ L 1 H)
pH - 2q (I(1 + A)(2 + 0) + Alq-Ael - 1(1 + X)28 + A  Plp ael  .
(iii) From lemma 2.4, 4 2<q<q i implies that pH < 2q, and:
2q                        L
(1 + A)20 + Apiae   <   (1 + A)(8 + 8) + AL- 80 < (2.9)
2q
L    1 H
<   (1 + A)(2 + 0) + AE-de < (1 + A)28 + A   -.:   2 8.
q                             pn
For this case the welfare is straightforward except for:
L                                 L
(1 + A)(2 + 8) + AE-de <V< (1+ A)(2 + 8) + AL de.
2q                           q
Then AW is as in (2.5), and AW > 0 whenever V < E Again it suffices to note that,
due to (2.9),
L                              L
(1 + A)(2 + 8) + AP-do <v< (1+ A)(2 + 8) + X2- &8,
2q                          q
since rewriting gives:
L
D   =   (1 + A)(2 + 0) + APAG +
2q
 H   /                 L                 24




v   =   (1 + A)(2 + 0) + AE-ae +
q
H L 1 H)
(1(1
+ A)(2 + 8) + AP--ae] - [(1 + x)28 + A   -,f   do]yl .PH -2q                                 q                                    r
(iv) Finally, for q.w <q f min{qi, 42} the parameters are ordered as follows:
2q                          L
(1 + A)28 + A--i; de   <   (1 + A)(2 + 8) + AL ae < (2.10)
p"                     2q
1-PH         L
<   (1 + A)2# + A 88 < (1 + A)(2 + 8) + AP-ae.PH                        q
The welfare is not straightforward for the case in which:
L                           1H
(1 + A)(2 +8) + AZ-de<v<(1+ A)28 +A   -.: de. (2.11)
2q                       P"
This means that for PH > 2q, AW > 0 is equivalent to:
L
V   >   (1 + A)(2 + 8) + ALAO +
2q
PH                2q                      L
1  [(1 + A)28 + Apibel - 1(1 + A)(2 + 0) + ALABI)
PH -2q 2q   )
which holds given (2.10) and (2.11). For PH = 2q, AW > 0 is a direct consequence of
(2.10). And, finally, for PH < 2q, AW > 0 is equivalent to:
1-PH
V   <   (1 + A)28 +A   PH    &8 +
1  2q C 1- P                                 L
1 1(1 + A)20 + A del - 1(1 + A)(2 + 8) + AL del)
PH-2q\ PH     q 3
This completes the proof of proposition 2.6.
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Introduction to Part II
In this part of the thesis we analyze problems of dynamic competition in research and
development  (R&D). A special feature  of the problems  is that innovating firms learn
while they invest in R.&D. The interaction between firms' incentives to learn, com-
municate and to develop their innovation is studied for different settings. Firms learn
about their costs of development by investing in research. Research investments give
information about development costs. After learning, firms decide what information
to reveal. Two effects of information revelation are central to the analysis. First, a
firm's revelation has a strategic effect. It provides its rival with information about the
firm's relative cost efficiency in development. When a firm is expected to be a more
efficient investor in development, this discourages its rival's development investments.
This effect would therefore give firms an incentive to bias their revelation towards
revealing only good news about themselves. The second effect is an informational
effect, and conflicts with the strategic effect. When costs of development investments
are positively correlated, a firm's revelation does not only reveal something about
this firm's costs of investment.  A firm also learns something about his own cost of
investment from his rival's revelation. This gives firms an incentive to only reveal bad
news to their rival. Bad news makes rivals pessimistic about their development costs,
and discourages development investments. The interaction between these two con-
flicting effects determines firms' incentives to acquire, reveal and further build upon
information.
In the first chapter we consider an R&D race in which firms always learn about
costs of development investments, although learning is imperfect. Therefore it is
known that a firm is informed. Firms only do not know what information their rival
possesses. Project's costs of development are perfectly correlated, and therefore the
informational effect dominates. When firms share revenues this effect is countervailed
by free-rider incentives. The relative strength of the two effects determines firm's
incentives to invest and reveal information. The verifiability of firms' private informa-
tion is crucial in determining how much information can and will be revealed between
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firms. Unverifiable information can never be revealed credibly, while verifiable infor-
mation results in unraveling for extreme revenue shares only.
In the second chapter of this part of the thesis we analyze an R.&D race in which
firms learn differently. When a firm learns, it learns perfectly, but whether it learns is
uncertain and depends on its research investments. When the acquired information
is verifiable, firms face the choice between disclosure and claiming to be uninformed.
The second chapter of Part II studies the effects of disclosure regulation on firms'
incentives to invest in research and development. Furthermore we investigate the
effects of correlation between development costs on firms' incentives to disclose in-
formation and to invest. When information is perfectly correlated the informational
effect dominates, and firms disclose only bad news. Bad news makes a rival more
pessimistic about his costs of development, and consequently discourages those in-
vestments. For independently distributed costs the informational effect disappears
and the strategic effect rules. Therefore firms disclose their information only when
they are efficient development investors, and firms invest aggressively in both research
and development.
Chapter 3
Strategic Revelation and Revenue
Sharing
3.1 Introduction
Innovative activity has at least three basic properties. It is mostly done in a compet-
itive environment. Firms compete to get an innovation first. Second, it is a dynamic
activity. Research and Development (R&D) is a process for which we can distinguish
several stages, at least there is a research stage, resulting in a raw prototype, and a
development stage in which the prototype is transformed into a final product. Fi-
nally R&D is an uncertain activity. Not only is it uncertain when an innovation is
going to occur, but also firms could be uncertain about the complexity of the project
that they start working on.  Only in the course of doing research firms learn whether
their project is worthwhile proceeding. For marginal product improvements learning
effects can be ignored. But for more fundamental innovations and more experimental
research these effects cannot be ignored. The fact that firms learn during the race,
and the fact that they could learn from each other, creates new and interesting incen-
tives to invest in R&D. This paper analyzes these incentives. Our analysis consists of
three parts. First, we investigate how the fact that firms learn affects their incentives
to invest in R&D. Second, we study how these incentives are affected under different
regimes of appropriability of the innovation. And, finally, we analyze under what
conditions firms will and will not learn from each other in equilibrium.
The simplest situation that captures the competitive. dynamic and informational
aspects of innovative activity is the following. Two firms compete over two stages
to get an innovation. In the first stage firms obtain an intermediate discovery, and
learn about their R&D project. In the second stage firms decide how much to invest
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in developing the intermediate innovation, given the information acquired in stage
1. Firms compete to get the developed final product first. An early intermediate
discovery in an R&D race can have two opposite effects on competition. We distinguish
a strategic and an informational effect, and discuss them in the next two paragraphs.
In most literature on dynamic R.&D competition the progress of one firm in their
project discourages its rivals to invest in the innovation. Taking a lead in the race
gives the leading firm a strategic advantage, e.g. see Grossman and Shapiro (1987),
and  Harris and Vickers  (1987).   This  is a "strategic effect".   If firms could credibly
signal that they made an early intermediate discovery without revealing the contents
of this discovery, they would always do so. The problem is that this revelation cannot
happen credibly unless the contents of the discovery are revealed also. But revealing
the contents of the discovery enables rivals to catch up in the race, which encourages
further investments. Therefore a leading firm is only willing to obtain and reveal
information about its progress in the race if it is sufficiently compensated for doing
so.  Compensation can happen by means of a licencing arrangement or an intermediate
patent (see, e.g., Chang (1995), Green and Scotchmer (1995), Scotchmer and Green
(1990) and Kabla (1997)) or grace period (see Goyal and De Laat, 1998). Thus there
is a trade-off between the incentive to reveal information and leaving the informed
firm an advantage in the race. The literature mostly focuses on this trade-off in R.&D
races.
For fundamental innovationst we see an effect that is opposite to the strategic
effect. After an early intermediate success by one firm, rivals flock in and invest
to obtain the final innovation first. This effect could be explained in the following
setting, as in Choi (1991). Firms learn about the properties of the project while they
work on it. These properties are universal for the industry. Favorable information for
one firm is favorable also for its rivals. Then progressing in the race and disclosing
this progress makes all firms more optimistic, and more willing to invest. This is an
"informational effect".   But when favorable information for one firm also encourages
rivals to invest in the project, the firm might want to prevent its rivals from learning
this information. There might be an incentive not to reveal any good news that firms
learned.
The strategic effect gives firms an incentive to state that they made early inter-
mediate discoveries, while they would keep intermediate successes secret under the
1 A classic example  of  this  kind of innovation would  be  the 1986 breakthrough  in cold super-
conductivity.    For a description  of the breakthrough   by  IBM,   and its resulting  race  for even colder
superconductivity, see Choi (1991).
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informational effect. In practice these two effects interact, and this interaction deter-
mines the firms' incentives to invest in both stages of the race.  In this chapter we
separate the acquisition of information from the acquisition of a leading position in
the race. First, firms invest solely in acquiring information, and then invest in winning
the race. Furthermore, we maximize the scope for firms to learn from their rival by
assuming perfect positive correlation between the firms' projects. We thereby focus
on the informational effect of intermediate discoveries and its subsequent problems
of information revelation. This gives a sharper trade-off between incentives to reveal
and acquire information.
This chapter contributes in two important ways to the study of the trade-off be-
tween the infomational and strategic effect. First, we study the effects of appropri-
ability of revenues on the firms' incentives to invest in R&D. Most literature on R&D
races focuses on the winner-takes-all race. This is, however, an extreme setting that
needs not be realistic. We add more realism to the economic analysis by studying set-
tings in which the winner does not take all. In particular, we assume that firms share
a fixed portion of their revenues. Revenue sharing introduces free-rider effects to the
analysis. These free-rider effects interact in an interesting way with the informational
and strategic effects.
The second main contribution of this chapter is to endogenize firms' information.
Information is endogenized in two directions. First, each firm invests in costly infor-
mation acquisition. The incentives to invest depend on the appropriability of both the
acquired information, and the innovation's revenues. When the acquired information
is public, firms have a low incentive to invest in information acquisition, because they
prefer to free ride on their rival's information acquisition investments. And when only
part of the revenues from innovation are appropriated by a firm, both negative as well
as positive externalities on research incentives exist between firms. The negative effect
is due to the erosion of expected revenues from a firm's own information acquisition
investments. This is a free-rider effect. The positive externality of revenue sharing is
active when the firms' acquired information is public. The externality is caused by
the fact that the information generated by one firm affects beliefs and consequently
expected revenues of the firm's rival. Since part of these revenues spill over, firms
have a bigger incentive to invest in information acquisition.
The second reason why the firms' information is endogenous is because firms can
choose what information they reveal.  That is, the revelation of information is not
exogenous, but a strategic choice of the firms.  When information is non-verifiable,
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firms never completely reveal their information, while there is an equilibrium in which
they completely conceal information. This result holds for any way in which firms
share revenues. These results are reversed for extreme revenue shares, however, when
information is verifiable. Firms cannot credibly conceal any verifiable information, and
will therefore fully disclose. For intermediate revenue shares there is no equilibrium
in which firms completely reveal their information.
These two main contributions of the chapter are discussed in more detail in the
next sections.
Related literature: Papers by Hendricks and Kovenock (1989), Choi (1991), Malueg
and Tsutsui (1997), and Cyert and Kumar (1996) study models in which firms learn
about their project's characteristics while they invest in it. In their models the infor-
mation obtained from research is publicly observable. Firms learn from each other's
experience without cost. Information is incomplete, but symmetric. We show in this
chapter that firms have incentives to misrepresent their intermediate research results
to affect competition in the development stage. Furthermore, we analyze how invest-
ments are affected by revenue sharing, and how they compare to the industry's efficient
investments. We show that firms' expected profits can be increased by relaxing the
"winner-takes-all" assumption.
Dewatripont et at. (1999) give sufficient conditions under which a manager's in-
centives for information acquisition investments are affected by an additional signal
about his project. We perform a similar exercise for signals that are generated by a
firm's rival. We extend the analysis by introducing competition both in information
acquisition, as well as in the determination of firms' revenue.
Problems of strategic information revelation in R&D races are studied by Bhat-
tacharya et at. (1990, 1992) and d'Aspremont et at. (1996, 1998) but in their models
information is exogenous (and partly verifiable). Another model of endogenous  in-
formation spillovers between competing firms is analyzed by Katsoulacos and Ulph
(1998), and Ulph and Katsoulacos (1998). Their problem deals with information
about the contents of the intermediate innovation, and not information about the
costs of proceeding with the project. This puts more emphasis on the strategic effect
of information revelation.
The effects for incentives of racing firms after the relaxation of the "winner-takes-
all" patent scheme are studied in La Manna et at. (1989) and Denicold (1996). In
these papers the social optimality of full-scope patents is seriously questioned.  We
perform a similar exercise, but in an environment in which firms learn.
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Problems in which information revelation occurs between competitors are problems
of information sharing in oligopoly.2 Novshek and Sonnenschein (1982), Fried (1984),
and Creane (1995) study models in which firms acquire and reveal information before
they compete.3 However, in these models firms can commit ex ante whether to reveal
information or not. This is a strong assumption that need not always be realistic. In
fact, Ziv (1993) shows that the scope for information sharing is drastically reduced
when firms cannot commit el: ante and information is non-verifiable. We follow the
same modelling approach as in the paper by Ziv.
The chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section we describe the basic
model. In section 3 the eflicient investments that maximize total industry's prof-
its are characterized. These investments serve as a benchmark. Section 4 analyzes
the effects of introducing competition in this setting, while signals remain public in-
formation. This gives the equilibrium investments of competing firms that receive
publicly observable signals about the project's complexity. In section 5 we analyze
the equilibrium investments when firms have only private signals. The sixth section
discusses what information is revealed, and what investments are chosen, when firms
reveal information strategically. Section 7 discusses the assumptions on observability
of research investments, and the last section concludes. All proofs are relegated to
the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
We consider an industry in which two firms compete over two stages to obtain an
innovation. Firms work on the same innovation but compete to get it first. Since
firms work on the same innovation, we assume that their costs of investments are
perfectly positively correlated. In the first stage firms acquire information about the
costs of development investments, that should lead to the innovation.  This is the
research stage. In the second stage the firms actually try to develop the innovation.
We call this stage the development stage. The firm that develops the innovation first,
the winner, receives prize W. When both firms develop the innovation, each firm
receives prize T. Naturally, we assume that O S T S  W. At one extreme firms
2For a survey of the main results of information sharing in oligopoly. see Gal-Or (1986) and Raith
(1996).
30ther papers, e.g. see Li et at. (1987), Hwang (1993, 1995) and Hauk and Hurkens (1998),
study the incentives of competing firms to acquire information given that the acquired information
remains private.
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share the revenues from innovation equally, while at the other extreme, firms compete
fiercely in the product market which leaves no rents for either of them. A firm that
does not develop the innovation successfully receives no revenues. Define A E W-T
as the difference between the prizes of winning and tying.  Note that our assumption
on T implies that  W S A S W.
At the beginning of the race firms do not know the complexity of the project
they work on. Complexity directly affects the cost of investments in developing the
innovation, and is summarized by the parameter 0. The project can either be easy,
8 - 2, or difficult, 8-0,t o complete, with 0<2<8. When the project is easy
(resp. difficult), it is easy (resp. difficult) for both firms. An easy project has low
marginal cost of development. A diffcult project is completed at high marginal cost.
The probability of an easy (resp. difficult) project is p (resp.  1- p), with 0<p<1.
In the research stage firms find a prototype, and learn about the costs of develop-
ment investment.  Firm i does research by making an investment Ri  e [0,11. Research
investments are not observable. Firm i expects research investment rj from its rival
firm j. Costs of research investments are quadratic in investments, C(Ri) = 642,
with p high enough such that coordinating firms both invest in research. Learning
is, however, not perfect. After firms invest in research they receive a signal about
the project's complexity. The quality of the signal depends on the investments in re-
search. When the project is difficult, investments always lead to a bad signal, 4 = I,
for i =  1,2.  For an easy project firm i's signal depends on its research investment,
Ri. Firm i receives a good signal, 4 - 1, with probability 4, while the probability
of a bad signal, 4 - 2, is 1 - R*, with i = 1,2. Signals are independently distributed
between firms given the project's complexity. The first-stage stochastic structure for
firm i is depicted in Figure 3.1 below. The dashed lines represent firm i's information
sets.
We make different assumptions about the nature of the firms' signals.  In the following
two sections we assume that signals are public information, while in section 5 we
assume that signals are private information to firms. Besides the fact that these cases
are interesting by itself, they also enable us to analyze a richer model in which firms
strategically choose how much information to reveal to their rival. We introduce this
model in section 6 of this chapter.
Whenever a firm receives a good signal, 4 - t, it learns that both firms work
on an easy project. Whenever both firms receive a bad signal, they are in one of
the following situations. Either the project is difficult, or firms work on an easy
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Figure 3.1: Firm i's research stage
project and were simply unlucky. The extent to which firms were unlucky under an
easy project depends on firms' research investments, R. The more firms invested in
research, the more pessimistic they get about the project's complexity.
In the second stage firms invest in the development of the innovation by spending
Di   €   10,11.    Firm i's probability of making a final innovation  is  then  D'.    An  easy
project, 8 - 2, has low marginal costs of development, while a difficult project has
higher development costs, 8 - 8. In order to keep the model manageable, we as-
sume that firm i's development cost is quadratic in development investment Di, i.e.
c(Di; 8) =  D,2, for i = 1,2. Furthermore, we assume that 2 > 28 to obtain interior
solutions for firms' development investments.
We assume that firms are risk neutral. For firms' profits we define the following.
Given development investments  D  E  (Di, D2),  firm i's development profits  are:
r,(D; 0) E D:DjT + D,(1 - Dj)1* -  Dt = D,(w - ADj) -  D2Z'
Then firm i's expected payoff is given by:
IIi(R, D) = Ee{x,(D; 0)'Ri} -  R'1
We solve the game backwards, and focus on symmetric, pure-strategy Bayes perfect
equilibria.
3.3 Benchmark: Efficient Investments
In this section we analyze the efficient outcome for the industry. This means that
we calculate the research and development investments that maximize expected total
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industry's profits. We analyze this solution to understand firms' incentives when all
relevant externalities are internalized.4 We use the efficient outcome as a benchmark
to study the effects of competition and private information on equilibrium strategies.
Given public signals, we calculate the efficient information acquisition and devel-
opment choices by solving the model backwards. In the first subsection we find the
efficient development investments, D. In the second subsection we compute efficient
information acquisition investments, R, given efficient investments in the development
stage.5
3.3.1 Efficient Development Investments
After the information acquisition stage there are two basic states of the world. Either
there  is at least  one  firm that received  a good signal,  t  E  { (t, i), (t, i), (I, i) },  or both
firms received  a bad signal,  t  =  9, D.    In the first  case both firms learn that their
project is easy, 8 = 2, while in the latter case they cannot establish with certainty
whether the project is easy or difficult.  For both these states of the world we calculate
the efficient development investments D.  In the industry's efficient outcome firm
i chooses development investment Di that maximizes expected total development
profits, given the signals t, research investment Ri, and expected research investments
T:
max.Ee{7ri(D; 8) + 7rj(D; 8)It; Ri}, for i = 1,2.
D,€10,11
Expectations are taken after observing the signals.  Firm i's posterior belief of working
on  an easy project  is  Mi  =  51(t, Ri, rj). The expected  cost of investment parameter  is:
Fie + (1 - B,)0 = E(Glt; Ri, rj).
Total profit maximization leads to the first-order conditions for development invest-
ments:
W - 2Dja = E(elt; Ri, rj)Di, for i,j = 1,2, and j 0 i.
4Such a benchmark could be relevant for policy analysis when firms can fully appropriate the
social value of their innovation.
6We assume that firms' research investments are unobservable in the efEcient outcome, in the
equilibrium with public signals, and in the equilibrium with private signals. Keeping research invest-
ments unobservable throughout the whole analysis enables us to focus on the effects of competition
and private information on the firms' signals. It enables us to compare firms' investment in the differ-
ent benchmarks. In fact, efficient investments for observable and unobservable research investnients
are identical, since all relevant externalities are internalized.
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When there is a firm that receives a good signal in the first stage, the firms know
that the project is easy, i.e. 51 - 1. Firms' first-order conditions for these beliefs give
their optimal development investments, and development profits, for i = 1,2:
DE (t) = and  'r,  (13(L); 0   =   D,(t) W.
W
2Att
After both firms received a bad signal, t =  (t, t), firms update their beliefs about
p(1-R.)(1-rj)the project's complexity by applying Bayes'  rule:   51(t, t; Ri, rj)   = p(1- R,)(1-ri)+1-p'
Therefore expected costs after two bad signals is:
E(BIT, T; Ri)=2+0(Ri, rj), with 0(Ri r:) =
(1 - p)(0 - 2)
' '  - p(1 - Ri)(1 - rj) t l-p
If firms still receive bad signals even though they invested more in information ac-
quisition, firms become more pessimistic about the complexity of the project. Firm
i's expected development cost increases in firms' information acquisition investments.
The efficient development investments and expected profits are:
-  --                          W                2 + 0(r)D,(t, t; Ri) = and2+ 0(r) +2 A    2+ 0(Ri, rj)
Ti(i,t; Ri)   E   Ee{,ri (D(t, t; Ri); 8)  t, t; Ri} =  Di(t,t; R,)W
Since in the efficient outcome expectations will be realized, F = R, firms' efficient
investments will be symmetric along the optimizing path. Since 0(R) > 0, expected
marginal cost,  2 + 0(R), strictly exceeds marginal cost of investing in  an easy project,
2. Along the optimizing path it is therefore efficient to invest less after observing
(t, t) than after observingagood signal, i.e.  D,(t)  > Di (T, T; Ri)  for i =l, 2 Greater
information acquisition efforts that result still in two bad signals make firms more
pessimistic about the project's complexity, and expected costs increase. Therefore
efficient investments should decrease. After partially differentiating the efficient de-
velopment investments toward  Ri, we establish  this:
aD,(t, t; R) = -p(1 - rj)0(Ri, rj)Di(T, t; Ri) < 0,
BRi [p(1 - Ri)(1 - rj) +1-p l (2+0(Ri, rj))
with i,j = 1,2, i 96 j.
We summarize our results in the following lemma.
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Lemina 3.1 The e,Oicient development investments are such that, for i = 1,2.·
(i)   along the optimizing  path,   i. e.    Fi   -   Ri,   investments   after  a  good  signal   exceed
-   -  -    -
those after two bad signals:  Dlt)  > Di(t, 1, Ri) for all Ri;
(ii) investments after two bad signals decrease in information acquisition investments:
aD,jil ,R')  5  0 for  all R .
3.3.2 Efficient Research Investments
Given prior beliefs concerning the complexity of the R&D project and given efficient
development investments, D, firms choose research investments, R. Firm i's ex ante
expected profit, given efiicient development investments, is:
II,(Ri, D)   =   (1 -p),ri (D(f, fIR,); 0) + p(1 - R,)(1 - Rj)71'i (D(f, fIR,);2) +
+P[l - (1 - Ri)(1 - Rj)}T,(D(i); 2) -  122
Efficient information acquisition investments R are determined by maximizing II, (Ri, D)+
IIj (Rj, D).   When we calculate the first-order conditions,  and let expectations  on  re-
search investments be realized, r = R, we obtain:
(2       2




_.  for i, j = 1,2. (3.1)(2 + 28)(2 + 0(R) + 2&)2
That is, marginal costs equal marginal revenues of information acquisition invest-
ments. Marginal costs are the direct cost of research investment, pRi. The marginal
revenue of information gathering investment is the total profit gained from obtaining a
good signal and finding out that the project is easy after investing a marginal amount
more.
Observe that net marginal revenues in the right hand side of expression (3.1) are
positive for all Rj < 1. Direct marginal costs are linear and increase monotonically
from 0. Therefore efficient information acquisition investments are in the interior of
the unit interval, i.e.0<R< 1.6
6 Unfortunately,   the net revenue function   need not always be concave  for  all R. Especially  for
big  p  (p > sittf3) net revenues are convex for small  R.   For  big  p and small costs  of in formation
acquisition, p, there can exist two local optima. \Ve avoid nonconcavities by assuming that the costs
of information acquisition investments p are big enough to guarantee a unique optimum.
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3.4  Race with Public Signals
In this section we calculate the equilibrium of the R&D race where signals t are
publicly observable. We derive equilibrium investment decisions of noncooperative
firms, and analyze how they relate to the efficient outcome. Research and development
investment choices are now made under competition, while firms' information remains
symmetric. Again, we solve the game backwards in pure strategy equilibrium.
3.4.1 Public Signal Development Investments
The qualitative properties of equilibrium development investments do not differ from
those of efficient investments. Again development investments are high after a good
signal and are generically decreasing in research investment. Quantitatively equilib-
rium investments differ from the efricient ones. Competing firms do not internalize the
negative effect of their investment on the expected revenue of their rival. Therefore
firms overinvest in development, which is shown in the remainder of this subsection.
After observing the signals, t, and given expected rival's research investment,
rj,  firm i updates his beliefs (/*(t; Ri, rj),1 - B(t; Ri, ri)), and chooses development
investments that maximize its expected profit. This gives first-order conditions:
(W - ADj) = E(elt, R,)Di, for i,j = 1,2, and j 0 i,
with E(elt; Ri, rj) = B(t; Ri, rj)2 + (1 - B(t; Ri, r))8.
When at least one of the firms observes a good signal, firms learn that their
project is easy.  Firm i's posterior belief is B(t,.) = 1, and its first-order condition
gives its reaction function for development investments. Firms' reaction functions
slope downward.  When firm j invests more in development, it becomes less likely
that firm i will be the winner of the race, which depresses its expected prize, and its
incentive to invest. Both firms' reaction functions together determine the symmetric
equilibrium research investments and profits:
0,(i) = _31 and Ki (D(i); 2) =  eD/£)2, for i = 1,22+8
Whenever both firms receive a bad signal, they remain uncertain about the true
state of the project. Depending on the information acquisition investments, each firm
updates its beliefs about the project's complexity, and forms beliefs  B(I, I; Ri, rj)  =
p(1f j,)1; Cr)  -p.    From  both  firms'  reaction  functions  we  derive  equilibrium  invest-
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ments and expected profits:
Dig, I; Ri) = andW              2 + 0(r)2+ 0(r) +A '2+ 0(Ri, rj)
r,(t, t; Ri)    a    Ee •  7ri <(D(I, t; Ri); 8   t,t; Ri   =   (2 + 0(Ri, rj)).8,(Ri)2.
Along the equilibrium path expectations about rival's research investments are real---
ized,  i.e.  F, = Ri  for i =  1,2, and we obtain that Dig, t; Ri)  < D,(i)  for all Ri.
Suppose that firms' research investments only result in bad signals. The greater a
firm's information acquisition investments, Ri, the higher its expected costs of devel-
opment investments, and the more cautious the development investments. Pessimistic
firms invest less than optimistic ones. Therefore equilibrium development investments
decrease in research investments, given bad signals:
abi(T, T; Ri) =
-p(1 - rj)0(Ri, rj)D,(t, T; Ri)
5 0 (3.2)
BR4 (p(1 - Ri)(1 - rj) t l-p) (2+ 0(Ri, rj))
These findings are qualitatively identical to those summarized in lemma 3.1 for efficient
development investments.
Given a signal combination t, firms overinvest compared to the efficient invest-
ments:  Di(t; Ri)  >  Di(t; Ri)·   This is due to the fact that competing firms do not
internalize the negative effect of their own development investments on their rival's
expected revenues. Firm i's investment D, marginally decreases firm j's revenue with
Dja. Therefore firms invest more aggressively than would be efficient for them. This
is a common observation in the literature on R.&D races. Competition leads to over-
investments, which is stated in the following proposition.
Lemma 3.2  For the game with public signals jirms overinvest in equilibrium.  bi(t; Ri)  >
D,(t; Ri) forallt, R, andr, withi = 1,2.  All qualitative properties oftemma 3.1 hold
true for Di(.)  too.
3.4.2 Public Signal Research Investments
Working backwards, we calculate the equilibrium information acquisition investments
given the equilibrium development investments. Firm i chooses R, that maximizes
expected profit II,(R, D), given equilibrium development investments, D. Profit max-
imization leads to the following research equilibrium condition:
PR, = p(1-Rj) {.i (b(i),2)- 7Ti (,8(t, t'Ri);2) }+ (3.3)
aii (I, t; Ri)+IP(1 - Ri)(1 - Rj) +1-p l
8/4
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Notice that marginal revenues contain two informational effects now. The first effect
captures the marginal increase in revenue after more research results in jumping from
a bad to a good signal. However, when bad signals persist despite increased research,
then the increase in research leads to growing pessimism and lower expected rev-
enues. The second effect captures this loss in expected revenues due to firms' growing
pessimism after persistence of bad news. Firms internalize the second effect in the
efficient outcome.
In equilibrium firms' expectations about research investments are realized, i.e.
Fi  =  Ri.   Therefore  we can rewrite the equilibrium condition  for  Ri  to:
PRi  =  P(1-Rj) 2' Di(i)2-Di(i, I; Ri)2   +
t[p(1 - Ri)(1 - Rj) + 1 -pl (et 0(12))A(i, i; Ri) aD,(T, i; Ri)
BRi
=   max  0, M-R(R) ,
with
p(1 - Rj)W20(R) ( 20(R) -(2 + a)a)M-R(R) E (3.4)(2 + a)2(2 + 0(R) + A)2
When we focus on symmetric equilibria (Rl = R2), we can show that firms underinvest
in research. Since signals are public, and firms can learn from each others' signals,
they have an incentive to free-ride on their rival's information acquisition investments.
Proposition 3.1 Symmetric equilibrium research investments in the mce with public
-
signals do not exceed the ellicient investments:  Ri  2 Ri for i = 1,2.  For interior
equilibrium and e,Oicient research investments the inequality is strict.
It is efficient to invest more than R,1 because the eflicient investments internalize
the positive externality of informational spillovers among firms.  If firm i's research
leads to a good signal, this improves both its own and its rival's expected profit.
On top of that each firm takes into account that the decrease in its equilibrium
development investments from higher research investments after bad news improves
its rival's development profits. Internalizing these two effects results in higher research
investments.
It would be an interesting exercise to characterize firms' expected equilibrium de-
velopment investments given their equilibrium research investments, and characterize
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expected equilibrium profits. This would shed more light on the interaction between
research and development. Such an exercise awaits future research.
In these two subsections we saw that firms would improve their profits if they
could find a way to both lower development investments D, and increase research
investments R. In the next subsection we will show that revenue sharing provides
firms with a way to achieve this.
3.4.3   Effects of Revenue Sharing
So far we assumed that in the race the winner takes all. This is, however, only an
extreme way of distributing revenues from the innovation among firms. In general the
loser of the race gets a share, a, of the revenues.  In US sports tournaments revenue
sharing is used to decrease firms' overinvestments in talent. Cook and Frank (1995)
observe the following:
"Revenue sharing - the practice whereby team owners pool and
share gate and television revenues with each other - is another
common device for limiting expenditures.  Because fans strongly
prefer to watch winning teams, there is a strong tink between a
team's winning percentage and the amount of television and gate
revenues the team generates. Without revenue sharing, owners
thus face powerful incentives to bid for star players, coaches,
scouts, and other inputs that make winning mom likely. Rev-
enue sharing weakens these incentives and thus helps to restrain
player salaries and other key costs." [Frank and Cook (1995),
pp 1691
In the race for a patent revenue sharing should have the same desirable effect on
development overinvestments. But in the race for a patent revenue sharing has an
effect on the firms' incentives to invest in development but also on incentives to invest
in information acquisition. In what direction these effects point, is studied here. We
argue that revenue sharing introduces a free-rider incentive in the development stage
which depresses development investments. Revenue sharing introduces the following
effect for research. When research investments result in a good signal, then this
increases the expected revenue of a firm's rival too. Since part of the revenues are
shared, this gives each firm a bigger incentive to invest in research. An effect in the
opposite direction results from the fact that in absolute terms firms' development
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investments are lower than in the "winner-takes-all" race, which would reduce the
incentive to invest in research. However, initially both investments change in the
right direction. This is the main point made in the remainder of this subsection.
Observe that for 0 - 0,w e are iIi the "winner-take-all" race, and for 0 -  firms
share the prize equally. Such a share in the revenue affects firms' incentives to invest.
In this subsection we characterize the revenue share that brings firms' equilibrium
investments closer to the efficient investments. In the following paragraphs we solve
the game backwards  for any revenue share a  E  10,11
• Given revenue share a and cost parameter 8 development profits are:
4(D; 010)   =   D,DjT + D,(1 - Dj)(1 - a)W + (1 - Di)DjaW -  81),2
=   7ri(D; 8) + a (Dj - DJ W
This changes first-order conditions into:
(1 - 0)W - Dja = E(elt, Ri)Di,
with E(Glt, Ri) the expected costs, depending on first-stage signals and research invest-
ment. Note that marginal expected revenues are reduced with aW from introducing
revenue sharing, while marginal costs remain the same. Therefore, equilibrium devel-
opment investments decrease in the revenue share a. The marginal effect of firm i's
development investment on firm j's expected profits is now aW - Djd. Hence the
negative externality -DjA of the "winner-takes-all" race is reduced by oW.  Shar-
ing revenues makes firms less aggressive competitors, because their profits are more
interdependent. Development investments and profits are:
Di(a)   =  (1 - 0)A, and
71'i(b(a); 8Ela)   =   (1 - 0)2*i(t; Ri) + (1 - 0)(rDjW.
for i = 1,2. Notice that equilibrium development investments range from 0,  in the
"loser-takes-all" race (a = 1), to Di, in the "winner-takes-all" race  (a  =  0).    In  the
"equal-sharing"  race,  a=  , firms underinvest in development.   From the first-order
conditions  W - Dj( ) A = GED,( ) and  W - Zija =  GED„ and the symmetry of
equilibrium it follows immediately that Di( ) < Di.
These results are summarized in the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.2 For the race with public signals and revenue share a the following
holds:  (i) Equilibrium development investments decrease in the revenue share:
2 21  <  o  for  all  a.
(ii) Firms underinvest in the "equal-sharing" development equilibrium:
D,(t, Ril ) S D:(t, Ri) for allt, Ri, r.
I Now we calculate equilibrium research investments given equilibrium development
investments. To derive first-order conditions, it is useful to recall how equilibrium
development profits with revenue sharing relate to those without revenue sharing.
This gives the following first-order conditions for firm i's research.
PRi    =    (1-0)2p(1-Rj) lri  D(L);2 -71 i  D(t, T; Ri);8)1 +
ai,(I. t: Ri)+(1 - 0.)2[p(1 - Ri)(1 - Rj) t l-p]        ' '      +
BRd
+GI(1 - a)p( 1 - Rj)W  4(i) - 4(t, t; rj)  
Both firms' first-order conditions determine the research equilibrium investments.  The
first two terms of firm i's marginal revenues trade off similar informational effects as
in the previous subsection. They are its "winner-takes-all" marginal revenues, as in
expression (3.3), where we correct for the fact that the firm can only keep (1 - a) of
its generated revenue, and that firms' incentives to invest in development are reduced
with factor (1 - 0).  The last term is exactly the change in revenue that firm i expects
to receive from its rival after making him more optimistic by providing the industry
with a good signal. Remember that share a of firm j's development revenues spill over
to firm i, while equilibrium development investments are reduced with factor (1 - a).
In equilibrium expectations are realized. The equilibrium research investments
R(a) are then the solution to:
pR, = max <0, (1 - tr)  (1 - a)/R(R) + a/Q(R) ,1,                (3.5)
with AiR(R) as defined in (3.4), and
M-Q(R) = p(1 - Ri)W {Dj(i) - D,(2,2, r,) i = (3.6)
p(1 - Rj)W20(R)
(0 + A)(2 + 0(R) + 8)
Due to the model's symmetry, firms' research investments are symmetric.  In the
remainder of this subsection we characterize the equilibrium research investments,
R(a), by deriving how investment depends on the industry's prize share a.
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We show that research investments do not decrease after introducing a sufficiently
small revenue share a > 0. Increasing the revenue share has two conflicting effects.  At
the one hand it internalizes a fraction of the positive informational externalities from
research, which increases firms' incentives to invest in research. However, when the
revenue share is increased this shrinks the development investments, and consequently
firms' revenues of research. The equilibrium research investment trades off internal-
izing informational externalities of research against free-rider effects in development.
This is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3 For the race with public signals in which jirms make positive re-
search investments in the "winner-takes-all" race, R,(O) > O, there is a revenue share
G E (0,  )  such that equilibrium research investments are increasing for all a<a and
decreasing for all a > 8.
A direct consequence of this proposition is that total profits are increased by
introducing a (small) positive revenue share in the "winner-takes-all" race. Since
both overinvestments in development and underinvestments in research are reduced,
total profits are increased.
3.5  Race with Private Signals
In the previous section we assumed that the firms' signals are public. However such
an assumption need not be realistic. In this section we make the assumption that
information is private to the firms and cannot be revealed to rivals. We derive the
equilibrium investment levels and compare them with those of firms with public sig-
nals.
3.5.1 Private Signal Development Investments
When signals are private information to firms, firms can condition their development
investments on their own signal only. A good signal received by one firm does not
imply that both firms become optimistic about development costs. It is possible that
the other firm is unlucky and receives a bad signal. Therefore the expected rival
to a firm with a good private signal is less aggressive than the rival to a firm with
a good public signal. This makes equilibrium development investments of a good
private signal firm exceed those of a good public signal firm.  When both firms receive
a bad private signal, a firm faces the following trade-off.  On the one hand a firm
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with only one bad signal is more optimistic about development costs, because it does
not pool its information with its rival. However, on the other hand, the firm expects
a more aggressive rival compared to the race with public signals. The first effect
encourages, while the second effect discourages development investments. We show
that the informational effect dominates the strategic effect along the equilibrium path.
This is done in the remainder of this subsection.
Given private signals, and firm i expects its rival's information acquisition invest-
ments  are  rj, its reaction functions  are the following:
eD;(i)   =  (1 - a)W - (rjD;(i) + (1 - rj)D;(I)) 8,
(2 + 4(14)) D;(T; Ri)   =   (1 - a)1,1/ - (P(Ri)D;(i) + 11 - P(Ri)]D;(I)) A,
(1 - p)(0 - 0) p(1 - Ri)rj
with 99(Ri) = -   and P(Ri) =p(1-Ri)+1-p p(1-Ri)+1-P
The equilibrium development investments of a firm with a bad signal, D;(I; R,), de-
pends  on its investments in information acquisition,  Ri.   If the firm keeps receiving  a
bad signal despite the fact that it invested more in information acquisition, it becomes
more pessimistic about the complexity of the project. The firm's growing pessimism
has two effects. First, the firm expects higher development costs. This decreases its
development investments. Second, it attaches a stronger belief to the contingency
that its rival also receives a bad signal, i.e. P(R,) decreases. A rival with a bad signal
is a weaker competitor, which encourages the firm's development investments. These
two effects are captured in the following expression.
DD;(T; Ri) = -pp(Ri)D;(I; Ri) + P(1
- p)rj (D;(i) - D;(I; rj)) A
BRd (P( 1 - rj) t l-p) (2+ p(Ri)) (p(1 - rj) t l- p)2 (0 + 4,(Ri))
Along the equilibrium path, where expectations are realized and symmetric, i.e. r; =
R;  =  R for i  =  1,2, the direct effect outweighs the indirect effect. Development
investments of a firm with bad news decreases in its research investments. Expected
equilibrium development profits given ti = t and t, = I are respectively:
71':(t)     =      21); (02 + a (rjD;(i) + (1  - rj)D;(i)) W  and
lr;(T; Ri)   =     (et W('14)) D:(T)2 + a (P(Ri)D;(t) + (1 - P(Ri))D;(T)) W.
Along the equilibrium path, where firms invest equal amounts in information acqui-
sition and expectations concerning investments are fulfilled, ri = Ri = R, development
3.5.  Race with Private Signals 67
investments are the following:
D: (i; R)     =
(1 - a) (2 + p(R) + (R - P(R))8) iii/
(2 + Ra) (2 + 4(R) + (1 - P(R))A) - (1 -R)P(R)A2'
Di (I; R)     =
(1 - a) (2 + (R - P(R))A) W
(2 + Ra) (2 + 9,(R) + (1 - P(R))A) - (1 - R)P(R)82
It is immediate that D;(t; R) > D;(I; R).  A firm with a bad signal is more reluctant
to invest in the development of the intermediate innovation than a firm with a good
signal.
Since a rival with a bad signal invests less than one with a good signal, a t-firm
expects its rival to invest less aggressively than with public signals. This means that
a firm with a good private signal invests more in development than a firm with a
good public signal, provided that information acquisition investments are symmetric
(Ri = R2) and expectations are realized:  D;(1; R) 2 6,(i) for all R.
Now  consider the situation in which nature chose  two bad signals,  (i, i).   For  each
firm there are two effects when we turn from a public to a private bad signal. First,
the firm becomes more optimistic about its costs. Since it conditions its beliefs only
on its own bad signal, expected cost is lower. This drives the firm's investments
up. Second, it expects higher investments from its rival. This decreases the firm's
investment incentives. The direct cost effect outweighs the indirect effect of rival's
expected investments, when information acquisition investments are symmetric and
expectations are realized. Therefore a firm with a private bad signal invests more in
development than a firm with bad public signal:  D;(T; R) > b,(T, i; R) for all R.
In the situation in which there is one firm who receives a good signal while the other
receives a bad signal, equilibrium investments for firms with private signals are lower
than investments with publicly observable signals.  That is, D; (D +D (0 -2,D,(t, D  <
0. Again, this holds provided that Rl = R , and that expectations are fulfilled.
We summarize the findings of this subsection in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.4  In the mce with private signals where expected research investments
are symmetric and realized, with r; =R; -R<1, equilibrium development invest-
ments are such that, for i = 1,2.
(i) Di'(t; R) > D;(f; R), and aDJJR) 10,
(ii)  D; (i; R)  >  A (t)   and  D; (7; R)  >  Di (t, 1,  R)
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3.5.2 Private Signal Research Investments
In the first stage of the race firms invest in information acquisition. The information
that each firm acquires remains private information for that firm. The free-rider
incentive in research that exists in the race with public signals is no longer present.
Firms will therefore invest more in research when the winner takes all. When firms
share revenues, it is not clear in which direction equilibrium research investments
change. We have seen that for public signals there are two free-rider effects. First
there is the direct effect, that a firm's own revenues are negatively affected because
also the firm's rival learns from its research. But, second, the rival's learning has a
positive indirect effect through revenue sharing. We substantiate these observations
in the remainder of this subsection.
First-order conditions for equilibrium research investments R* are the following:
PRi     -    P 2 [Di (t)2 - D;(t; Ri)21  +
+ [p(1 - Ri) + 1 -pl (2 + cp(Ri)) D; (I; R') aD; (I; Ri)
BRi
-   , 1 lp:(t)' - ( 1 + ,(RS)) D:( 1 1'4)'] t
 
p(1 - p)RjD;(i) (D; (t) - D;(T; Rj)) a
(p(1 - Rj) +1-p)
If we focus on symmetric equilibria, we get the following:
 p24(R)2(1 - 0)21'V2
PR= ..      (3.7)((2 + RA) (2 + p(R) + (1 - P(R))A) - (1 - R)P(R)82)'
A marginal increase in firm i's research investments that gives firm i a good signal
does not directly affect firm j's investments, because the firm's signal is private in-
formation. Therefore the revenue that firm i receives from its rival, through revenue
share a, is no longer affected by its research investments. The incentive to invest
in research for flrm i now only depends on the appropriability of its research invest-
ments, which is the share of its own revenue that the firm keeps, i.e.  1 - a.  The more
revenue spills over to the rival, the less valuable its own research becomes for the firm.
Therefore we observe that each firm's equilibrium research investment decreases in
the revenue share a. This is confirmed in the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.3 In the race  with private  signals,  for all revenue shares 0  6  10,11  jirnfs'
research investments decrease in the revenue share: < 0 for i = 1,2.
In the "winner-takes-all" race equilibrium research investments in acquiring private
signals exceed those of the equilibrium with public signals. Since firms can no longer
free ride on their rival's investments and signals, they have an incentive to invest more
in information acquisition. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5 In the "winner-takes-all " mce (a = 0) firms invest in equilibrium
more in acquiring private than public  signals:   R; (0)   2  Ri (0).    This  holds  with  strict
inequality whenever jirms choose interior equilibrium research investments.
More insight in the interaction between research and development could be gained
from the characterization of firms' expected equilibrium development investments
given equilibrium research investments, and their equilibrium profits. An overall
comparison between equilibrium development investments and equilibrium profits for
public and private signals would close the analysis. This exercise awaits future re-
search.
3.6 Strategic Revelation
In this section we extend the game by adding an information revelation stage. After
firms invested in research and received their private signal, firms choose what message
to send to their rival. After firms received each other's message, they invest in de-
velopment. Firms have an incentive to manipulate their information in order to alter
their rival's beliefs, and consequently change competition in the development stage in
their favor. Firms in a "winner-takes-all" race have an incentive to make their rival as
pessimistic as possible to discourage rival's development investments. For high rev-
enue shares firms have an incentive to make their rival as optimistic as possible. An
optimistic rival invests relatively much, and the revealing firm can take a free ride on
the revenue generated by those investments. The extent to which firms can actually
manipulate rival's beliefs and investments and the direction in which this happens is
the main topic of this section. Typically we are also interested in learning in what
direction firms want to shift rival's investments for intermediate revenue shares.
We make two distinct informational assumptions. First we analyze what infor-
mation is revealed when firms' information is non-verifiable. We do this in the next
subsection. How firms' incentives and possibilities to reveal information are affected
when information is costlessly verifiable is studied in the second subsection.
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3.6.1 Non-verifiable Information
In this subsection we assume that firms cannot verify the truthfulness of their rival's
messages. This makes it costless for firms to lie about their signal. Since lying is for
free and there is always a firm with incentives to lie, firms never fully reveal their
signals. We establish this in this subsection. Our contribution is here to show that
even for intermediate revenue shares firms' incentives are not aligned. Naturally, a
firm's rival is aware of the strategic nature of the firm's messages, and will be less
willing to rely on the firm's information. In fact we can show that there always is an
equilibrium in which no information is revealed. That is, investments for the race in
private signals are equilibrium investments in this situation.
Since information is non-verifiable, firms can make any statement about their
information they like. Formally, after each firm received its private signal, firms si-
multaneously choose their revelation rules (Ti(i, Ri), Ti(i, Ri)), with T,(4, Ri) E {t, f},
and reveal information Ti E {7-*(4, Ri)Iti = i, T and 0 S Ri 5 1} accordingly. Informa-
tion is not verifiable for firms. For example, revelation rule (7-,(t, Ri), T,(t, Ri))  E  (t, t)
gives full revelation, while rules (T,(L, Ri), T,(t, Ri))  E (t, t) and (t, t) do not reveal any
information to the rival firm. After messages are sent, firms simultaneously invest in
development.
A natural first step of analysis is to see whether firms voluntarily reveal all their
information in equilibrium. This would give us investments of the race with public
signals. First consider the "winner-takes-all" race.  In this race each firm has an
incentive to make its rival invest as little as possible.  If it is expected that a firm fully
reveals its information, then this firm has an incentive to always send bad news. That
is, it always states t = T. The rival believes this is truthfully revealed information,
and becomes pessimistic. The pessimistic rival invests little in development of the
prototype, which increases the expected profit of the sender of bad news. Second,
consider the "equal-sharing" race where firms believe that their rival fully reveals
information. In an "equal-sharing" race each firm has an incentive to make its rival's
investments as big as possible in order to take a free ride on those investments. Then
a firm has an incentive to always send good news. The firm's rival believes that
t was observed, and becomes optimistic about the costs of investment. The rival's
investments increase, and the sender of good news takes a free ride on these high
investments. Similar incentives to under- or overstate information exist for other
revenue shares. And full disclosure does never happen in equilibrium, as is stated in
the following proposition.
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Proposition 3.6  For all revenue shares a E IO, 11, there does not e:Eist an equilibrium
of the game with strategic revelation of non-verijiable information in which signals are
completely revealed.
This result indicates that the assumption of publicly observable signals, as in Choi
(1991) and Malueg and Tsutsui (1997), is indeed a strong one. When the assumption
is relaxed and signals can be costlessly misrepresented, complete revelation no longer
happens in equilibrium.
The polar case of complete revelation is no revelation of any information.  No
revelation of information can always be sustained as an equilibrium. Given that
the statements of firms contain no information whatsoever, firms ignore them. Since
statements are ignored, neither truthful nor false statements affect rival's investments.
Therefore firms are indifferent between all statements, and it is optimal to choose the
non-revealing rule that is consistent with equilibrium beliefs. This is stated in the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.4 There is an equilibrium of the game with strategic revelation of non-
verijiable information in which no information is revealed for any revenue share a E
P, 1].
This  result is similar  to  that  of  Ziv  (1993),  and is standard for models  with  non-
verifiable signals. The paper by Ziv focuses on the incentives of Cournot duopolists
to understate costs of producing homogeneous products. In our analysis we consider
a situation in which revenue sharing affects firms' incentives. And we show that ir-
respective of how firms share the revenue from innovation, they never reveal their
information. Depending on how much of the revenue is shared between firms, firms
have an incentive to give less (low a), more (high a), or both less and more (interme-
diate a) favorable information to the rivals.
It would be interesting to see whether there are revenue shares for which revela-
tion of some information will be chosen in equilibrium. This question awaits future
research.
3.6.2 Verifiable Information
In the previous subsection we assumed that firms can costlessly misrepresent their
private signal. Therefore credible revelation of information is not possible in equilib-
rium. A natural question to ask is how the results are affected when information is
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costlessly verifiable. The only choice that a firm with verifiable information has, is to
either disclose its information or conceal it. For low (resp. high) revenue shares firms
have an incentive to disclose only bad (resp. good) news. A firm's rival anticipates
this and knows  that a concealing firm's cost signal  is  low  (resp.    high). This evapo-
rates a firm's possibilities to effectively conceal information. However for intermediate
revenue shares complete disclosure is not an equilibrium strategy. For intermediate
shares both the high- and low-cost type of firms have an incentive to conceal, and can
therefore credibly do so. This is shown in the remainder of this subsection.
The seminal paper by Okuno-Fujiwara et at. (1990) gives sufficient conditions
on firms' strategic interaction and information under which an equilibrium with full
disclosure of private information with sceptical inferences exists.  For our R&D race
neither sufficient condition 4c nor 4d from Okuno-Fujiwara et al.  (1990) are met.
Assumption 4c (resp. 4d) states that as a firm's signal increases, his reaction curve
shifts out (resp. in) while his rival's reaction function shifts in (resp. out) or stays
the same.
In our model firms' signals, and expected profits, are correlated. Therefore firm i's
marginal expected development profit is non-increasing both in its own and its rival's
signal. The negative relationship between a firm's disclosure and its own marginal
profit is a strategic effect. After disclosing verifiable good news, a firm discloses
to be an aggressive development investor. The negative relationship between a firm's
signal and its rival's marginal profit is caused by the informational effect of disclosure.
Disclosure of good news by one firm makes the other firm more optimistic which shifts
out its development reaction function.
The violation of the sufficient conditions for complete revelation raises the question
whether the "unraveling" result still goes through. Okuno-Fujiwara et al. discuss a
common value example in which neither condition 4c nor 4d is satisfied, but full
disclosure is still established. The result is obtained here because the strategic effect
dominates the informational effect. In our model the informational effect dominates
the strategic effect, and we obtain a similar result for extreme revenue shares.
Proposition  3.7   When jinns'  signals are costlessly verijiable after revelation, then
there are revenue shares E and g, with 0<1<2<1, such that:
(i)  for asa  jirrns  fully  disclose in, equilibrium with skeptical inferences,
(ii)  for 3  <a <eno inferences support fult disclosure in equilibrium,
(iii) for a>2 jirms fully disclose in equilibrium with skeptical inferences.
Note that skeptical inferences of (i) and (iii) are not identical. For revenue shares
3.7. Observable Research Investments                                        73
0 5 0 firms have an incentive to conceal good news, while they have an incentive
to disclose bad news. Therefore firms infer that a concealing firm received signal t
under (i). These beliefs make strategic concealment of information unprofitable.   For
revenue shares that exceed g firms have an incentive to conceal only bad news. Hence
for (iii) firms rationally infer that a concealing rival has signal I, which establishes full
revelation.
For extreme revenue shares the verifiability of firms' information enables a firm
to unravel its rival's private information, as in Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981).
Such a result is the opposite of our results on revelation in the previous subsection.   For
non-verifiable signals firms cannot credibly reveal any information, while for verifiable
signals firms cannot credibly conceal information from their rival.
Under (ii) both firms have an incentive to misrepresent their information, and
full disclosure is not chosen in equilibrium. For intermediate revenue shares different
effects dominate for different firm types.  A firm who received a bad signal has an
incentive to conceal since it makes his rival more optimistic about the costs of invest-
ment. The rival will invest more in development, and the high-signal firm can take
a free ride on its rival's higher expected revenue. A firm with a good signal has an
incentive to conceal information, and discourage its rival in the development stage.
For the good-signal firm the informational effect outweighs the free-rider effect. A
similar result is found in a different setting by Hendricks and Kovenock (1989).
3.7 Observable Research Investments
In this section we discuss how results depend on the non-observability of research
investments. We illustrate the effect of publicly observable research investments by
looking at the case in which signals are public.
Changes in one firm's publicly observable research investments affect both firms'
beliefs. When firms keep receiving bad news after a firm increases its research invest-
ments, this has two conflicting effects. First the usual effect is that the investing firm
decreases its development investment, because it becomes more pessimistic. However,
also the firm's rival becomes more pessimistic, and contracts its development invest-
ments. This spillover effect gives the firm a bigger incentive to invest in development.
Therefore increases in observable research investments make development investments
after bad signals decrease less steeply than unobservable research investments. This
has two consequences for equilibrium research investments. First the spillover ef-
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feet makes a firm's own expected revenues of observable research investments bigger
than those of unobservable investments. Therefore equilibrium observable research
investments exceed equilibrium unobservable investments in the "winner-takes-all"
race. The second observation is that the spillover effect decreases rivals' expected
revenue. Therefore the marginal benefit of revenue sharing is reduced, which makes
observable equilibrium research investments smaller than unobservable investments in
the "equal-sharing" race.  A more detailed discussion of these effects is given in the
remainder of this section.
With observable research investments equilibrium development investments D°
depend on the research investments of both firms, R
Dio(L) = and  D;(t, t: R)  =(1 - a)W (1 - a)W9+a ' 0+0(R)  + a,
and
aD:(t, I; R) = -p(1 - Rj)0(R)D;(I, i; R) < 0.
DR4 Ip(1 -Ri)(1 -R j) +1-p} (2+ 0(R)+A)  -   '
for  i  = 1, 2.When we compare this expression  with  that in equation (3.2) where
expectations concerning research are realized,  rj  =  Rj  for j  =  1,2,  we note the
following:
aD,(I, t; R)  <  DDI'(i, I. R) < 0.
BRi BRi  -
When research investments are observable, firm i's equilibrium development invest-
ments are less sensitive to unilateral investment changes. This is caused by the fol-
lowing spillover effect. When firm i's research investment is observable, and firm i
increases research investments while the signals remain (t, t), not only firm i, but also
firm j becomes more pessimistic. Firm j therefore decreases its development invest-
ments. Since development investments are strategic substitutes, this countervails firm
i's direct decrease in development investments. This spillover effect reduces the direct
effect of firm i's own growing pessimism.
The equilibrium profits, given cost of investment 0 and equilibrium development
investments D°, is:
71'i(D°(a); 8) = (1 - a)  (1 - a) 8(DY)2 + aWD; 
The equilibrium condition for research investments, R°, becomes:
PRi = (1 - 0) ((1 - a)MR°(R) + aMQ°(R)),
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with
MR°(12)  = p(1 -Rj) 2 (Dio(t)2- D;'(I, 2, R)2) +
OD°(t.t· R)+Ip(1 -Ri)(1 -Rj)+1-p](2 + 0(R))D;(T,T; R)  '  '
OR<
p(1 - Rj)10(R)}2Wv (20(R) + (2+ A)(2 - 2A))
2(2 + A)212 + 0(R) + 813
MQ°(R)  =  p(1 -Rj)W (D;(L)-D;(I, I; R)) +
t[p(1 - Ri)(1 - Rj) t l- p}W     'aD:(t, T; R)
DR.,
p(1 - Rj)W2[0(R)12
(2 + A)(2 + 0(R) + a)2
When we compare these expressions with expressions (3.4) and (3.6) we observe the
following. Along the equilibrium path, when expectations are realized, A = Di:
Since observable changes in research investment affect own equilibrium development
.-I
investments less than unobservable changes, we have MR(R) < MR°(R), for all R.
It is therefore immediate that for the "winner-takes-all" race (a = 0) observable
equilibrium research investments are greater than unobservable equilibrium research
investments for any cost of research investment p:  R;(0)  >  R,(0). But since observable
changes in research investment do affect rival's equilibrium development investments,
8055,2-,R) --.< 0, we have MQ(R) > MQ°(R), for all R. It is easily verified that in theaR,
"winner-takes-all" race firms with observable research investments still underinvest in
research:  Ry(O) < Ri, for i = 1,2.
For the "equal-sharing"  race  (a  -   )  the effect of observable research investments
on a firm's own as well as its rival's development investments are present. These effects
point in opposing directions. Since the effect of observable research on own develop-
ment investments is an indirect effect, while the effect on the rival's development
investments is direct, the latter dominates the former in the "equal-sharing" race.
This is reflected in the fact that for all R: M-R(R) + M-Q(R)> MR°(R) + MQ°(R).7
Therefore unobservable research investments exceed observable ones in equilibrium:
R,( ) > R;'( ), for i = 1,2.
These results are summarized in the following proposition:
7 It is easily verified  that:
p(1 - Rj)H/20(R)(2 + 0(R))
[AiR(R) + AIQ(R)1 - [AIR°(R) + AIQYR)} = > 0.
(2 + 0(R) + a)3
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Proposition 3.8 Consider the race  with  public  signals,   and  take  ri  =  R,  for i  =   1,2.
With observable msearch investments equilibrium is such that:
(i. a) development investments do not di#er: Di(t; R) = D;(t, R), for all t, R,
(i. b)  development  investments fall  more  steeply  in unobservable research investments
than in observable ones: a j , ,R) < aD I ;R)   0,
(ii) observable equilibrium research investments exceed unobservable ones in the "winner-
takes-all" race, R;(0) 2 RiCO), while the reverse holds in the "equal-sharing" race,
R;( )  S  Ri( ). WheTe strict inequalities hold for interior equilibrium research  invest-
ments.
We conclude that observable research investments create an effect on the way
both firms respond to changes in research investments. The direction in which this
effect points depends on the direction in which spillovers between firms point.  In
a setting where Cournot competitors acquire private information on their demand
intercept, Hauk and Hurkens (1998) show that observable research investments exceed
unobservable investments in equilibrium. The analysis of this subsection suggests
that this conclusion is sensitive to their assumption on the kind of information that
is acquired. Our analysis could be interpreted as one of Cournot competitors who
acquire public information about the "slope of demand", and give different equilibrium
results.8
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter we studied investment incentives of firms who learn about the R&D
project they work on, while they invest in it. We showed that these incentives are
such that firms' pessimism grows when they receive bad news after more investments.
This depresses development investments after bad signals are received. In a winner-
takes-all race with public signals the firms overinvest in product development, because
research efforts are duplicated. They underinvest in information acquisition, due to
the public good nature of the disclosed information.
The chapter has demonstrated that firms' incentives change drastically when firms
share revenues. When we introduce revenue sharing in the race with public signals,
both research underinvestment and the development overinvestments are initially re-
duced. This suggests that firms would be better off if they would share revenues from
8Malueg and Tsutsui (1996) show that incentives to commit to sharing exogenous information
change too when they move from information about unknown demand intercept to information about
unknown slope. (Firms  have a bigger incentive to share information about unknown slope.)
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innovation. Revenue sharing should, however, not be driven too far. For example,
in an equal-share R.&D race firms underinvest both in information acquisition and
development, due to free-rider incentives. An efficient revenue share trades off distor-
tions of incentives in information acquisition and development of the innovation, and
creates a race between "winner-take-all" and "equal-sharing".
Not only the extent to which firms share revenues, but also the observability of in-
termediate research results affects investment incentives substantially. When signals
are private and firms acquire the same information, firms invest more in develop-
ment along the equilibrium path. When firms receive difTerent information, then the
total development investment under public information exceeds that under private
information. Again revenue sharing decreases firms' development incentives. Because
free-rider effects are absent in a race with private signals, firms invest more in ac-
quiring private than in public information when no revenues are shared. In contrast
to the race with public signals, equilibrium investments in private signals decrease
monotonically in the revenue share.
We have shown that the verifiability of intermediate research results is crucial in
determining what kind of investments are actually made in equilibrium. No informa-
tion is credibly revealed for any share of revenues when information is non-verifiable.
In that case revealing no information is an equilibrium strategy. Therefore the re-
search and development investments of the race with private signals are equilibrium
investments for a race in which non-verifiable intermediate information is created.
When firms' private information is verifiable, the "unraveling result" ensures for ex-
treme revenue shares full disclosure of research results, and gives the public signal
equilibrium investments. For intermediate revenue shares verifiable information will
not be disclosed.
Observable research investments create more spillovers between firms' research
investments, since changes in one firm's research investments affects both firms' pos-
terior beliefs about their project.  When an extra unit of research did not give an
improvement in signal, both firms become more pessimistic about their project. This
puts the investing firm in a relatively better position at the start of the develop-
ment stage, as compared to a race with unobservable research investments. Therefore
firms invest more in observable research than in unobservable research in the "winner-
takes-all" race. When firms share revenues equally, a firm's growing pessimism from
his rival's unsuccessful research investments is not beneficial for the rival. Therefore
4                                                „firms invest less in observable research in an equilibrium of the equal-sharing   race.
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Although we made a substantial first step in the analysis of learning effects in
R&D races, there remain some open questions. It would be interesting to study the
overall effect of the interaction between research and development investments by
characterizing the expected equilibrium development investments given equilibrium
research investments. The ultimate goal of this research project would be to make an
overall comparison between expected profit levels under public and private signals. It
would improve the paper if we could prove statements on partial information revelation
in equilibrium. Also comparative statics would improve our understanding of the
results. These, and other extensions of the analysis await future research.
3.9 Appendix
In this Appendix we prove the main propositions of this chapter. The first subsection
proves the main propositions on equilibrium investments for public signals. Subsection
2 proves the main proposition for a race with private signals. In subsection 3 we prove
the lemmas and propositions concerning strategic information revelation.
3.9.1  Proofs for Public Signal Race
In this subsection we prove propositions 3.1 and 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.1  (R > R)
First we show that marginal revenues of research investments in the optimum are
strictly larger than those in the public signal race:
p(1 - Rj)11/20(R)2       > p(1 - Rj)W20(R) ( 20(R) - a(2 + A))
(2 + 28)(2 + 0(R) + 28)2 (2 + a)2(2 + 0(R) + a)2
which certainly holds whenever:
1                       2
(2 + 2a)(2 + 0(R) + 2a)2>  (2 + a)2(2 + 0(R) + a)2 4*
(2 + a)2(2 + 0(R) + 8)2>  2(2 + 28)(2+0(R)+2A)2   **
0(R)2(2A2 + 228 + 22) + 20(R)(22 + 2 2 + 222 A + 23)+
+(22 4 + 2823 + 0) > 0,
which obvipusly holds. Since marginal costs are identical, this gives underinvestments
in research by competing firms.
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Proof of Proposition 3.3 (BR/80)
For positive "winner-takes-all" research investments, i.e. MR(R) > 0, we apply the
implicit function theorem to first-order condition (3.5) to derive that:
DR,(0) - (1- 20)  M-Q(R) - MR(R)  - M-R(R)
80       (1 -a)  (1 - a)Alik'(R) + a.lfiQ'(R)1 -p
/ R=R(e)
Note  that   for an interior solution   R,(a), the second-order condition gives  a  non-
negative denominator. The numerator is linear in prize share a.  For 0 -Owe obtain:
.-- ----1-
BR,(0) =  MQ(R) - 2MR(R) |       > O,
aa             Mk'(R) - P     |R=A
since M-Q(R) > 2MR(R) for all R, and therefore also for R. For a - we get:
DRi (3) = -AiR(R)
0'       t (M-Q'(R) + MQ'(R)) -p          <0,
R-R( )
.-I
because MR(R) > 0.  From the linearity of the numerator we deduce that there always
is a G E (0,  ) such that Mel =0.
3.9.2    Proof for Private Signal Race
In this subsection of the Appendix we prove proposition 3.5 and 3.4.
Proof of Proposition 3.4 (D;(.))
In part (i) the first inequality is obvious, while the second, for ri -Ri = R and
i = 1,2, reduces to:
aD;(I; R)  - -p(1 -PR)*(Ri)D;(T; R) + p(1 -p)Ra (D;(t) -D;(7; R))
8R£ (1 - PR)2 (2 + 4(Ri))
where the numerator is proportional to:
-(1 - PR)W(R)[2 + 49(R) + (R - P(R))81 + (1 - p)Rp(R)A
= -(1 -PR)W(R)12+ F(R)1,
which is negative for R < 1.
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For part (ii) it suffices to observe that:
Di (t; R) - b.·(t) = (1 - a)(1 - R)84(R)W
[(2 + Ra)(2 + 4(R) + (1 - P(R)) A) - (1 - R)P(R)82](2 + a)'
and
D; (i; R) - D,(I, i; R) =
(1 - 0)210(R) - 4'(R)]W
1(2 + Ra)(2 + F(R) + (1 - P(R))A) - (1 - R)P(R)821(2 + 0(R) + A)'
which obviously exceeds zero for R <  1. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3.5 (R;(0) 2 R,(0))
In this proof we compare marginal research revenues for public signals with those for
private signals. Naturally, from (3.4) we obtain:
M-R(R) <  1)20(R)2W2(2 + a)2(2 + 0(R) + 8)2
 P/1 -  20 - 2)2WY (3.8)= [p(1 - R)2 +1- P]2(2 + A)2(0 + 0(R) + 8)2
For 0-0 (3.7) marginal research revenues for private signals reduce to:
MR*(R) E
 p6'(R)2M/2
((2 + Ra) (2 + 4(R) + (1 - P(R))8) - (1 - R)P(R)82)2
 2(1 - p / - 2)2W2                             6OP)
(1 -PR)2((2 +RA)(2 + 92(R)+(1 -P(R))A)-(1-R)P(R)A )
When we compare denominators of (3.8) and (3.9), we obtain:
Ip(1 - R)2 + 1 -p}(0 + A)(2+0(R) + A) +
-(1 - PR) ((2 + RA) (2 + 9,(R) + (1 - P(R))8) - (1 - R)P(R)82)
=   (E(8) + a)[22 + (1 + R)A] -PR(3 - R)(2 + A)2.
Since this expression is linear and decreasing in p it suffices to evaluate it for p = 1.
For p=1 the expression reduces to:
(1 - R)(2+ A)12 + (1 - R)(2+ a)120
This implies that MR(R) < MR*(R) for all R < 1, which completes the proof.
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3.9.3  Proofs for Strategic Revelation
In this subsection we prove lemma 3.6, propositions 3.4 and 3.7.
Proof of Proposition 3.6 (No Complete Revelation)
Suppose complete revelation does happen in equilibrium. Then equilibrium beliefs
are such that any statement is believed. Firm j's equilibrium investments would be
Dj (t)  =  ilifiIv   and  Dj (I, t)  =  2;(:}11.2. At: ),  respectively.   Suppose  that  firm j
completely reveals his information, and that he received signal tj = t from nature.
Then if firm i received signal t and reveals it, firms invest b(t), and firm i has expected
profit:
71'i(tlt) = (1 - 0 ) 11'.2
(1 - a) 2 ta(2 + A)
(2 + a)2
If firm i states I instead, this makes firm j invest Dj(£, f).  Firm i's optimal response
to  Dj (I, t)  is Di  =  (1-0)lv(0+0(r))    Firm i's profit from overstating his signal  is:(2+0(r)+a)2
7ri(Ilt) = (1 - 0)11/2 (1 - a) (2 + 0(r))2 + of(2 + 0(r) + A)
2(2 + 0(r) 4 j)2
The difference in profit between overstating and truth-telling is:
(1 - a)11/2
iri(ili) - 71''QID - ((1 - a)a + a(-b)),2(2 + A)2(2 + 0(r) + a)2
with
a E   (1(2 + 0(r))(2 + 8)12 - 12(2 + 0(r) + a)]2),
b   E   2(2 + a)(2 + 0(r) + 8)0(r).
Hence, there is a a€ (0,1) such that iri(FIL) > 71-i(Lit) iff 0 5 2· Similar for a 7-firm
i, stating t (resp. 0 makes I-firm j choose Dj (D   (resp.    Dj (2, t)).    Firm i's optimal
response to this investment is Di = (e-hA)(1+4(14'r,)) (resp. Di(i , th).Firm i'S proft for(1    0)1Ve
understating its signal is:
1Ti (il to   =   (1
-
cr)1/1/2
(1 - 0) 22 + 0(2 + a)(2 + 0(Ri, rj))
(2 + a)2(2 + 0(Ri, rj))
while truth-telling gives it:
ir,(III) = (1 - a)W2
(1 - (7)J(2 + 0(r))2 + 0(2 + 0(r) + Lj)(2 + 0(Ri, rj))
(2 + 0(r) + A)2(2 + 0(14, rj))
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The difference in profit between understating and truth-telling is:
(1 - a)M/2Tri( IT) - 71'i(Ily) = ((1 - a)(-A) + aB),(2 + A)2(2 + 0(r) + 8)2(2 + 0(Ri, rj))
with
A E a, and B=(2+ 0(Ri, rj))(2 + A)(2 + 0(r) + A)0(r).
Hence, there is a a e (0,1) such that 7ri(tlt) 2 7r,(Ilt) whenever a 2 0.I t i s straight-
forward that b 5 B. This implies that 0 5 2, and, thus, is deviating from complete
revelation profitable for all a  €  [0,11. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.4 (No Revelation)
Observe that when firms never update their beliefs, each firm is indifferent between all
revelation rules, i.e. lr,(Ti(ti), Tj)  = 11'i('r;(ti), 7-j) = Ee{71-,(D'; 8)Iti; Ri} for all 7-i, T;
and ·rj. No revelation, e.g.  9,(4)  = i for i =  1,2, is therefore weakly preferred by
firms, which is consistent with beliefs. By stating high costs, no type of firm i can
obtain higher profits, since beliefs are not updated.
Proof of Proposition 3.7 (Verifiable Information)
Since information is verifiable, a firm can only choose to either disclose or conceal its
signal, 1-,(ti) E {ti, 0}.  If only one type of firm chooses to conceal its signal, its rival
can infer its information perfectly. We therefore only need to distinguish between
strategies  of full disclosure  and full concealment.   We  take  0,2,  and  7r,(.1.)  as  in  the
proof to lemma 3.6, and characterize part (i), (ii) and (iii), respectively.
(i)  Take  0  5 0. Suppose  that  firm j discloses its information:   Tj (tj)  =  tj  for  tj  E
{i, T}.  In that case firmi's disclosure rule can only affect the equilibrium outcome when
firm j discloses t.  Firm i's expected profit from disclosing private signals t and I is then
71'i(£10 and 'ri(TIT), respectively. Suppose that firm i deviates from complete revelation
and conceals its signal. After concealment firm j updates its beliefs skeptically, and
believes that ti = i with probability 1, i.e. lr,(014) E 7ri(114). Consequently it invests
Dj(t) in development. This leaves firm i indifferent between disclosing and concealing
when 4 - i. When firm i has private signal I, it prefers to disclose his signal, since
74(212) 2 71-i(LIT) iff a 5 27 Hence sceptical beliefs are consistent with firm's incentives,
and firms' disclosure strategies are optimal given beliefs.
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(ii) Take a<a<e, and suppose  that  firm j discloses his information.     Firm  j's
development investments can only be affected by firm i's disclosure decision when firm
j receives a bad signal, tj = t. We consider this case. After firm i's concealment, 9, =
0, firm j assigns probability B to the contingency that firm i received a good signal,
4 - 1 with 0 5 51 5 1. Firm j's expected costs of development after concealment are
2 + (1 -p)0(n, Rj). The first-order condition for firm j's investments is the following:
(2 + (1 - *)0(n, Rj))Dj(0; Rj) =(1 - a)W - (BDi(t) + (1 - B)Di(i)) A.
Firm i's first-order conditions remain unchanged. Given firm j's belief, we obtain the
following equilibrium investments:
(1 - a)W 12(2 + 0(r)) - (2 + /40(r))Al
D1(0; rj) =
2(2 + 0(r))(2 + (1 - 11)0(r)) - (2 +  10(r))A2
Df(L)   = (1 - 0)H/(2 + 0(r))(2 + (1 - B)0(r) - A)2(2 + 0(T))(2 + (1 - /1)0(r)) - (2 + /10(T))A2
ir (I;  Ri)        =
(1 - a)We(2 + (1 - *)0(r) - a) (2 + 0(r))
2(2 + 0(r))(2 + (1 - p)0(r)) -(2 +  10(r))82 . (2 + 0(Ri, rj))
Firm i's expected equilibrium profits are:
71' (01£)   =    D:'(i)2 + (71''FD;(0; 9)
4(012)   =    (2 + 0(Ri, rj))1):'(I; R,)2 + aWD;(0; rj)
Note that for belief B=0 firm i strictly prefers to conceal t, since 11' (0'D - 71'*(TIL) >
lr,(AID for a  < 2.  We can therefore rule out belief f = 0 as supporting a full disclosure
equilibrium. Belief B - 1 can be ruled out too, because firm i prefers to conceal a bad
signal given this belief, i.e. 7rii(0 lt) = 7ri(LIT) > 7ri(LIT) for a > a. For beliefs strictly
between 0 and 1 there is a critical value op (resp. QB) such that disclosing t (resp
t) is profitable for firm i whenever a 2 f (resp. 0 14 7). The critical values are
defined as follows:
 2 (d('( 2 - i( )2 CK = ,and
12 (df )2 - 4(O,) - (d;(0,9) - d,(t))
-  (2 + 0(Ri, rj))  (1('(i; R,)2 - di(i; R,)2 
ap =
- (2 + 0(Ri, rj)) <dI'(t; Ri )2 - i(t; R,)2  +  d;(0; rj) - J(t; rj) 
where 04(.) E De(.)/(1 - a)W, with  f  -  i,j. For prize share  a full disclosure  is  an
equilibrium strategy given belief /1, whenever belief B is such that k s a s 5#. First
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we verify that both f and axare monotonically decreasing in belief B for 0 < B < 1:
ae•   =   2 [;'; i') (d.(t)2 - i(t)2) - d.(t)21il  (d»(0. r,)- gj(t))]
8&1                                       2




1 2 (d:(t)2 - '4(t),) - (djf(0; 5.) - d.,(t))1
1 ad;(0;rj) Co¢(i; R,)2 - (12(T; Ri)2  +
(2 + 0(Ri, rj)) 2   ap    \
85* -  -(¢(t; Ri)adr R,)  djx(0; rj)-  ·(t; rj) 
8*                                          2
[ 2 (f(i; Ri)2 - i(i; Ri)2  -  d;(0; ri) - Ri(i; Ri))]
-'12*20(r)382(2+0(r))(2+0(r)-a)(2-8)3  . (2+0(r))2
(24-0(r)+A)212(2+0(r))(24.(1-B)0(r))-(2+1,0(r))8214 (2+0(Rt,rj))
2<0·
[ 2 ((¢(t; R')2 - d,(t; R')2) - (d;(05 ri) -  (t, Ri))]
Furthermore, it is easily verified that:
a alima" = = limP.wn- 2+28  2+ 0(r)+2& plo
In combination with monotonicity this implies that 24* >a p for all 0<B<1.
Therefore there is no belief p such that full disclosure is chosen in equilibrium.
(iii)  For a  2  9 w e have a similar argument as in (i). Sceptical beliefs after concealment
are to believe that your rival has a "bad" signal, i.e. 71-,(0lti) E 71-,(t|ti). This leaves
firm i with a bad signal indifferent between disclosing and concealing. Firm i with a
good signal is worse off by concealing its signal, since Ti(ilt) 5 71'i(ilt) iff 0  2 2.  This
completes the proof.
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A basic property of research and development (R,&D) is that it generates information
for the firms who invest in it. Usually this information is private to the firms and is
produced along the trajectory of the R,&D project that leads to an innovation. Disclo-
sure or concealment by competing research labs of such intermediate information can
have different effects on RkD competition. This gives these labs different incentives
to disclose information, and consequently different incentives to invest in the creation
of information and in the development of the innovation. This chapter discusses in
what direction the different incentives point and what investments result from it.
For some innovations firms aggressively preannounce their new products to dis-
courage rivals. For example, in the operating system market many people claim that
Microsoft (MS) is using preannouncements of its operating system upgrades to drive
competition out of their market.1  Such a preannouncement strategy is called a "va-
porware" strategy.  On many occasions MS is accused of practicing such an aggressive
preannouncement strategy. Disclosing good news about their own capabilities of in-
troducing a new product in the market quickly, discourages rivals to invest in the
development of competing products.  In most literature on dynamic R&D competi-
tion the progress of one firm in their project discourages his rivals to invest in the
innovation. Taking a lead in the race gives the leading firm a strategic advantage, e.g.
see Grossman and Shapiro (1987), and Harris and Vickers (1987). This is a "strategic
1 See e.g Lopatka and Page (1995), Prentice (1996), Shapiro (1996), United States v. Microsoft,
Civil Action No. 94-1564, and Shapiro and Varian   ( 1999). An extensive anacdotical report   on
Microsoft's strategies is presented in Wallace and Erickson (1992).
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effect". If firms can disclose that they made an early intermediate discovery without
revealing the contents of this discovery, they would always do so:
The strategic effect can be observed in another case. British Biotech (BB) is a
pharmaceutical firm whose main activity is research on and development of anti-cancer
drugs.  In the Spring of 1998 director of clinical research Andrew Millar of BB was
dismissed after disclosing bad news about BB's research and commercial strategy. As
a result of the disclosure BB's stock market value collapsed, reflecting its reduced
opportunities in the race for anti-cancer drugs. By concealing their bad test results,
the firm tried to keep the market optimistic about its capabilities of introducing a
new drug shortly.3  Both cases suggest the predominance of the strategic effect of
information disclosure. Ftom the disclosed information rival firms learn about the
firm's progress in the race, and become more pessimistic about their own opportunities
of participating in the R&D race. Disclosing good news, and concealing bad news
about yourself makes your rivals believe that you will be a strong competitor in the
remainder of the race.
Although the effects of information disclosure and concealment are similar in the
two cases, regulatory responses differed substantially. In the 1994-95 licencing court
case against Microsoft Corp., Microsoft's "vaporware" practices where investigated
(e.g.  see US v MS, 1995).  This did not lead to any restrictive regulation of Mi-
crosoft's announcements. Regulations in the pharmaceutical industry, however, re-
quire firms to disclose their intermediate testing results. The attempted concealment
by British Biotech had severe negative consequences for its chances to get approval
from the European Medical Evaluation Agency (EMEA) to sell developed drugs. In
this chapter we study the effects of regulating firms' disclosure strategies.  We com-
pare firms' investments and profits under a regime of mandated disclosure with those
under voluntary disclosure.
In other industries we can observe an effect of intermediate information disclo-
sure that conflicts with the strategic effect. For fundamental innovations, for which
firms do not have a clear idea of their costs of investment, disclosure of intermediate
successes can encourage rival firms to invest. An example of this type of behavior
2In patenting the preannouncement is accompanied with disclosure of the contents of the inter-
mediate innovation. Typically patents trade off the benefit (from catching up of firms) against the
cost (from free-riding on competitors' research efforts) of information appropriation. For dynamic
incentives of patents, see e.g. Scotchmer and Green (1990), and Green and Scotchmer (1995).
3For coverage on this case, e.g. see Financial Times April 21, 27, and their survey at May 2/3
1998.
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is provided by the history of the development of cold superconductivity.4  Here one
firm's intermediate success gives not only aii indication of this firm's capabilities of
developing the new product, but also of that of its rivals. After an early intermedi-
ate success by one firm, rivals flock in and invest to obtain the final innovation first.
This effect could be explained in the following setting, as in Choi (1991). Firms learn
about the properties of their project while they work on it. These properties are
universal for the industry. Favorable information for one firm is favorable also for its
rivals. Then progressing in the race and disclosing this progress makes all firms more
optimistic,  and more willing to invest.   This  is an "informational effect".   But  when
favorable information for one firm also encourages rivals to invest in the project, the
firm might want to prevent its rivals from learning this information. Such an informa-
tional effect would induce firms to conceal good news about their research progress,
and disclose only bad news. Concealing good news and disclosing bad news makes
your rivals believe that the project has high costs of investment, which discourages
their investments.
Note that the strategic and informational effect lead to conflicting incentives to
disclose preliminary information about one's costs of investment. The interaction be-
tween the two effects is studied in this chapter. R&D races are typically dynamic
processes in which firms learn in the course of investing in it. Information is actively
and endogenously acquired in R&D races. Information need not always flow freely
between firms.  In many situations firms actively manage the flow of information that
they generate. This adds a new dimension to the firms' strategies. The main contri-
bution of this chapter is that it provides a theory on firms' incentives to strategically
disclose endogenous information to rivals. The trade-off between the incentives to cre-
ate, disclose and further build upon information in an R&D race is analyzed in this
chapter. As far as I know has this never been done in the literature. Furthermore we
discuss the consequences of disclosure regulation for firms' investments and expected
profits. We distinguish between the policy of mandated and voluntary disclosure, and
study their consequences for firms' investments and profits.
When correlation between firms' costs of investments is positive, both the informa-
tional and strategic effect emerge after disclosure of information. For perfect positive
correlation between costs of investments we show that the informational effect dom-
inates the strategic effect in most cases. Firms disclose bad news, and conceal good
news to make their rival as pessimistic about costs of investment as possible. There
4This example can be found in e.g. Choi (1991).
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are, however, also special cases in which the strategic effect is more powerful. With
independent costs the informational effect disappears. Since costs are independently
distributed, one firm's cost disclosure doesn't affect the other firm's expected costs of
investments. The strategic effect remains. Which suggests that firms disclose good
news only. Disclosing good information and concealing bad information makes rivals
expect strong competitors in the development stage, while it leaves their rival's own
cost expectations unchanged. Note that the firms' equilibrium disclosure rule under
independently distributed costs is in general exactly the opposite of that under perfect
positive correlation. By focusing on these extreme cases we get a clear-cut trade-off
between incentives to disclose and acquire information and to further develop the
innovation.
Related literature: Races in which firms learn after investing are studied by Hen-
dricks and Kovenock (1989), Choi (1991), Malueg and Tsutsui (1997), and Cyert and
Kumar (1996). The first three papers assume that information flows freely between
competing firms. And in Cyert and Kumar information becomes public after one of
the firms starts producing the innovation. Katsoulacos and Ulph (1998) study R&D
competition in which firms actively manage their information, but this information is
exogenous.
"Vaporware", i.e. strategic preannouncement  of good  news and concealment of
bad news, has been analyzed in some papers.  One of the first papers to point to the
potential strategic implications of preannouncements is Ordover and Willig (1981).  In
a seminal contribution by Farrell and Saloner (1986) the strategic effects of product
preannouncements are mainly driven by consumers' myopia: consumers only antici-
pate a new product after the preannouncement of it.  Both Levy ( 1997), and Lopatka
and Page (1995) note that in a signalling setting preannouncements only have strate-
gic effects when false announcements affect rival's or consumers' beliefs.  Haan (1998)
provides a signalling model of "vaporware" with intelligent consumers. False pre-
announcements do not affect consumers' beliefs and no information is revealed in
equilibrium. A first step towards an empirical analysis of vaporware effects in the
Digital Versatile Disc (DVD) player industry is made in Dranove and Gandal (1999).
In this chapter we present the first model that I know of that results iIi strategic
preannouncements among intelligent agents.
A powerful result in the theory of strategic disclosure of verifiable information is the
"unraveling result". Seminal contributions by Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981), Mil-
grom and Roberts (1986), and Okun Fujiwara et al. (1990) study this result. When
4.1. Introduction 93
it is known that the sender of information is informed, and information is costlessly
verifiable, he cannot do better than disclose his information, given skeptical equilib-
rium beliefs of the receiver. This result relies on the assumptions that information
is costlessly verifiable and that it is known that the sender is informed. Uncertainty
about whether or not the sender is informed and non-verifiability of uninformedness
disables the unraveling result in most cases. Austen-Smith (1994) shows that when
the receiver is uncertain about the informedness of the sender, the sender can conceal
some of his information in equilibrium. In equilibrium good news is disclosed while
bad news is concealed from the receiver. This argument is generalized and refined by
Shin (1994). Recently Krishnan et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence that firms
partially disclose earnings information to the financial market. We will use a simi-
lar framework of uncertain informedness to study strategic disclosure by racing R&D
laboratories.
The incentives to acquire and disclose information have been studied in firm-
financial market (see Verecchia, 1990), buyer-seller (see Shavell, 1994) and lobbyist-
government (see Lagerlof, 1997) settings. These papers endogenize the degree of
informedness of the sender, but abstract from competition between senders. Papers
in which firms strategically disclose information under competition are Admati and
Pfieiderer (1998), Dewatripont and Tirole (1999), and Shin (1998). The setup of these
papers, however, is such that senders disclose or conceal information to a third party.
Both Shavell (1994) and Admati and Pfieiderer (1998) are interested in the effects of
disclosure regulation. This is a main theme of this chapter too.
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First we endogenize the
extent to which firms are uninformed, by allowing firms to acquire costly information.
And second we study a problem in which competing firms disclose to each other. Dis-
closed information affects competition in developing the innovation. This means that
we endogenize the costs and benefits of both information acquisition and disclosure.
This is the main contribution of this chapter.
The chapter is organized as follows.  In the next section of this chapter we describe
the model. The third section discusses results under perfect positive correlation be-
tween firms' costs of development investments. We compare the benchmark outcome
in which firms maximize joint profits, the equilibrium of the game for mandatory dis-
closure, and the equilibrium for voluntary disclosure of information. Section 4 gives
results for identical independently distributed costs of development investments.  The
last section concludes the chapter.
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4.2 The Model
Consider the simplest environment in which two firms compete over two stages for an
innovation.  At the beginning of the race firms do not know the complexity of their
project, 8, for firm i, with i = 1,2.  Firm i's project is either easy or tough.  An easy
project for firm i has low costs of development 8, = 2, while a tough project has high
costs of development Bi - 0, with 0<2<8. The probability of working on an easy
(resp. tough) project is p (resp.  1 -p), with 0<p<1. Projects' costs of development
investments are either perfectly positively correlated, or identically independently
distributed.  For Pr[Oi =0 2=2 1=p and Pr[81 =0 2=8 1 -1-p, projects are
perfectly positively correlated. We study the model with perfect positive correlation
(PPC) in the next section of this chapter. For Prle, =2 1=p, Prle, =e l=1-p
with 8, and ej independent (i 56 j), projects are identically independently distributed
(IID). This specification of the model is analyzed  in the fourth section of this chapter.
Firms can learn about the complexity of their project by doing research in the first
stage of the race.  In this stage firms choose their research investments, Ri E 10,11
for firm i, simultaneously. Research investments are not observable. Firm i's rival
expects research investments ri. Costs of research are strictly convex and increasing
in investment: c(Ri) =  Ple, with p > 0. The research stage leads to a prototype
of the final innovation, and could provide information about the development costs.5
After investing in research each firm receives a signal, e, for firm i, about his cost of
development. With probability Ri firm i learns its true cost of development, e, = Bi·
However, with probability 1 - Ri firm i learns nothing, ei = 0.  Thus the more a firm
invests in research, the sharper its signal on the project's complexity will be. The
research stage is summarized in figure 4.1.
Information obtained by firms is verifiable. Only the fact whether or not a firm
is informed is not verifiable.  If firm i receives information 0„ it can choose to either
disclose it or conceal it, i.e. the firm chooses his communication Bi(Bi) from the set
{Gi, 0}.An uninformed firm can only state b,(0) = 0. It therefore suffices to denote
firm i's disclosure  rule  as  (4,3,)  E   (b,(2), 8,(0)). We denote the realization  of  rule
6,(.) as i, with i e {6,(e,)lei E {2,0,0}} for i, j - 1,2 and i 4 j. That is, 3, is the
message from firm i to j.
In the second stage firms invest in the development of their prototype by investing
5 We   assume that developing the prototype   is a necessary   step in successfully developing   the
innovation. The only reason for doing so is to avoid that firms decide not to acquire information and
skip the first stage of the race in order to take a lead over their rival.
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IR,1-e, - eIi-«1«
0, « I
11 - Ri}\ e, = 0
i [fl. e,=2     1Ipl  \0<        1
11 - R» e, 2 0
Figure 4.1: Firm i's research stage
Di,   with   D,   € [0,1]. Costs of development investment increase in investment   and
complexity:  C(Di; 8,)  =   e,Di2. With probability Di  firm i manages to develop a
marketable product, with probability 1 - Di it develops nothing. In this chapter we
study a "winner-takes-all" race. A firm gets payoff W, when it is the only firm that
develops the prototype. When both firms develop a marketable product, both firms
get payoff T.  When a firm does not manage to develop the prototype it gets no payoff.
Naturally, we take 11/ 2 2 T 2 0. Define A E W-T a s the prize difference between
winning and tying in the race. Because T is non-negative and cannot exceed   W,
we obtain that 1/1/ S A S W. For convenience we assume that 2> 28, since this
enables us to focus on interior development investment solutions.
Firms are risk neutral. Given the projects' complexity, and sunk costs of research
investments, firm i's expected development profit is:
A,(D; 0,) = Di(l - Dj)W + D,DjT -  8:DI = D,(H' - Dja) -  0,D,2,
with D = (Di, Dj). We solve the game backwards, and restrict the analysis to sym-
metric, pure strategy equilibria.
4.3 Perfect Positive Correlation (PPC)
In this section we assume that there is perfect positive correlation between firms'
development costs. We choose Pr[Gi - 0 2 - 01 - p and PrE81 =8 2=0 1 -1-p.
This reduces the firms' costs to 0,  =  8,  with 8  E  {2,0}  and i  =  1,2.   In the case
of perfect positive correlation firms could learn about their own cost of develop-
ment investment from their own acquired signal, and from disclosed information by
their rival. The expected development cost parameter can therefore be denoted by
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GE(ei, 6,6)  E  E(Oile:,6,6.),  for i,j  =  1,2,  i  0 j. For example,  when firm i  is
--
uninformed, ei = 0, while it receives bad news about its rival, 61-8, it does not
only learn that it faces a high-cost rival, Bj = 0, but it also learns that its own costs
of development investment are high, Of(0,8, 6) = 8. This gives us the informational
effect of information disclosure.
In the next subsection we solve for the industry's joint profit maximizing invest-
ments and disclosure rules. In the second subsection we derive and discuss firms'
equilibrium investments under mandated disclosure. Finally we discuss the equilib-
rium investments and disclosure rules when firms voluntarily disclose information. All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
4.3.1 Benchmark: Efficient Investments (PPC)
In this section we solve for the joint profit maximizing outcome of the race.  We
solve the game backwards. Note that for joint profits full disclosure is never worse
than any other disclosure rule - firms can always choose to ignore certain disclosed
information. It is therefore optimal to take 6,(e,) E 9, for i - 1,2
Efficient Development Investments
In this subsection we derive the efficient development investments, given full infor-
mation disclosure and any research investments. It is intuitive that firms' efiicient
development investments decreases in the expected cost of development, and increase
in the prize that is at stake. We show this in the remainder of this subsection.
After acquiring and disclosing information we can distinguish between two cases.
First, there are cases in which firms invest under complete information. Whenever
one of the firms receives an informative signal about development cost, both firms
are fully informed about their costs of development investment. The expected cost
parameter equals:
Of (0, 8) = GE(8,0) = of(0, 8) = 8, for o E {2,8} and i = 1,2.
Second, there  is the no-information  case: (0,0). Firms cannot update beliefs about
development costs, and maximize joint ex ante profits.  The ex ante expected cost
parameter is:
BE(0,0) = pe + (1 - p)8, for i = 1,2
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Total expected development profit, given signals  e  =  (ei, ej),  is:
1.-
E,    4(D; Ge)| e  = 1,1/   D, - 2AD,D. - - 4  ef(e)Di.' 2
This gives the following efficient development investment,  Di for firm i.
W
87(e)Di =w- 284 =* Iii(e) = . with i = 1,2.
BE(e) + 2&
Note that firms' efficient development investments decrease in their expected devel-
opment cost parameter Of(e). The more pessimistic firms are about their costs of
development the less they invest in developing the innovation. The efficient expected
development profit is the following:
Ti(e) E Ee (7ri(D; 8) le) =  M,13,(e), for i = 1,2.
Efficient Research Investments
In the first stage of the race firms make research investment decisions. By doing
so, they choose the probability of getting informed about their development costs.
Efficient research investments are determined by the trade-off between the marginal
cost of investment, p, and the expected gain of becoming informed.  This gain is
the difference between the expected efficient profit when firms are informed, and the
expected profit when firms remain uninformed. We show this in the remainder of this
subsection.
Total expected profit of choosing research investments  R   =   (Ri, Rj), given  its
- --
efficient development investments D = (Di, Dj), is:
2                                                   2
En,(R) = 11-(1-12,)(1-Rj)] Z {PT(2) + (1- p)*1(8)}+
f=1 1=1
+(1 - Ri)(1 - Rj) El'/(0) -  p (42 + R2).
E-1
Maximizing total profits with respect to Ri gives first-order condition PRi  =  (1 -Rj)A,
where
2
A    E    Z {pit(2) + (1 -p) (8) - 4(0) }
/=1
M,,2 M,,2 11,2
=P + (1 - P)-0+2A 8 + 2&      E(e)+28'
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and A > 0.6 The marginal revenue of research investments is the total expected
profit added to the industry from being informed instead of uninformed. The efficient
research investments are:
ARi --  fori -1,2
P+A'
In the following sections we study how noncooperative firms choose their invest-
ments, and how these investments relate to the efficient ones.
4.3.2 Mandated Disclosure Equilibrium (PPC)
In this section we study the equilibrium in which firms are required to disclose their
information e=(ei, e j).  Such a disclosure regulation could be implemented by the
threat of severe penalties after withholding of information is discovered.  Such a regu-
lation is effectively chosen by the European Medical Evaluation Agency for evaluating
medicine innovations. Observe that the only difference between the benchmark and
this case is that we introduce competition in research and development. The first sub-
section characterizes the equilibrium development investments, D, given the research
investments and full disclosure. Typically, firms overinvest in development, because
of a "business-stealing effect". The second subsection characterizes the equilibrium
investments, R. Firms underinvestment in research is due to a free-rider effect in
information acquisition.
Full Disclosure Development Equilibrium
Equilibrium development investments are determined again by the trade-off between
revenues and costs of development. However, firms do not internalize the adverse
effect that an increase in their development investment causes on the chances of their
rival to win the race. This causes them to overinvest in development, which is shown
in the remainder of this subsection.
Firm i chooses development investment D, to maximize expected profit, given
signals e and resulting expected cost parameter GiE(e):
Ee x,(D; 8)leI = Dil,1/ - di[)iDj -  Of(e)D , for i = 1,2.
6Since the function f (e) = 5+126 is strictly convex for all 0 > 0, pf(2) + (1 -p)f(0)> f(pa+(1 -
p)8). And therefore A > 0.
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The first-order condition for profit maximization of firm i is the following.
Of(e)Di =W- ADj.




Again equilibrium investments decrease in the expected costs of development.  Note
that these equilibrium investments are bigger than the optimal development invest-
ments Di(e). Firms that are required to disclose their information, overinvest in
development. This is a standard observation in R.&D races where investments are
strategic substitutes. Expected equilibrium profits are:
*,(e)   =   E, {., (D(e),e) | e} = f),(e) (w - D,·(e) a) -  ,f(e),8,(e)'
-  of(e)M/2
=    of(e),5,(e)· =  (e (e) + a)2
Full Disclosure Research Equilibrium
When firms choose research investments competitively, they prefer to free-ride on
information acquired by their rival. A firm's research investments only contributes to
its profit when its rival did not acquired information. In equilibrium firms therefore
underinvest in research, which is shown in the remainder of this subsection.
Firm i chooses research investment Ri such that it maximizes its expected profit,
given the equilibrium research investment  of the rival  firm,  Rj, and anticipating equi-
librium development investments, D.  Firm i's expected revenue of learning its own
cost of investment, ei = 8, is:
p#(2) + (1 -p)4(8).
The expected revenue from receiving ei = 0 is:
Rj (PRi(2) + (1- p)*,(0)) + (1 - Rj)*,(0)·
The marginal revenue of obtaining an informative signal is therefore (1 - Rj)B, where
B  E  p*:(2) + (1- p)*,(8)- 1,(0)
=   11'1/2 f     132         (1 -p)8 _       p2 + (1- p)/       l
2        1 (2 + 8)2       (8 + a)2       (pg + (1-p)8 + 8)2 J
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Note that the firm's marginal revenue of information acquisition is only positively
affected when the firm's rival failed to obtain any informative signal.7 Whenever firm
j managed to obtain an informative signal, firm i would prefer to incur no research
cost and free-ride on firm j's information.  Firm i's profit maximizing investments
in research are such that marginal cost of research investment equals its marginal
revenue: pR, = (1 - Rj)B. Equilibrium research investments are the following:
A=B
p + B.
When we compare these equilibrium investments with the efficient research invest-
ments, we obtain the following. Under mandated disclosure each firm free-rides on
the information acquired by its rival, while efficient research investments internalize
this externality. This is stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1 Under PPC and mandated disclosure the following holds:
-
(i) jirms overinvest in development: Di(e) > Di(e). for all e, and
(ii) firms underinvest in information acquisition .·  A f RE for i = 1,2,  with strict
inequality for interior research investment choices.
This subsection characterized the equilibrium investments under mandated dis-
closure. We compared the equilibrium investments with the efficient investments.
Ftee-rider incentives in information acquisition predominate when firms are required
to disclose their information. In the next subsection we characterize firms' equilibrium
investments and disclosure rules, when disclosure is voluntary.
4.3.3 Voluntary Disclosure (PPC)
In the preceding subsection firms were required to disclose their information. This
section studies the equilibria in which firms disclose information voluntarily. Under
PPC the informational effect is strongest for firms. Firms' incentives to conceal good
news while disclosing bad news are strongest in this case.  In this subsection we
characterize equilibrium investments under this rule, and derive conditions under
which concealment of good news and disclosure of bad news is indeed an equilibrium
disclosure rule.
Solving the game backwards involves three stages. First we must solve for the
equilibrium development investments, D-, given firms partially disclose inforniation,
7Since the function 9(0) = IN:&,r is strictly convex for all 8 > 28, pg(2) + (1 - p)0(0) >
g(1,2 + (1- p)0), and hence B > 0.
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6, expected disclosure  rule   (6, 3,)   =   (0.8) and expected research investmeIits,   r
Second we solve for the equilibriilm disclosure rules,  6*,  given tlie expected research
investments and equilibrium development investments. And thirdly we determine
the equilibrium research investments, 12*. This will be done in the following three
subsections, respectively.
Voluntary Disclosure Development Equilibrium
In this subsection we characterize firms' development investments under partial disclo-
sure. Both firms conceal good news, 6, = 0, while they disclose bad news about their
project, 3,- 8, with i = 1,2 Obviously, firms' equilibrium development investments
only differ from those under mandated disclosure when both firms send uninformative
messages. Since firms with good news pool together with uninformed firms under
partial disclosure, equilibrium development investment are affected in the following
way. A firm with good news expects weaker competition from a concealing firm under
partial disclosure than under mandated disclosure. It therefore invests more in devel-
opment. An uninformed firm will be more optimistic about costs of development but
expects stronger development competition under partial disclosure than under man-
dated disclosure. The informational effect dominates. Consequently it invests more in
development. When expected research investments grow, we expect the following. A
concealing firm is more likely to actually have good news. An informed firm therefore
expects a stronger competitor, while an uninformed firm expects lower development
costs. Therefore equilibrium development investments for the informed firm decrease,
while those of the uninformed firm increase in expected research investments.  We
establish these results more extensively in the remainder of this subsection.
First determine the equilibrium beliefs. Obviously, when one firm disclosed high
costs of investments, both firms expect 8 - 8, and invest D(8) accordingly.
When firms' costs of development investments are perfectly correlated, there is only
incomplete information between firms when neither firm disclosed any information,
(i, Sj)   = (0,0) Firms  are  in  one  of the following two situations.    When  firm  i
receives signal ei = 8, it knows that its costs of development investments are low.  A
firm that receives an uninformative signal, ei = 0, and faces a rival who does not
disclose information, bi = 0, knows that nobody received a high-cost signal. His rival
was either uninformed or received a low-cost signal. Given this inference and given
expected information acquisition investments,  rj,  firm i updates  its cost expectations
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by using Bayes' rule, which gives the following:
Pr[8 = 2166 = 01  =
Prie, 0 010 = 21 Prle = 2]
prIej 36 818 = 21 Prle = 0 + Prlej 9  ele = el Prle =  ]
P
=   p + (1 -rj)(1 -p) - al.
This gives expected costs of development:
E; (810) E Ei(Glei = 0,6. - 0) = aje+ (1 - E2j)0
Firm i's belief about firm j's private signal is then:
pr[ej = 2] Frjpr[ej = 216 =0 1. Prlej = 21 + Pr[ej =0] = prj +1-r j= ajrj
Given these beliefs, development investments are the following. When no informa-
tion was disclosed, firms update their beliefs, maximize expected profits given no
disclosure, and consequently invest in line with the following first-order conditions:
eD;(2)  =  W- (rjD;(2) + (1- rj)D;(0)) A (4.1)
E;(010)D;(0)  = W- D:(0)       1-9    D*£0) | A.   (4.2)
C     pri
<prj tl-Tj   '         prjtl-Tj   1<     )
When we solve this system of linear equation, we obtain the four equilibrium develop-
ment investments. About the equilibrium development investments of informed firms
with low-cost signal,   D- (2),  we  can  say the following.    The  firm  that is expected  to
have invested more (resp. less) in information acquisition, invests more (resp. less) in
development, when it receives a low cost signal.8
D:(2) > D;(2) ** ri > rj, for i, j - 1,2 and i 76 j
When your rival invests relatively little in research, you assign relatively little prob-
ability to facing an informed, aggressive rival. This gives you a relatively bigger
incentive to invest in development. Therefore equilibrium development investments
are bigger than those of your rival.
For uninformed firms the reverse holds. The uninformed firm who is expected to
have invested more (resp. less) in information acquisition, invests less (resp. more) in
development:
D;(0) > «(0) *> ri < rj, for i, j - 1,2 and i 0 j.
8 Note that D; (2) - D; (2) is proportional  to  (1 - p)2811/(1 - r,)(1 - ri)(0 - A)(0 - 2)(r, - rj),
which gives the observation directly.
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When your rival expects that you invested relatively little in research, this has two
effects. On the one hancl your rival expects you to become relatively less pessimistic
after receiving no informative signal and message. Given that you will be uninformed,
this gives you a strategic advantage compared to your rival, and increases your incen-
tives to invest in development. On the other hand your rival expects you to become
uninformed relatively more often. This makes your rival expect a relatively weaker
competitor. However, the former effect dominates the latter. Therefore an uninformed
firm who is expected to invest relatively little in research invests more aggressively in
development under partial disclosure.
With symmetric expected research investments, ri = r and a, = a for i = 1,2, the
equilibrium development investments under partial disclosure become:
Di (2)   = (ae + (1 - a)0 + r(1 - a)8) Iii/(2 + ra) (ag + (1 - a)8) + ((l - ra)2 + r(1 - ap) A'
DI (0)     =
(2 + r(1 - a)A) W
(2 + rA) (aG + (1 - a)8)  + ((1 - ra)etr(1 - a)8) a'
for i = 1,2. Observe that D:(2) 2 D;(0). When we compare firm i's development
investment first-order conditions we note the following. An uninformed firm has higher
expected costs, but expects weaker competition. The direct effect of lower costs
dominates the indirect competition effect. Therefore firms with low cost signals invest
more than uninformed firms in symmetric development equilibrium.
Observe that for symmetric expected research investments equilibrium develop-
ment investments depend in the following way on the expected research investments:
DD; (2) -(1-P)(1- r)A(8 -2) ((1 -p)(1 - r)(8 + A) + 2pQ) W
-                                                                  2 5 0,
ar               [(2 + rd)(ae + (1 -a)8) + ((1 -ra)2 + r(1 - a)a) Al
aD;(0) p(1 - p)2(8 - 2) (2 - (1 - 2r)A) W
-                                                                  2 20
ar               [(2 + rd) (ae + (1 - a)#) + ((1 -Ta)etr(1 - a)&) A]
Note that we change both r, and rj in equal amounts in the same direction. Typi-
cally when ri = rj = 1 equilibrium both development investment Di (0)  and  D; (0)
coincides  with  the full information development investment   A (2). When firms  are
expected to be fully informed, the distinction between disclosure and concealment
is no longer relevant. Rational firms anticipate their rival's disclosure strategy and
update beliefs accordingly. That is, when it is expected that firms are informed with
certainty, the "unraveling result" holds.9 When both expected research investments
9 Note  that  it  is  not the perfect correlation between firms' costs of development investments  that
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increase, it becomes more likely that firms are informed. This implies that firms ex-
pect to face stronger competition in development. This discourages investments of
firms. Therefore equilibrium investments of low cost firms decrease in the expected
research investments. An increase in expected research investments also makes an un-
informed firms more optimistic about their own costs of development. Since your rival
is less likely to be uninformed, an uninformative message from him becomes a better
indication to you that he actually is concealing good news about development costs.
This positive cost effect dominates the negative effect of expecting fiercer competition.
When we compare the symmetric development investments under partial disclo-
sure with those under mandated disclosure, we observe the following. Given a firm's
individual development cost signal, each firm invests more under partial disclosure
than under full disclosure. That is, D;(2) > 8,(2) and D;(0) > D,(0), for i = 1,2.
When firm i knows that it has low development costs, it expects weaker competition
under partial disclosure than under full disclosure, which encourages higher invest-
ments. Under voluntary disclosure an uninformed firm expects lower development
costs, but expects stronger competition. The (direct) cost effect is the dominating
effect. However, this does not mean that the overall overinvestment in development
is increased. Because a low-cost firm conceals its costs, there are contingencies, (2,0)
and (0,2), under which one of the firms remains uninformed under partial disclosure.
And this uninformed firm invests less in development than its informed counterpart:
D;(0) < Di(2)
We summarize our results on equilibrium development investments under partial
disclosure in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2 For PPC, partial disclosure (4,3,) = (0,8), ri < 1, and i = 1,2,
i 0 j,  the following holds:
(i) For ri < rj: D;(2) < D;(2) and D;(0) > D;(0),
(ii)  For ri =Tj  -r:
(ii.a) D;(2) > D;(0), while 2991 < 0 and 2 El > O, for r < 1,
(ii. b)  Di(0)  5  D;(0)  <  8,(2)  <  D;(2),  for r  <  1,
(ii.c) D;(0) = Di(0) for r = 0, while D;(2) = D;(0) = Di(2) for r - 1.
causes this result. The result is obtained through firms' inferences that are consistent with the
anticipated disclosure rule. It is not necessary that firms are actually completely informed about the
true costs of investments, and therefore have perfectly correlated costs.  It only matters that in the
firms' perception, no concealment is possible, since firms cannot credibly claim to be uninformed.
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Equilibrium Disclosure Strategies
Since the informational effect is strongest under PPC, we would expect it to outweigh
the strategic effect of information disclosure. This indeed happens in most cases,
typically. In that case we expect that full disclosure cannot be an equilil,rium, since
firms prefer to deviate by concealing good news. Nor can full concealrnent be an
equilibrium disclosure rule, because a high cost firm prefers to unilaterally disclose its
information. Furthermore, we show that there is indeed a sufficient condition under
which firms partially disclose their information irrespective of their expectations on
research investments. This is done in the remainder of this subsection.
Given expected research investments  (ri, rj), cost signals  (ei, ej), and anticipated
equilibrium development investments (D,(ei,3), 4(ej,6)), for all e and 6, we de-
termine firms' equilibrium disclosure rules. We focus on pure strategy symmetric
disclosure equilibria. First, we establish the following negative result.
Lemma 4.1  For PPC and ri <  1, with i =  1,2,  the following symmetric combina-
tions of disclosure rules are not chosen in equilibrium:
(i)  Full  disclosure  of information,   (6, 8,)  =  (2.0),
(ii)  Partial disclosum with disclosure of low cost only,  (di, 3,)  = (2,0),
(iii) No disclosure of any information, (di, 8i) = (0,0)
The proposed disclosure rules are not chosen in equilibrium, because firms have
either an incentive to conceal a low cost signal, as in (i), an incentive to disclose a
high cost signal, as in (iii), or both, as in (ii). In general firms have an incentive to
manipulate the disclosed information such that it makes their rival more pessimistic
about their costs of development investment.  This is due to the informational effect.
The indirect, strategic effect of such a disclosure rule is that it makes the rival more
optimistic about the concealing firm's development investments. The strategic effect is
however offset by the informative effect in this setting. This suggests that disclosing
only high costs of investment could be an equilibrium disclosure rule.  In the next
proposition we argue that disclosing only high costs is indeed an equilibrium rule
under a certain condition.
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Proposition 4.3 If
(8 - A)8pk - (4.3)
(8 - A) A + (2 - 8)2'
then partial disclosure (d:,3;)  = (0,0)  is an equ·ilibrium disclosure rule for any ex-
pected research investments (ri, rj) linder PPC
From this proposition we can conclude that under condition (4.3) the informational
effect dominates the strategic effect of information disclosure under PPC. By disclosing
bad news, and concealing good news, firms make their rival pessimistic about the
actual costs of development investment.
In the next subsection we assume that condition (4.3) is met. We can therefore fo-
cus attention on equilibrium candidates in which symmetric partial disclosure occurs.
In the next subsection we characterize the equilibrium research investments when par-
tial equilibrium disclosure and its resulting equilibrium development investments are
anticipated. We conclude the analysis of the PPC race by discussing what happens
when sufficient condition (4.3) is violated, and making concluding remarks.
Voluntary Disclosure Research Equilibrium
In this subsection we derive and characterize the equilibrium research investments,
given equilibrium disclosure rules 8; = (5;,3;) = (0,8), with i = 1,2, and devel-
opment investments  D-. In which direction incentives for research change  when  we
move from mandated to partial disclosure, is not immediately clear. When research
investments result in an informative signal for a firm, this enables it to be a more
aggressive development competitor and gain higher expected profits. This clearly in-
creases firms' incentives to acquire information under voluntary disclosure. However,
an uninformative signal gives rise to a trade-off. On the one hand, when both firms
are uninformed, they are less pessimistic and reach a higher expected profit under
voluntary disclosure. This gives an uninformed firm a lower incentive to invest under
voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, when the uninformed firm's rival actually
received bad news, the uninformed firm can no longer take a free-ride on this in-
formation, which gives it a bigger incentive to acquire information under voluntary
disclosure. The increased incentive of being informed and foregoing information free-
riding outweighs the disincentive of lower pessimism. We confirm this in the remainder
of this subsection.
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In the previous subsection we obser ved that under condition (4.3) of the propo-
sition firms always partially disclose information. In that case firm i's anticipated
expected profits, given research investments,   R   =   (Ri, Rj), equilibrium disclosure
rules, development investments and beliefs, are the following:
Ee{Ki(D*; 8)IR}   =   pR,71'i (D:(2),D;;2) + p(1 -R,)71 i (Di'(0),D;;2) +
+(1 - p) (Ri + (1 - Ri),Rj) 7ri (D;(0), D;; 8) +
+(1 -p)(1 - Ri)(1 - Rj) 11-i   (D; (0) ,  D;;  8)   -     R'
Z
When  we   take the first-order condition towards  RE,   and   let firms' expectations  be
realized, ri = RE, we get equilibrium condition:
pRi = PRi {lr;(2)  - 71';(0)} +  (1  -  Rj) {plr; (2) + (1  - p)71';(0)  - 71';(0)}
-   P OD;(0)2_   (Pe + (1 -p)(1 - Rj)8) D;(0)2 +
+(1-p)(1 - Rj)  #D; (D)2.
With probability p the project has low costs of development.  In that case a firm's
rival never discloses information. Therefore a marginal increase in research investment
could change a firm's revenue from that of an uninformed to that of a low-cost firm's
revenue.  When the project has high costs of investment, a firm's research investments
only makes a difference if its rival did not obtain an informative signal on the costs.
Because if the rival would get a high-cost signal, he would disclose it in equilibrium.
When we compare the research investments under required and voluntary disclo-
sure, we observe the following.
Proposition 4.4 For PPC, under condition (4.3,1 ./irms' symmetric equilibrium re-
search investments under voluntary information disclosure exceed those linder man-
dated information disclosure: R; 2 Ri for i = 1,2.  Strict inequality holds for interior
equilibrium research investments.
The intuition for this result is as follows. Since high development costs are always
disclosed in equilibrium, the incentives to acquire information on high costs are the
same under mandated and voluntary disclosure. We can therefore ignore high cost
Signals in comparing research incentives under voluntary and mandated disclosure.
The incentives to learn low development costs differ between mandated and voluntary
disclosure. When firm i's research investment results in a low cost signal, e, = 2, this
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generates more expected profit for a concealing firm than for a firm who is required to
disclose this signal. This gives bigger research incentives under voluntary disclosure.
When firm i's research investment did not result in a low cost signal, then either firm
j received good news, ej = 2, or no firm received any information.  When firm j
received good news, firm i can take a free-ride on this acquired information under
mandated disclosure. This gives firms under mandated disclosure a disincentive to
invest in research. Given that no information is disclosed, firms become less pessimistic
about their development costs, and generate a bigger expected return under voluntary
disclosure than under mandated disclosure. This gives firms a disincentive to invest in
research under voluntary disclosure. The disincentive from free-riding under mandated
disclosure outweighs the disincentive from lower pessimism under voluntary disclosure.
Therefore the total research incentive is bigger under voluntary disclosure then under
mandated disclosure.
Conditions for Partial Equilibrium Disclosure
After the characterization of equilibrium investments in the regular case of partial
disclosure, we discuss in more detail the conditions under which partial disclosure
is indeed an equilibrium disclosure rule. Condition (4.3) is a sufficient condition
for obtaining partial disclosure given any feasible combination of expected research
investments. Necessary and sufficient conditions under which firms partially disclose
information in equilibrium are stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 4.5 Under PPC partial disclosure with jirms disclosing only high cost
information,  (6*,T) = (0,8), is chosen in equilibrium ill
rj  S  min   1, (4.4)
2 (p2 +  (1  - p)8 -  a)             1
l    (1 _ AC,_ A) (2 + (1 - ri)A) f
and
f    (2- A) 0,2 -(1 -p)A)+ (1 -p)(1- ri) (20 - 82)  rj 2 max  
0, (1 - p) ((1 - ri)(0 - 0 - r,(2 - a)) a (4.5)
fori, j  -1,2   (i  +  j).
In figure 4.2 we illustrate the conditions of the proposition for parameter values
P =  i, A =  ,W-1,2 -2.0 =3. Along the horizontal axis we put fir In i's
expected research investment, ri, while along the vertical  axis  we  put  rj. The solid
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boundaries represent the b„undaries of condition (4.4), while the dashed boundaries
represent boundaries of con,lition (4.5).  For this numerical example condition (4.4) is
stronger than condition  (4.5). For other parameter values the reverse  can  hold.
rj
1                                                    ---
O.9,
0.6
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Figure 4.2: Partial disclosure region
Observe the tight link between expected information acquisition investments and
equilibrium disclosure rules in this example. Not only do the information acquisi-
tion investments depend on the anticipated equilibrium disclosure rules, but also the
equilibrium disclosure rules depend in a nontrivial way on the expected information
acquisition investments.
From the proposition we can conclude that under conditions (4.4) and (4.5) the
informational effect dominates the strategic effect of information disclosure under
PPC. When one of the conditions is violated, the strategic effect is the dorninating
effect for one of the firms. When condition (4.4) is not met, unilateral disclosure of
good news becomes profitable given beliefs that are consistent with partial disclosure.
Parameter values for which this occurs are north-west and south-east of the solid
lines in figure 4.2. Unilateral concealment of bad news becomes profitable when
condition (4.5) is not met, given beliefs consistent with partial disclosure. The set
of parameter values for which this is profitable are north-west and south-east of the
dashed lines in figure 4.2. A firm has an incentive to unilaterally disclose (resp.
conceal) to make its rival realize (resp. believe) that he is facing a "strong" competitor
in the development stage of the race. In these situations firms' expected information
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acquisition investments and beliefs are such that the informational effect plays a minor
role, and the strategic effect dominates.  In the remainder of this subsection we discuss
the intuition behind firms' incentives to deviate from partial disclosure in more detail.
We discuss two cases. In the first case there is a firm who has an incentive to disclose
good news. And in the second case there is a firm that has an incentive to conceal
bad news.
I First we consider the case in which firm i prefers to deviate from disclosure rule 8;
by disclosing a low cost signaL  Take 0 - 0, and ri  =E, rj  -1-E, with E, p > 0 small.
Suppose that firm j has equilibrium beliefs and investments, and firm i received an
informative signal, ei = 0. When p is close to zero, an uninformed firm expects to
have approximately high development costs 0, and does not expect to compete against
a low-cost rival. An uninformed firm will therefore approximately invest Di®, and
be a weak competitor in the development stage.
If firm j receives a low-cost signal, it assigns probability E to facing a low-cost
rival, and probability 1-E t o facing a weak, uninformed firm. Since firm j puts high
probability (1 - E) on facing an uninformed rival, it becomes an aggressive investor in
the development stage. Informed firm i, however, assigns high probability (1 - E) to
facing such a low-cost, aggressive rival, and probability E to facing a weak, uninformed
rival. This gives firm i a disincentive to invest in development. For low enough E
firm i's incentives to invest in development under information concealment are lower
than those under information disclosure. Therefore firm i's expected profits under
concealment are lower than its profit under disclosure. Firm i surprises its rival with
the news that it will be an aggressive investor in the development stage by disclosing its
low-cost signal.  That is, informed firm j revises its beliefs about firm i's development
investments drastically, which lowers its incentives to invest substantially. For small
enough p and E this strategic effect outweighs the informational effect of disclosure.
We illustrate this in figure 4.3, with p = 6, ri - · li, rj = *;, a =  , W - 1,
2 = 2, e = 3. For these parameter values firm i's equilibrium investments under
disclosure and concealment are fi,(2) =   0 0.400 and D;(2) = :,2"Z; Rt 0.399
respectively. Along the horizontal (resp. vertical) axis we put firm i's (resp. firm j's)
development investments. The solid lines represent the reaction functions of firms
under disclosure, and the dashed lines represent the informed firms' "reduced-form"
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Figure 4.3: Reaction to disclosure of e, = 2.
Firm i's "reduced-form" reaction curve is only slightly shifted inwards after firm i dis-
closes its information. Firm j's "reduced-form" reaction curve is much more affected
after disclosure.  This is due to the fact that this firm puts far less weight on competing
against an informed rival before disclosure takes place. Figures 4.4.a, 4.4.b and 4.4.c
sketch the development investments of concealing low-cost firms for parameter values
P =  i, 8 = 5, W - 1, 2 = 2,8 = 3, and ri = 4i,   and li, respectively On the
horizontal axis we put firm j's expected research investment rj, while on the vertical
axis we put development investments D;(2) (dotted line), and D; (2) (solid line). The
horizontal dashed line represents the level of development investments for a disclosing
low-cost  firm,  D, (0)
10 The "reduced-form" reaction curves of low-cost firms represent the relationship between   low-
cost firms' development investments after we solve the system of first-order conditions lip to the
development investments of low-cost firms.
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It is immediate from these figures that for (Ti. rj) = (,ill,  i) and (Ti, rj) = (fli,  ),
firm i's, respectively  firm j's, low-cost concealment development investments  Di (0),
respectively  D; (0), drop below the disclosure investments  b(0). This gives  firm  i,
respectively firm j, an incentive to unilaterally disclose low costs for these expected
research investments.
I In the second case there is a firm who has an incentive to conceal bad news. Take
8 = 0,  and  ri  =  E,  rj  =  1  - E,  with E, p  > 0 small. Suppose that  firm j is uninformed
and has equilibrium beliefs and investments, and firm i received a bad signal, e, = 3,
and conceals. When E iS close to zero and no information is disclosed, firm j thinks
that firm i is almost surely uninformed.  If firm i would be uninformed, it would infer
development costs 2 from firm j's uninformative message. Therefore firm j anticipates
approximately equilibrium investment  Di(0)  from firm i.   That  is,  firm j expects  an
aggressive rival after receiving an uninformative message, 6, = 0, from him. For g
close to zero firm j expects that firm i is uninformed too, which gives it expected cost of
development equal to 12+ (1-p) 8.  For low enough prior probability p firm j's expected
development cost is approximately 0.  That is, for sufficiently low p and E firm j expects
high development costs and an aggressive rival, which depresses its investments. These
investments become in fact lower than Dj (0).    Therefore,  firm  i  has an incentive  to
unilaterally conceal a high-cost signal. Concealment makes uninformed firm j expect
aggressive development competition, which lowers its investments. This strategic
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effect of concealment dominates its informational effect. We illustrate this in figure
4.5 with p -  , ri = *, rj = fli. A =  , W - 1. 2 = 2, 0 - 3. For these parameter
values firm i's equilibrium investments under disclosure and concealment are b i®=
  . 0.286 and I);(0) = j:j' :.;:  F= 0.285, respectively. Along the horizontal (resp
vertical) axis we put firm i's (resp. firm j's) development investments. The solid
lines represent the reaction functions of firms under disclosure, and the dashed lines
represent the uninformed firms' "reduced-form" reaction curves under concealment.
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Figure 4.5: Reaction to concealment of ei = 0.
Now firm j's "reduced-form" reaction curve is only slightly shifted outwards after firm
i conceals its information. Firm i's anticipated "reduced-form" reaction curve is much
more affected after disclosure. This is due to the fact that an uninformed firm i puts
high weight on having low costs of development, and competing against an informed
rival.  In fact firm i has high cost of development, and by concealing it makes its
uninformed rival invest D; (0), which is less than bj(01. Figures 4.6.a, 4.6.b and 4.6.c
sketch the development investments of uninformed firms for parameter values p  =   ,
a = i, W - 1,2 - 2,0 = 3, and ri =  li, 5 and A, respectively On the horizorital
axis  we put  firm j's expected research investment rj, while on the vertical axis  we  put
development investments DI(.0) (dotted  line),  and  D; (0)   (solid  line).    The  dashed
line represents the high-cost firms development investments after disclosure, bi(0).
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It is clear from these figures that for ri -   and rj = · uninformed firm j's invest-
ment D;(0) drops below Dj(3), while for ri = *i and rj = lii firm i's D;(0) drops
below b, (e) Therefore firm i, respectively firm j, has an incentive to unilaterally
conceal its high costs in these cases.
The preceding examples of profitable unilateral deviations rely heavily on asym-
metry between firms' expected research investments. It is immediate that conditions
(4.4) and (4.5) are always met for symmetric expected information acquisition in-
vestments: ri = rj.11 We also saw that the examples worked in particular for small
prior probability p.    For big enough prior probability  p,  i.e.   p  as in condition  (4.3),
we always get partial disclosure in equilibrium. When expected research investments
are asymmetric and the prior probability is sufficiently small, we would expect asym-
metric, and possibly mixed equilibrium disclosure rules. The characterization of the
equilibrium disclosure rules for these asymmetric cases await future research.
Conclusion (PPC)
In this section we have seen that incentives to invest in research and development
are greatly affected by disclosure regulation. When disclosure is mandated, firms
underinvest in research, while they overinvest in development in every continuation
game of the race. When disclosure is voluntary, the following observations were made
in general. Both firms conceal good news and disclose bad news to their rival for high
enough prior  p. This makes their rival pessimistic about its costs of development,
liThis follows directly from studying the conditions  (see, e. g. figure 4.2),  and  from the character-
ization of symmetric equilibrium development investments under partial disclosure in the previous
subsection. In particular, recall that for r, = rj, D;(f) 2- D,(2) and D;(0) 2 6,(0), for i = 1,2.
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and discourages development investments. Such a disclosure rule makes firms more
aggressive than under mandated disclosure in the development stage of the race.
Informed investors are more aggressive because they expect more pessimistic and
therefore weaker competitors in the development stage. Uninformed investors invest
more in development, because they are more optimistic about their own costs of
investment. It should however be noted that under voluntary disclosure there are
relatively weaker, uninformed firms in the development stage given expected research
intensities. Strategically disclosing firms invest more in research than fully disclosing
firms.
In the next section we study how these results depend on the assumption on the
correlation of development costs.
4.4 Identical Independent Distribution (IID)
In this section we study the situation in which firms are working on projects that
have independently distributed costs of development. Prior probabilities are as fol-
lows:  PrIB, =2] =p and Pr  0, =8 1 -1-p, for i=1,2, with 01 and 02 independent.
With independently distributed costs firms can no longer free ride on their rival's
information acquisition investments. A firm can only rely on its own acquired infor-
mation to know its costs of investment. It should be clear that this implies that the
informational effect of information disclosure no longer plays a role under IID. Since
the informational effect was the dominating effect under PPC, it is not surprising that
equilibrium investments and disclosure rules differ greatly compared to those in the
previous subsection. We show in what direction the race's equilibrium changes in the
remainder of this section.
IID differs in at least two respects from PPC. First, under IID costs of development
can differ among firms. Therefore investments do not only depend on the absolute
magnitude of a firm's costs, but also on how these costs relate to the rival's cost
of development.  The more efficient a firm is compared to its rival, the bigger its
equilibrium development investments. A second difference with PPC is that under
IID firms no longer learn about their own costs from observing their rival's cost signal.
Firms' expected costs of development only depend on their own cost signal, and there
is no more scope for the informational effect. This means that firms still have an
incentive to acquire information when they expect that their rival will be informed.
In the first subsection we study the benchmark investments. Second we compare
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equilibrium investments under mandated disclosure with the benchmark investments.
In subsection 3 we characterize equilibrium investments and disclosure rules under
voluntary disclosure, and compare them with investments under mandated disclosure.
Finally we conclude with some summarizing remarks. All proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
4.4.1 Benchmark: Efficient Investments   (IID)
Efficient development investments depend on both the absolute and relative magni-
tude of firms' costs. Under IID firm i's expected cost of development parameter only
depends on its own cost signal (for i = 1,2):
C  2, for ei = 2
8ECei) = 1   PR + (1 - p)8, for ei = 0
l 8, for e, = e
I Again it is best for joint profits to disclose all information e. Total expected
development profit, given signals e, is:
Ee {Ti (D; 0,)  + 7rj (D; ej)  l e}  =
(D, + Dj)1/F - 2AD,Dj-   (ef(e,)Dj + 8 (ej)1) ) .
This gives the following efficient development investments for firm i:
of(e,)Di =w- 2&4
=>  Dde) = . with i, j -  1,2, i 96 jW (8 (ej) - 2a)ef(ei)09(ej) -4A2,
Note that it is efficient when firm i is expected to be more efficient, 8 (e,) < 8 (ej),
to let it invest relatively more in development. For given rival's expected development
costs 8 (ej),  firm i's efficient development investments decrease  in its expected costs,
GE(e,). Anda firm's efficient development investments increase in its rival's expected
cost of development, given its own expected costs. The efficient expected development
profit is the following:
wi(e) E Ee (lr,(D; 8,) le) =  M/Ii,(e), for i = 1,2.
I The efficient research investments are determined by maximizing total expected
profits, given efficient development investments. Firm i's expected profit, given effi-
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cient development investmetits is:
ll,(R) = Ri {RjEe, (Ee, [Ti(ei, ej)]) + (1 - Rj)Ee: IT,(ei, 0)]} +
+(1 - Ri) {RjEej(i,(0,8j)) + (1 - Rj)Ti(0,0)} -  RT,
with
Ee,[T,(Bi, ej)1   =   04(2, ej)+(1-p)i,(8, ej) and
EB,Chi(ei,ej)) = phi(e:,2)+ (1 -p)/4(e,8),
for i, j  -  1,2 and i  0 j.   When we maximize total expected profits,  EL-i Mt(R),
towards research investment RE we obtain first-order condition:
(2 \    2
pR, = Rj Eej   Ee: 1 Z 11 ( 0*, ej )   - E 11 ( 0, ej )   +
C \£-1 £=1
\    2
+(1 - Rj) fE,i (Ex,(8" 0)/1- Ex,(0,0)}.
l \t=1 1=1
It is easy to verify that Zi=1 Te(e) is convex in Of(ei) for any 8 (ej). Hence, efficient
research investments are non-negative, Ri > 0.  Note that cost of research parameter,
p, must be "big enough" to obtain an interior research solution, Ri < 1.12 We will
assume that this holds.
4.4.2 Mandated Disclosure Equilibrium (IID)
Under mandated disclosure firms still do not internalize the negative effect of an
increase in their development investment on the expected revenue of their rival.  We
therefore expect that firms generically overinvest in development. Concerning research
we know that free-rider effects no longer play a role for firms' incentives. Firms there-
fore no longer need to underinvest in research. We show that this actually happens
in equilibrium in many cases.
i When firms are required to disclose their signals, they base their development in-
vestment decision on their relative costs of development investment.  Firm i's expected
profits given firms' signals (ei, ej) are:
Ee (lr,(D; 0,)  le)  =  Diw  -  AD,Dj  -   ef(e,)D,,.
12Due to symmetry, it sufEces to assume that:
p »Ee, <Ee, <E *(0.,0,)) - 2 1,(0,8,)}
\/=1 f=1
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Profit maximization gives equilibrium development investment and profit:
Dde) andw (GE(ej)- a)of(e,)8 (ej) - a2
*,(e)         Ee (71'i(D; 0,) le   =  07(et)fi,(e)2,
respectively,  with  i,j  -  1,2,  i  96  j.   Firm i's equilibrium development investments
depend on expected development costs Of(ei) and Of (ej) in a similar fashion as its
efficient investments do. The following is easily verified for i = 1,2 and i 0 j.
Lemma 4.2 For IID the following holds. When firms are expected to be equally elli-
cient, BE(ei) = GE(ej), both jit·ms overinvest in development.  When jirm i is mole
eBicient than jirm j, Of (e,) < ejE(ej), then ine,Oicient firm j always overinvests,
while e,Oicient jirmi overinvests  i# Of(e,)  >  (38,  ;S a)a.
A direct consequence of this lemma is that firms always overinvest in development if
2 2 3A.13
• In the research stage each firm maximizes expected profits, given anticipated equi-
librium development investments, D. Firm i's expected profit, given equilibrium de-
velopment investments, H,(R), is as H,(R) with T,(e) replaced by *,(e) Maximizing
Hi(R) towards Ri gives first-order condition:
PRi   =   RjEej {Eo: (*i(Gi, Bj)) - *,(0, ej)} +
+(1 - Rj) {Ee, (1,(Bi, 0)) - 1,(0,0)},
for i, j - 1,2, i 0 j. Since li(e) is convex in GLE(e), it is immediate that R* > 0, for
i = 1,2. In order to obtain an interior solution of this system of equations for Ri, we
have to put a lower-bound on p.
Suppose that we get symmetric, interior optimal and equilibrium research invest-
ments under mandated disclosure. Then we can illustrate that firms can either under-
or overinvest in equilibrium, depending on the parameter values.
Proposition 4.6 For IID the following holds.
(i)  If 2 2  3a,  then jirms overinvest in research,  Ri  2 Ri
(ii)  If a  =  1,  2 -   11  ,  8  =  S, then jirms underinvest  in  research,  Ri  5  Ri.
These inequalities are strict for interior equilibrium research investments.
13 Note that function £(8) := (38- A)a increases in 0, with lim f(0) =34 hence 40<3A.8-00
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Part (i) of the proposition gives a result that is opposite to that under PPC. For
223a firms always underinvest in research under PPC, while they overinvest under
IID. Because firms can no longer free-ride on research investments of their rival, their
incentives to acquire information increases.
4.4.3 Voluntary Disclosure (IID)
In this subsection we show that firms strategically preannounce innovations. A firm
who discloses good news and conceals bad news about its project discourages its rival
in further developing the innovation. Disclosure of only low development costs leaves
the rival's expected development cost unaffected, while it makes it expect strong
competition in the development stage.  We call such a disclosure choice "vaporware".
We characterize development investments under vaporware, establish that vaporware
is indeed an equilibrium disclosure rule, and discuss equilibrium research investments
under vaporware in the following three subsections, respectively.
Equilibrium Development Investments
In this subsection we derive the equilibrium development investment, given expected
research investments, (ri, rj), disclosure rules, (8*(e,), bj(ej)), and disclosed informa-
tion, (i, 6j). We focus attention to development investments under the "val)orware"
disclosure rule, (di, 3,) = (8,0) for i = 1,2. Firms' incentives to invest in development
under vaporware are driven solely by the strategic effect. The comparison between
development investments under mandated and voluntary disclosure changes because
there are no longer two conflicting effects for an uninformed firm under voluntary
disclosure. The direct effect, that increases a rival's expected cost from concealment,
vanishes under IID. Only the indirect effect, that makes a rival expect a stronger
development competitor, remains.
First we introduce the following notation: firm i who received signal ei and re-
-         I.- ..I
ceived messages (i, bj),  with 8,  = 6,(ei), invests Di(ei; bi, aj) in equilibrium.   We
distinguish three different situations for firms. Either both firms disclose, only one
firm discloses, or both firms do not disclose information. We discuss firms' equilibrium
development investments in these situations in the remainder of this subsection.
When both firms have low development costs, they disclose this cost information.
They therefore invest in development as under mandated disclosure, i.e.  D (2; 0, 2)  =
D,(2,2).
The second case is one in which firm i discloses low costs, while firm j discloses
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no information:  (4,65) = (2,0).  In that case firm j could either be a high-cost firm,
or an uninformed firm. Given vaporware disclosure, firm i assigns bellef 1-p,)L to(1-p)r
facing a high-cost firm j, and maximizes its expected development profits. This gives
first-order condition:
eD, =W-a(1- 9 Dj(0) + (1- 13)5 Dj(8)  .(1 -pg 1 - prj
Firm j has complete information about costs, and its investments follow the following
first-order conditions:
E(e)Dj(0)  =W- AD,
04(0)  =  W- AD,
Note that E(0)Dj(0) = GDj(0). When we substitute this in firm i's first-order con-
dition, and define Bj as:
Bj - (1 _ P)rj E(B)   1 - rj Q
1 - prj 1-prj
we can easily derive the following equilibrium development investments:
g (2; 2,0)      = (E(8)0 - dj A) W
GE(0)0 - 6&2 ,
D;(0; 0,2) =
8(2 - A)W
fLE(0)8 - B jd3'
D;(0,0,9) - E(0)(2 - A)WREi03 - Bj&2.
Note that firm j invests less when it received bad news, and firm j always invests less
than firm i in this equilibrium. After information (2,0) is disclosed, firms know that
firm i has lower expected marginal costs of development than firm j. This encourages
firm i, and discourages firm j to invest in development.
Since Bj is decreasing in rj, it is easily verified that D (0; 2,0) is increasing in Tj,
while both Dj*(0; 0,0) and D;(8,0,2) are decreasing in rj.  When firm j's expected
research investments increase, it is more likely that it is informed. More weight is
therefore put on competing with a high cost firm j after it sends an uninformative
message. This encourages firm i, which, in turn, discourages firm j in the development
stage of the race. In particular, when firm j is expected to be uninformed, Tj = 0,
firms invest their full disclosure amounts  Di (2,0)  and  Dj (0,2),  respectively.   When
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firm j is expected to be fully informed, rj = 1, firms invest in equilibrium A (2, 0)
and  Dj (8,2), respectively. For expected research investment levels strictly between
zero and one, firm i invests strictly between the mandated disclosure development
levels:   D,(2,0)  <  D;(2; 2,0)  <  8,(2,0)  for  0  <  rj  <  1.   For  0  <  r,  < 1, informed
firm j invests  more in development under vaporware,  D; (0,0,2)   > Dj(0,2), while
uninformed firm j invests less, D;(0,0,2) < ,85(0,2) Under vaporware informed
firm j pools with its uninformed counterpart, which discourages firm i's development
investments, and consequently encourages firm j to invest. When firm j is actually
uninformed and pools with his high cost counterpart, this encourages its rival and
discourages firm j to invest in further development of the innovation.
Finally we consider the case in which both firms disclose no information:   (i, 65)  =
(0,0). This gives first-order conditions:
E(,}D,(0) - W -4 (1,-;;, Dj(0) + (1-S, Dj(8))
el)i(A)   =   W-a< 1-7.3 Dj(0)+(1- p)r, - , )
Cl-prj 1 - prj- ujle)  1
for  i,j  -  1,2  and  i  0 j. Again this gives E(0)D,(0)  =  BD,(Q)' and equilibrium
development investments:
D;(0; 0,0)   =
0 (E(8)0 - Bja) W
Et0' 2 2 - BiB jle '
D;(8,0,0)   = E(B) (E(8)0 - Bja) W
Et°«02 - 0*0 j A2  1
for i = 1,2, and i 96 j.  Note that D;(8; 0,0) < D;(0; 0,0). An uninformed
firm is more optimistic about its development costs, and therefore invests more in
equilibrium.
When firm j's expected research investments increase, it seems more likely that
it is a firm with bad information. This encourages firm i to invest in development.
Therefore firm i's development investments are decreasing in rj. It is intuitive that:
Di(ei, 0) s D'(e,; 0,0) 5 4(e:,8) for e, E {0,8}, with D;(0; 0,0) = 4(0,0)
for n = rj = 0, and D;(8; 0,0) = D,(8,8) for ri = rj = 1.
Expected equilibrium development profits, given disclosed information (i, 65)  and
equilibrium beliefs are:
--       --
lr;(ei; 4, 4) =  ef(ei)'D;(ei; 4, 4)2,
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for i, j  -  1,2 and i 96 j. We summarize the findings of this subsection in the following
lemma:
Lemma 4.3  For IID take (6,3)  = (2,0), Ti  = Tj = r  and i = 1,2,  i 0 j.
(i) For 0<r< 1, vaporware development investments under diferent states of nature
are ordered as follolus:
(i. a)
D:(0;0,2)    <    D:(0;0,2)<D;(24 2,2)<D;(2; 2,0),  and
D;(0; 0,2) < D;(8; 0,0)<D;(0; 0,0)<D;(2;2,0);
(i. b)
aD;(e,; 4(ei),2) < 0 fore,€ {0,8},and
Bri
aD;(ei; 8,(e,), 0)
>     o fore,  e  {2,0, A};
eTi
(ii) Development investments under vaporware compare with those under mandated
disclosure as follows:
(ii. a)
8,(ei, 0)   5   D;(e,;5'(ei), 0) ri  ,(ei,0),for e, € {2,0,8},
D;(2; 2,2)    =    .5,(2,2),  D;(0;0,2) 5 .5,(0,2),  and D;(#;0,2)  2 A(#, 2);
(ii. b) For T = 0:
Di(e,; ei,4)   =   8,(e„&) with ei, 6 E {2,0},
- E(0) - - -
D; (8; 0,8j)   =   -rl)&0,6j) with bje {2,0}, and
for r = 1:
Di(ei; 6,(e:), 4(ej))  =  Di(ei, ej) with ei,ej c {2, 8},
D;(0; 0,4(ej)) = -88,(0. ej) with ej€ {2,0}.
E(0)
Equilibrium Disclosure: 6*Vaporware"
In this subsection we show that strategic preannouncements are made in equilibrium.
Disclosure of only low development costs leaves the rival's expected development cost
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unaffected, while it makes him expect strong competition in the development stage.
The strategic effect is the only effect that drives the result.
Firms anticipate equilibrium development investments when they determine their
disclosure rules. Firm i's expected profits under vaporware are the following:
Ea  lr;(ei;i,3j)  =prjx;(e,; 6,(e,),2) + (1 -prj)71·;(ei; 8,(ei), 0),
for i = 1,2. We prove the following proposition (see Appendix).
Proposition 4.7 Under IID there is an equilibrium in which jirms only disclose low
cost  information,  i. e.   they  conceal high Costs: (ai, 3;) = (2,0), for i = 1,2.
Note that the equilibrium disclosure rule under IID is the complete opposite of
the equilibrium rule under PPC. Since there no is no longer an informational effect
of disclosure, the result is completely driven by the strategic effect of disclosure.  By
preannouncing good news about your costs of development investment, you disclose
yourself as a tough competitor in the development stage of the race. This discourages
your rival's development investments. And since there is only one effect that drives this
result, it holds for all parameter values. Remember that under PPC the informational
effect is the dominating effect for most parameter values. However, we could find some
extreme, asymmetric parameter value combinations under PPC for which the strategic
effect dominated for a firm.
Equilibrium Research Investments
In this subsection we show that there are parameter values for which equilibrium
research investments under vaporware disclosure exceed those under mandated dis-
closure. The intuition for this result is the following. If a firm j receives good news,
ej = 0, then firm i expects under voluntary disclosure relatively higher profit from
being informed, and lower from remaining uninformed. This gives it an incentive to
acquire information.   When  firm  j  does not voluntarily disclose information,  bj  =  0,
firm i faces the following trade-off. When firm i would acquire low or no cost in-
formation,   ei  €  {2,0}, it would be better off under mandated disclosure. The first
observation gives the firm a disincentive to acquire information, while the second gives
the firm an incentive to acquire more information under voluntary disclosure. If firm
i would acquire bad news, e, = 8, its development equilibrium profit under voluntary
disclosure would exceed that expected equilibrium profit under mandated disclosure.
This increases the firm's incentive to acquire information under voluntary disclosure.
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The relative disincentive of information acquisition under voluntary disclosure is out-
weighed by the two extra incentives, if the spread between high and low cost is not
too big.
Before the firms choose their disclosure rules, they invest in research. Firm i's
first-order condition of maximizing expected profit toward Ri, after expectations  are
realized, is:
PRi   =   pRj{Ee, (7<(Oi; 6;(8,),e))-71 ;(0; 0,2)} +
+(1 - pRj){Ee, (lr;(8,; 6;(Bi), 0))- 71';(0; 0,0)}.
We can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 4.8 For IID and any p, W, a and 2 them is an E > 0, such that if
8 E (2,2+El, jirms equilibrium research investments under voluntary disclosure ezceed
those under mandated disclosure,   i. e.    R;   2   Ri  for  i   =   1,2.     This  holds with strict
inequality for interior equilibrium research investments.
Actually,  E  can be rather big. For example,  for p  -   ,  A  =   ,  2  -  2  and 8  - 200 firms
invest more in research under voluntary disclosure then under mandated disclosure.
Conclusion (IID)
In this subsection we have seen that firms' incentives to disclose information are
drastically changed in comparison to a race with perfect positive correlation between
development costs. Under PPC firms have an incentive to only disclose bad news
to make their rival pessimistic about costs of development, while under IID firms
discourage their rival by disclosing good news about themselves. While under PPC
the informational effect dominates, under IID the strategic effect rules. Obviously,
not only is the equilibrium disclosure rule affected, but also the firms' equilibrium
investments in R&D are affected. Generically firms overinvest in both research and
development under mandated disclosure, while they invest yet more in research under
voluntary disclosure.
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we developed a theory of information acquisition, strategic disclosure
and product development in a dynamic competitive setting. We have seen that disclo-
sure regulation substantially affects firms' investments, both in research as well as in
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development. And finally we have shown that correlation between development costs
affect equilibrium disclosure and investments dramatically.
We have given a model in which "vaporware" emerges in equilibrium. We have
seen that Microsoft's alleged strategic preannouncements, and British Biotech's at-
tempted concealment can be explained in a dynamic, strategic setting of incomplete
information. Furthermore we have been able to explain how firm's investments are
affected in the different regimes. In another extreme of the model we have shown
how to explain the increased competition after IBM's breakthrough in the research
of superconductivity.  Not only did we replicate Choi's (1991) results, but we could
also indicate in what direction equilibrium investments change when disclosure is no
longer mandated, and when costs are not perfectly correlated.
The analysis of this chapter can be extended in many directions. It would be
interesting to study the effects of introducing revenue sharing in this model.  This
could correct some of the equilibrium inefficiencies as the previous chapter suggested.
A natural next step would be to study how results change for intermediate degrees of
correlations. For intermediate degrees of correlation we would expect a more subtle
trade-off between the informational and strategic effect of information disclosure.  In
the race with identical independently distributed development cost new insights could
be gained when we study the effects of knowledge spillovers.  If part of the innova-
tion's contents are revealed after its preannouncements, this could make firms more
reluctant to preannounce innovations. These extensions of the basic analysis await
future research.
4.6 Appendix
This Appendix contains proofs to the main propositions of this chapter.  The Ap-
pendix is organized as follows. The first two subsections contain proofs to the results
under PPC. The first subsection proves underinvestment in research investments un-
der mandated disclosure. In the second subsection we prove results under voluntary
disclosure. The third subsection of the Appendix provides proofs for the model under
IID.
4.6.1 PPC: Mandated Disclosure, Proposition  4.1
Part  (i)  of the proposition is obvious.   For  part  (ii)  we  have  to  show  that  -L  <  -1..P+B P+A
Since p > 0, and the function F(z) = ;t is increasing in z, it suffices to show that
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A > B. Decompose B as follows:
28   -   (   p    +  1 -P -        1         +
M/2 (2 + a Ota E(G)+ a)
a<  P  + -1-P - 1        )
C (2 + a)2       (eta)2       (E(8) + A)2 7
and note that
A-2B -af  p  + 1-p _   1   j+
W2 ((2 + a)2       (8 + 8)2       (E(0) + 8)2)
A< p  1-p  1
\.(2+ a)(2+2a)     (#+ A)(0+2a)  -  (E(8) + a)(E(8) + 2A)  
-A2< P  1-P  1
 (2+ a)2(2+2&)    (# + A)20+28) -(E(0) + A)2(E(0) + 2a)  
which is positive, since g(8) = is convex in 8, and therefore E (9(0))  >-  (eta)2(8+2A)
g (E(8)). This proves the proposition.
4.6.2 PPC: Voluntary Disclosure
In this subsection we prove the main results concerning equilibrium choices of firms
who voluntarily disclose information. First we characterize development investments
under partial disclosure. Second we give a negative result. We show that neither full
disclosure, nor full concealment, nor partial disclosure with only disclosure of good
news can be equilibrium disclosure rules. Third we derive the sufficient condition
under which firms always partially disclose information. Then we show that equilib-
rium research investments under voluntary disclosure, exceed those under mandated
disclosure. Finally we derive necessary and sufficient conditions under which firms
partially disclosure their intermediate information in equilibrium. This is done in the
next five subsections.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
First we calculate equilibrium development investments under partial disclosure. We
substitute the equation (4.1) in equation (4.2). This transforms the uninformed firm's
reaction into:
pE;(810)D;(0) = pw - aj (w - eD; (2)) + (1 - p)rjajg(2)8.
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Substituting this expression  in the low-signal firm's reaction function, equation  (4.1),
results in the following "reduced-form" reaction function:
(O: + (1 - p)r,(1 - rj)A) W - (rje; + (1 - rj)2) D;(2)8
DICQ) =
1
(4.6)(28; + (1 - p)r,(1 - rj)&2)
fori,j - 1,2 (i 4 j), with G; =pO+ (1 -p)(1 -n)8. When we follow asimilar
procedure for the uninformed firms, we rewrite:
ajeD:(2) = ajW - (W - E;(8 0)D;(0)) + D;(0)8.
(1 - P)(1 - rj)
prj+1-rj
After substituting this in uninformed firm i's reaction function, equation (4.2), this
gives his "reduced-form" reaction function:
(2(1 - rj + prj) + (1 - p)(1 - ri)rjA) W - (rjO; + (1 - rj)2) D;(0)8
D;(0) = (28; + (1 - p)(1 - ri)rjA2)
(4.7)
for i, j =  1,2  (i  96 j).  From the "reduced-form" reaction functions we can derive the
equilibrium development investments.
(i) After calculating the equilibrium development investments,  we note that  D; (0) -
D;(0) is proportional to p(1 -p)eli/(2- A)(0 - 2)(rj - ri), which provides the char-
acterization directly.
(ii) For ri = rj equilibrium development investments follow directly from the
"reduced-form" reaction functions. Comparisons between investment levels are straight-
forward. This completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.1
(i) Disclosure rule (4,6)  = (2,0) gives full disclosure of information. Consequently,
firms i's development investments are D,(2), D,(0) and 8,(A), with i =  1,2.  Take
rj < 1, and suppose full disclosure can be sustained as an equilibrium. Then the
equilibrium development investments are as in the previous section. But when low-
cost firm i anticipates these investments, it has an incentive to conceal its information.
Given equilibrium beliefs, disclosure choice  6, (2)   =  0 only affects investments  when
firm j is uninformed, which happens with positive probability (rj <  1). An uninformed
firm  j who receives message  8,   =   0  from  its rival invests  4 (0), which  is  less  than
the investment Dj (2) after disclosure of « = 8. Given rj < 1, firm j's expected
development investments are:
rjbj(2)  + (1  - rj)4(0)  <  4(2)
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Therefore firm i's optimal deviation investment, and consequently its expected devi-
ation profit, is bigger than in the proposed equilibrium. Consequently full disclosure
cannot be sustained as an equilibrium.
(ii) Intuitive given (i) and (iii).
(iii) Disclosure rule (d, 3)  = (0,0) discloses no information about cost signals.  In this
case firms do not update their beliefs after disclosure. They can only condition their
development investments on their own observed cost signal. Firm i invests Dy(0),
D;(0) and D;(8) in development after receiving ei = 2,0 and 0, respectively. These
investments are determined by the following first-order conditions:
OD;(2)  =  W- (rjl);(2) + (1- rj)D;(0)) A
01)0(0)   =  W- (rjD;(0) + (1- rj)D;(0)) A
E(0)1);(0)   =   W- (rjpl);(2) + rj(1 - p)D;(0) + (1- rj)D;(0)) A
Note that E(8)Dio(0) - PQD;(2) + (1 - p)OD;(8). Given these investments and
beliefs we can show that a firm with signal ei = 0 has an incentive to disclose
its information.  If the high-signal firm i would choose investments I)9(8) it would
receive an expected profit of  #Dio(8)2. When this firm discloses its information it
gets  eD,(8)2. Deviating from concealment is therefore profitable whenever D;(0) <
D,(0) = 35. We use expression
E(8)Dio(0) = POD* (2) + (1 - p)#Dio(B)
to reduce the development equilibrium conditions under no-disclosure to the following
system of equations:
/      1 -r·   )
21);(0)   =   W -       -1- 1-- 1*,A 1 D;(2)A _ 1__11 ( 1 - p)OD;(0) A<rj '  ECM rx./1 E(B)
/r·   1  r\
=   W-1 1+ -li 1 (PRD;(2) + (1- p)AD;(#)) A t\pe
E (01     )
 rj(1 - p)0   0 -Dj(8)Ljpe-
#Dio(#)   =   W- rjD;(8) A - 1-ZIL (peD;(2) + (1- p)#D;(8)) A.
E(8)
After substituting the second equation into the first, we write the low-signal firm i's
optimal development investments as a function of firms' high-signal investments only:
(1 - rj)p/E(0)D;(2)   =   -rjE(8)W + rjECO)D;(0)8 +
+ (rjE(8) + (1 - rj)pg) eD;(0).
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When we substitute this expression back in the second equation of the system, we
get the high-signal firm's "reduced-form" reaction function. When this function does
not intersect with the set {D E [0,1]210,2 35}, any equilibrium investment D;(8)
is  smaller  than  A (8). Since the "reduced-form" reaction function slopes downward,
--
it  sufftces  to  show  that a firm's optimal reaction to rival's investment   Dj (8) under
concealment is smaller than .Di (8). When we substract 83 (8) from firm i's "reduced-
form"  reaction  to  Dj (8), we obtain:
-pae(1 - ri)(1 - rj)(8 - 2)11/
< 0.
(0 + a)E(0) ((1 - r,)24 + ri(1 - rj)82)  -
Since this is negative for all (n, rj) < (1,1), unilaterally disclosing 8 is profitable for
firm i. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
The proof to this proposition directly follows from necessary and sufficient conditions
(4.4) and (4.5) of proposition 4.5. Observe that the critical values for Tj of these
conditions are increasing  in  4. It therefore suffices to evaluate the critical value of
condition (4.4) at ri = 0, and find the prior probabilities p for which the critical value
exceeds 1. This happens for all p in (4.3). For critical value (4.5) it suffices to evaluate
it  at  ri,  and  find  the p for which  it  does not exceed  zero. This happens  for p  2  ,&,
which is satisfied under  (4.3). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.4
Equilibrium research investments under voluntary disclosure are bigger than under
mandated disclosure whenever marginal revenues of research under voluntary disclo-
sure exceed marginal revenues under mandated disclosure. Since high-cost firms earn
identical development profits under mandated and voluntary disclosure, we can ig-
nore these profit levels in the comparison of marginal revenues. We can rewrite the
equilibrium marginal revenues of research under required disclosure, net of high-cost
firms' revenues, to:
*772(R)   E   p 2&(2)2 -   (PR + (1 - p)(1 - Rj)#) 8,(0)2 +
1 /-
-PR,52 <D,(2)2 -  D,(0)2)
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Equilibrium marginal revenues of research under voluntary disclosure, net of high-cost
firms' revenues, are:
MR*(R) . p OD:(2)2 -   (p2 + (1 - p)(1 - Rj)8) D;(0)2.
Since we focus on symmetric research equilibria, we take R, = Rj = R. We must
check that for all R:
1  /
MR*(R) - M-R(R)     =    P22 (DI (2)2 -  D,(2)2   + PR 2  .D,(2)2 - .Di(0)2 
-  (1,2 + (1 -p)(1 - R)0)  D;(0)2 - .A(0)2 
exceeds  zero. We already  know  that  D; (2)  >  Di (2). Define the following function:
G(R) a   (pg + (1 - p)(1 - R) )  D;(0)2 - A(0)2   - PR 2  D,(2)2 - Di(0)2 .
Now we only need to show that G(R) 5 0 for all R. Observe that for R = 0,
D;(0) = Di(0), which makes G(0) = 0. For R = 1, D;(0) = D,(2), which implies
that G(1) = 0. Therefore, for G(R) 5 0 for all R E (0,1), it suffices to show that G
is convex in R. Note that:
1 &
G"(R) = 5.-{(pet(1 -p)(1 -R)#)DI(0)2}dR,
- eD:(0) -dD:(0)1
=   D;(0) < (pO + (1 - p)(1 - R)0)     ct,122     - 2(1 - p)0     R    ,  +
CdD,*(0)\ 2
+ (pg + (1 - p)(1 - R)#) t    iR    )
It is easily verified that:
(pg + (1 - p)(1 - R)8) - 2(1 - p)8
- eD'(0) -dD:(0)
dR2 dR
2W(1 - p)pg(0 - 2)8,(R; 0)=
(p2(2 + A) + (1 -p)(1- R)(0 + A)(2+Ra)) 3'
with
g(R; 8)   E   (1 -p)2(1-R)3 2 + (1 -p)(1 -R)2(3PG+(1 -p)(1 -R)a) jet





= (1 -p)(1 - R)28 ((1 -p)(1 - R)(28 + A) + 3pd) 20,
and 8 > 2, we obtain:
9(R; 0)29(R; 2)=2(2 + A)(pO + (1 -p)8(plf + (1 -R)3))  >0.
Therefore G"(R) > 0, which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.5
Suppose 5* is the equilibrium disclosure rule. This disclosure rule gives equilibrium
development investments  D' (2),   D-(0)   and  D- (8). Consider  the two possible  de-
viations from the equilibrium disclosure rule. First, a firm with a low cost signal,
ei = 2, can choose to disclose its information. Disclosing low development costs,
gives firm i development investments D,(2) and profits  2.D,(2)2. Concealment of
low costs gives expected equilibrium profits   OD; (2) 2. Therefore deviation  from  the
equilibrium disclosure  rule  is not profitable whenever  D,(2)  5  D; (2).   After we solve
for the equilibrium investment we obtain:
D;(2) - D,(2) = W(1 - p)(8 - 2)(1 - ri)(1 - rj)AZ (2 + a)ZN
with
ZN -   (1 -p)(ri(1 -rj) + (1 - 7.Jrj) 0 + p2(ri + rj- Tirj)2] 2-(22 - 82)+
+(1 - ri)(1 - rj)  22 ((P2 + (1 - P)  2 _ A2  _ (1 - P)21.,rja2 (02 - 82) 
2 (1 - ri)(1 - rj)  22 ((PO + (1 - p)0 2 _ A2  _ (1 - p)21.,Tja2(Q2 _ A2) 
= (1 - ri)(1 - rj) [22  2(22 _ 82) + 2p(1 - p)(28 - AY)) +
+  1 - p 2(82 - 82) (22 - Tirja2)  2 0,
and
Z  = (1 - p)(0 - a) ((1 - ri)2 - r,(1 - rj)a) + 1,2(2 - a)
Note that ZA 20 under condition (4.4).
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Second, a firm with a high cost signal, ei = 0, call choose to conceal its informa-
tion. After disclosing high costs, firm i receives profit  OD;(#)2. After stating bi = 0,
high-cost firm i only changes firm j's development investments when ej - 0. In
that  case  firm j chooses investment  D; (0) instead of equilibrium investment  D; (8)
Consequently firm i's deviation investment and profits are respectively:
#Di =w- (rjD;(0) + (1 - rj)D;(0)) A and li(018) =  8.82
Therefore,   when  rj   <   1   deviation  from  6;   is not profitable whenever  A   S   D; (8),
or D;(0) 2 D;(8). We follow the similar procedure as for the low-signal firms. We
rewrite the condition to:
D; (0)  -  Dj (8) = 20,WPQ0 - E)ZDH
(8 + A)ZN
where
ZIf =p2(2 - a) + (1 -p)[(1 - rj) (2 - ria) 8 - (1 - ri)(2 - rja)a],
and  Z#  2 O gives condition  (4.5). This completes the proof.
4.6.3 IID: Mandated Disclosure, Proposition 4.6
For the comparison between optimal and equilibrium research investments we need to
compare marginal research revenues under total profit maximization and mandated
disclosure. We do this in the remainder of the proof for part (i) and (ii) respectively.
(i) Overinvestment in research is obtained when marginal research revenue in equilib-
rium exceeds marginal revenue under total profit maximization. Define the following
function:
2
Hi(#i, Oj)    E    E Wt(Bi, Bj) - *i(Oi, ej)
1=l
=     97  < 0,  + ej  -  #A  _   0,(ej  -  Li)2  )2     edj - 4&2 (Biej - a2 2  |
A sufficient condition for overinvestment  by  firm  i  is  then  that  for  all  Rj:
RjEej {PHi(2,03) + (1 - p)H,(8, Bj) - HiCE(8),01)} +
+(1 - Rj) {PHi(2, E(0)) + (1 - p)Hi(8, E(8)) - H,(E(8), E(8))} < 0.
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If function  Hi is concave  in  0,  for  all  Bj,  then this sufficient condition  is  met  for  any
Rj and p. The second-order derivative of Hi towards 8, is:
FH,(ei, 8.) C (ej- 28)2    -  (ej - a)2(8,Oj + 282) \
' = 11/0.1
80&                      '  C (04 - 4893 (Bi j- a2 4       | .
Weevaluate this function in  (8*, 81)  =  (Gi +38, Bj +3A),  with 82  2 0 for f - i,j,
which gives:
82Hi(8)
1 =   1,1/(ej + 3A)  (8, + a)2
882 |8=8+38 ( [ (Of + 3& ) (bj + 3 A ) - 4 a 213
+
(Aj + 2A ) 21 ( 8: + 3a ) (8j + 3a ) + 2 A21 j
[0 + 3&)(85 + 3&) - 8214         
W(Oj + 3A)/4(8)=
10 + 3A) (Oj + 3 a) - 4a213 ICA + 3 A) (85 + 3a) - A214 '
with
hi(8)   ..   (ej + Lj)2[(0, + 3Lj)(ej + 3LJ) - Lj2l4 +
-(ej + 2A)21(#i + 3A)(Oj + 3A) + 2a211(Oi + 3a)(83 + 3a) - 4A213
=   -Al<(Ej + 38)4(23j + 38) + 2820:(Oj + 38)3(Oj + 2&) +
-2 -
4-2Ae, (e, 4- 38)(ej + 3A)3(98,2 + 36« + 32&2) 4-
+ 2A33, (83 + 38 ) (2 73; + 270 dej  + 999A'32 + 1580« + 876 A4 )
+ as(27< + 378210  + 1575 82< + 2564 A381 + 1404&4)].
Since h,(8)  < 0 for all 8 2 0, function Hi is concave in Ge, for all 0„ 8j 2 3A.  This
completes the proof.
(ii) The prove to research underinvestment is straightforward. This completes the
proof.
4.6.4 IID: Voluntary Disclosure
In this subsection of the Appendix we prove the propositions on equilibrium invest-
ments under voluntary disclosure. We first prove that vaporware disclosure is indeed
an equilibrium disclosure rule. Second we show that equilibrium research investments
under voluntary disclosure can be higher than those under mandated disclosure, for
8 close enough to 2.
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Proof of Proposition 4.7
Distinguish two deviations from the "vaporware" equilibrium. First, consider a 8-firm
i. In equilibrium it receives expected profits:
Elj ' 71';(0; 0,6j)  =  e (prjD;(8; 0,2)2 + (1 - prj)Di*(0; 0,0)2).
It could, however, unilaterally choose to disclose its costs. It would then receive
expected profits:
E33  71'i(0;0,31)   =   0  prj,81(#, 2)2 + (1 - prj)h,(0,0,0)2   ,
where ACe; O,0) solves
C 1- r. (1 - p)T:      - )#Di  = w-a l ' Dj(0) + ' Djte)  Cl-prj 1-prj
E(8)Dj(0) =  W -ADi
#Dj(8)   -  W- AD:,
and is therefore
D,(8; 0,0) = (E(0)0 - B,) W
(E(e)82 - d,a,).
It is straightforward to verify that D;(8; 0,2) > 11(8,2) and D;(8; 0,0) > Di(8; 0,0).
And, therefore, 4, <,r:(8;0,6j)} > 4, <71';(8,-8,3,) . Secondly, a 2-firm i
should
not have an incentive to conceal its costs. Expected equilibrium profit from disclosure
is:
Ejj <gr;(24 8,6)'   =  2 (prjD;(2; 2,0)2 + (1- prj)D;(2; 2,0)2),
while expected profit from concealment is maximized for OD,(21 0, 65) = BD;(81 0, bj),
with 6  c  {2,0}. This gives expected deviation profit  of:
E3j  <ir; (2; 0, bj)  =     (prjD; (A; 0,9)2  + (1 - prj) D; (0; 0,0)2).
The deviation for 2-firm i is unprofitable because #DZ (25 2,2) - #D; (8, 0,2) equals
[Q (GE(e) - 62 a,) - E(0) (22 - ,!f#) a')1 (0 - a)w » «
(0 - a2) (GE(0)0 - Bja2)
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and eD:(2-; 2,0)  - OD:(8; 0,0) equals
Bj 82 (E(8)0 - Bie) (E(8)0 - Bia) w
> 0.
(GE(8)8 - iyja2)  E(8)2#2 - /3,4 a2 
This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.8
We show that in equilibrium firms invest more under voluntary disclosure than under
mandated disclosure, by showing that marginal research investments under voluntary
disclosure exceeds those under mandated disclosure. We focus on symmetric research
equilibria, ri = Ri = R for i = 1,2. We rewrite the marginal research revenues under
mandated disclosure as follows:
PR    =   PR{Ee, (4(4,2))-1,(0,2)}+
+(1 - pR) < [Ee, (*,(ei, 0)) - *,(0,8)1 +
f (1 - p)R
ll_PR
I
1-R  [Ee, (*i(ei, 0)) - *,(0,0)1   pR
The comparison of marginal research revenues given €5 - 2 follows directly from
lemma 4.3:
Ee, (,r;(Bi; 6;(Bi),2)) 2. Ee: (*i(Gi, 2-)),
since
D;(2; 2,2)  = D,(2,2), and  D;(8,0,2)  2  Di(8,2),
while
A;(0; 0,2)  5 *i(0,2) since D;(0; 0,2) S D,(0,2).
In the remainder of this proof we show that for 8 close to 2 and given ej 02, expected
marginal research revenues under voluntary disclosure exceed those under mandated
disclosure, i.e. K(R; 0) > 0, with:
K(Rie) a Ee,(7<(8,;6;(8,),0))-71';(0,0,0) +
(1 - p)R
_           [Ee, CE,(Bi, 0))-5,(0,8)1 +1-PR
1-R
[Ee. (r,(8*,0)) - *i(0,0)1·
1-PR
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We make the following steps. First we show that for extreme investment level
R = 0 the inequality holds. Second we show that the difference between marginal
research revenues under voluntary and mandated disclosure increases in R, if 8 is close
to 2. From lernma 4.3 (ii.b) we conclude that for R = 0:
Ee, (7<(01; 6;(81), 0)) - lr;(0; 0,0) =
-E(0)2 -
peD,(2,0)2 + (1 - p)0--32   D,(0,0)2 - E(e).8,(0,0)2 >
Ee, (*i(Bi, 0)) - *i(0,0),
Given that K(0) > 0, it suffices to show that for 8 sufficiently close to 2, K'(R) > 0
to prove that K(R) > 0 for all R. It is straightforward to show that:
K'(R; 8)=     1- P     (/c.(R, 8)- k(8)   W2,(1 - PR)2 \
with
k*(12;0) E 2AGE(0)(0 - E(8)) <p2(2- a)(E(8)0 - Ba) _8- (1 -p)E(8))
C     (RE(8)8 - da2 )3 (E(0)0 + BA)3 3
and
k(e) - [Ee, (*,(ei, e)) - *,(0,0)1 - [Ee, (*,(8„0)) - *,(0,0)]
It is easily verified that limel, K'(R; 0) = 0 for any R.  For K'(R; 0)  > 0 to hold for
some 8>2,i t suffces to show that lime.- (aK'(f,e)  >0. For then there is an E>012 \   08
such that K'(R) > 0 for 8 E (2,2 + El. When we differentiate K'(R) to 8 and evaluate
it in 812, we obtain the following:
lim I 1 =  lim l 1 -lim 1-    1CaK'(R;8)) Cak*'(R;Q)) (ak(0) \
812 \ Del )  2 \   08   j   zi  ( 08 j
-   2Ap212 -(2 -a)1 _ 280.1-p-(1 -p)+11
(2 - a) (2 + a)3 (2 - a)(2 + a)3
2ay
= > 0.
(2 - a)(2 + 8)3
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Summary in Dutch
Essays over Prikkels in Regulering en Innovatie
Het proefschrift analyseert problemen van prikkels en informatie bij strategisch in-
teractieve bedrijven.  In het bijzonder worden problemen in optimale regulering en
wedrennen van onderzoek en ontwikkeling (0&0) bestudeerd. We gaan in het onder-
staande kort in op de econonlische aspecten van deze twee problemen.
In de analyse van optimale regulering is asymmetrische informatie tussen de reg-
ulator en de industrie over productiekosten belangrijk. Omdat bedrijven superieure
informatie en andere belangen hebben dan de regulator, moet de regulator aan bedri-
jven financiele prikkels geven om hen optimaal te laten produceren. In de industrie
worden twee complementaire goederen geproduceerd. Het probleem voor de regula-
tor is om de industrie zodanig in te richten dat de prikkels van bedrijven voor het
waarheidsgetrouw rapporteren van de productiekosten en participatie tegen minimale
kosten worden verkregen. De regulator kiest tussen een monopolist die twee producten
produceert of twee onafnankelijke bedrijven die ieder 66n product produceren. Naast
de organisatie van de industrie, kiest de regulator subsidies en de kans waarmee het
eindproduct geproduceerd moet worden.
Bij de keuze tussen monopolistische en onafhankelijke productie weegt de regula-
tor twee effecten tegen elkaar af. Aan de ene kant kan de regulator informatiepacht
besparen door kostenrapportages van twee onafhankelijke bedrijven met elkaar te
vergelijken en de reguleringsinstrumenten van deze vergelijking af te laten hangen.
Als de kosten gecorreleerd zijn, geven de kosten van een bedrijf een indicatie voor
de kosten van het andere bedrijf. In dat geval kan op een deel van de subsidie be-
spaard worden. Hoe sterker de correlatie, des te scherper de indicatie die kosten over
elkaar geven en des te meer subsidie bespaard kan worden. Dit effect noemen we het
maatstaf-competitie effect. Een monopolist kan zijn kostenrapportages coordineren,
waardoor prikkels op basis van kostenvergelijking nutteloos zijn. Aan de andere kant
kan de regulator subsidies besparen wegens het feit dat een monopolistische producent
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zijn kostenreportages op elkaar af kan stemmen. Als onafhankelijke producenten te
hoge kosten rapporteren, dan oefenen ze een extern effect op elkaar uit. Als bekend
zou zijn dat 66n bedrijf te hoge kosten rapporteert, zou het andere bedrijf minder
prikkels hebben om zijn kosten ook te hoog te rapporteren. Onafhankelijke bedri-
jven kunnen echter hun kostenreportages niet op elkaar afstemmen, zodat ze door dit
externe effect meer subsidie moeten krijgen om de juiste prikkels te geven.  Een mo-
nopolistische producent internaliseert dit externe effect, hetgeen subsidies bespaart
voor de regulator. Dit effect noemen we het internalisatie effect. Zowel de corre-
latie tussen productiekosten, als de beperkte aansprakelijkheid van bedrijven spelen
bij de afweging tussen deze twee effecten een rol. Een gereguleerde industrie met
beperkt aansprakelijke bedrijven wordt het best als volgt georganiseerd. Voor lage
correlatie kiest de regulator voor monopolistische productie, omdat het internalisatie
effect domineert, terwijl voor hoge correlatie onafhankelijke producenten beter zijn
voor de welvaart. In hoofdstuk 2 gaan we in meer detail in op deze twee effecten en
de optimale reguleringsinstrumenten die deze effecten in zich dragen.
Naast dit reguleringsprobleem onderzoeken we problemen van prikkels in dynamis-
che 0&0-wedrennen. Een speciale eigenschap van het probleem is dat bedrijven leren
terwijl ze investeren in 0&0. De interactie tussen de prikkels van bedrijven om te
leren en communiceren over hull uitvinding en prikkels om de uitvinding verder te
ontwikkelen worden onder verschillende omstandigheden bestudeerd. Bedrijven leren
over hun ontwikkelingskosten en ze leren door in onderzoek te investeren. Dat wil
zeggen, onderzoek geeft een bedrijf informatie over zijn ontwikkelingskosten. Nadat
bedrijven leren, beslissen ze welke informatie ze willen rapporteren aan hun concur-
rent. Twee effecten van rapportage staan centraal in de analyse. Ten eerste heeft
een prijsrapportage van een bedrijf een strategisch effect. Het geeft zijn rivaal infor-
matie over de relatieve ontwikkelingskostenefficientie van het bedrijf. Als verwacht
wordt dat een bedrijf een efficiente investeerder in ontwikkeling is, dan schrikt dit
de ontwikkelingsinvesteringen van zijn rivaal af. Dit effect zou bedrijven daarom een
prikkel geven om hun kostenreportage zo te kiezen dat ze alleen goed nieuws over
zichzelf rapporteren. Het tweede effect is een informatief effect en is tegenovergesteld
aan het strategische effect. Als ontwikkelingskosten positief gecorreleerd zijn, dan
geeft de kostenrapportage van een bedrijf niet alleen informatie over zijn eigen on-
twikkelingskosten, maar geeft ook zijn rivaal informatie over zijn ontwikkelingskosten.
Dit geeft bedrijven een prikkel om alleen slecht nieuws aan hun rivaal te rapporteren.
Slecht nieuws schrikt de rivaal wegens dit effect af. De interactie tussen deze twee
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tegenovergestelde effecten bepaalt de prikkels die bedrijven hebben om informatie te
verzamelen, te rapporteren en verder te ontwikkelen op basis van hun informatie.
In hoofdstuk 3 beschouwen we een 0&0 wedren waarin bedrijven altijd leren over
de kosten van ontwikkelingsinvesteringen. Bedrijven leren echter imperfect. Omdat
bedrijven altijd leren, is het bekend dat een bedrijf gernformeerd is. Wat niet bekend
is, is welke informatie een bedrijf bezit. De kosten van projecten zijn perfect gecor-
releerd en daarom domineert het informatief effect. Wanneer bedrijven opbrengsten
van de innovatie delen, dan wordt dit effect tegengewerkt door vrijbuiterseffecten. De
relatieve kracht van de twee effecten bepaalt de prikkel van bedrijven om te investeren
en om informatie prijs te geven. De verifieerbaarheid van informatie is cruciaal in de
bepaling van hoe veel informatie er kan en wordt prijsgegeven tussen bedrijven. Niet-
verifieerbare informatie kan nooit geloofwaardig worden overgebracht, terwijl verifieer-
bare informatie alleen voor extreme opbrengstenverdelingen tot ontrafeling leidt.
In hoofdstuk 4 analyseren we een 0&0 wedren waarin bedrijven anders leren.
Wanneer een bedrij f leert, dan leert hij perfect.  Maar of een bedrij f leert is onzeker en
hangt van zijn onderzoeksinvesteringen af. Omdat de vergaarde informatie verifieer-
baar is, staan bedrijven voor de keuze deze informatie prijs te geven of te beweren
niet gernformeerd te zijn.  In dit hoofdstuk bestuderen we de effecten van openbar-
ingsregulering op prikkels van bedrijven om te investeren in onderzoek en ontwikkel-
ing. Bovendien onderzoeken we de invloed van correlatie tussen ontwikkelingskosten
op de prikkels van bedrijven om informatie prijs te geven en om te investeren. Als
informatie perfect gecorreleerd is, dan domineert het informatieve effect en bedri-
jven geven alleen slecht nieuws prijs. Slecht nieuws maakt een rivaal pessimistischer
over zijn ontwikkelingskosten en ontmoedigt zijn ontwikkelingsinvesteringen.  Voor
onafhankelijk verdeelde kosten verdwijnt het informatieve effect en het strategische
effect heerst. Daarom geven bedrijven hun informatie alleen prijs als ze efficiente on-
twikkelingsinvesteerders zijn. En bedrijven investeren agressief in zowel onderzoek als
ontwikkeling.
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